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Preface 
The 1976 Touche Ross/University of Kansas Symposium on Audi t ing Prob-
lems constitutes the third offering i n this biennial series of symposia designed to 
bring practitioners and educators involved i n the field of auditing together to 
study matters of mutual interest and concern. O n the assumption that the series 
is now firmly established, I have chosen to identify this volume of the proceedings 
both simply and explicitly as Auditing Symposium III. 
A s before, planning efforts were directed toward a balance between practi-
tioners and educators i n the preparation of papers, wi th the discussant for each 
paper from the opposite group, and with a similar balance i n the invited partici-
pants. A l l papers, except for the traditional evening address on a more general 
topic, were distributed i n advance, making it possible for the preparer to l imit 
comments to summary remarks or observations about the paper and leaving more 
than an hour for the discussant's remarks and the ensuing open discussion. 
Although no attempt has been made to summarize the informal discussions, both 
the preparers and the designated discussants were afforded the opportunity to 
modify their papers and remarks to reflect matters that arose during the general 
discussion. 
The inclusion of the paper " A n Audi t ing Perspective of the Historical De-
velopment of Internal Contro l " extends my endeavor to assemble a series of 
papers that w i l l eventually provide a comprehensive dissertation on the develop-
ment and heritage of the auditing segment of the accounting discipline. The 
additional papers reflect a unifying theme only in that they were chosen with 
the expectation that the subject would be of current interest to the participants 
and to the readers of this volume of collected papers. 
As has been true for each of these symposia, I take ful l responsibility for the 
selection of topics for both the invited and the submitted papers, but the views 
expressed i n the papers are those of the preparers, and, of course, not necessarily 
those of the organizations wi th which they are affiliated. Those interested i n these 
auditing symposia are once again invited to submit papers, with a cut-off date of 
September 1, 1977 for papers to be considered for the 1978 symposium. 
Audi t ing Symposium III for 1976 and the printing of these Proceedings would 
not have been possible without the financial support of Touche Ross Foundation, 
and i n that connection I also wish to acknowledge the gracious personal assistance 
of Jerry Jackson, managing partner of the Kansas City office of Touche Ross & C o . 
H O W A R D F . S T E T T L E R 
October, 1976 
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An Auditing Perspective of the 
Historical Development of Internal Control 
Willie Hackett and Sybil C. Mobley 
Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University 
It is conceivable that internal control preceded auditing and other elements of 
the accounting profession. Internal Control emerged as a common-sense, natural 
product of the profit motive. As soon as the first entrepreneurs contrived a 
method for making a profit, they contrived ways of controlling and protecting 
that profit. As soon as it was determined that profits could be expanded by the 
employment of others, it was recognized that complete trust was not the most 
profitable policy and that some form of control should be established. 
This paper recapitulates the findings of accounting historians who have studied 
the historical development of internal control; however, it should be recognized 
that the history of internal control is still being researched and documented. 
Early Beginnings 
Kenneth Most 1 has stated that there is concrete evidence that internal control 
existed i n the Mesopotamian civilization as early as 3600 B .C . Most points out 
that the Sumerians recorded commercial transactions on stone dating back to 
3600 B.C. and 400 years later on clay. It was customary for summaries to be 
prepared by scribes other than those who had provided the original lists of 
payments. Further, the documents of the period reveal tiny marks, dots, ticks, 
and circles at the side of the figures, indicating that checking had been performed. 
Wi l l i a rd Stone noted 2 that i n ancient Egypt, i n the Pharaoh's central finance 
department, the "house of silver of the treasury," internal control and auditing 
were i n use. Scribes prepared records of receipts and disbursements of silver, 
corn and other commodities. One recorded on papyrus the amount brought to 
the warehouse and another checked the emptying of the containers on the roof 
as it was poured into the storage building. A n audit was performed by a third 
scribe who compared these two records. A n official order was required for with-
drawals and the scribe i n charge of the storehouse recorded the disbursements 
and retained the order. H i s records of receipts, disbursements and inventory 
balances were periodically audited by another scribe or his superior. 
Stone gives an account of internal control i n the Persian civilization of 549 to 
330 B .C . H e reports that Darius (521-486 B.C.) used government scribes, called 
the "King ' s eyes and ears," to perform an important function i n the control of 
his extensive empire. For convenience of administration the empire was sectioned 
into satrapies each with a "satrap" as the civil administrator and tax collector. 
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Government of these provincial units was divided; the troops were under a 
general, and a royal secretary performed the duties of an internal auditor, re-
porting to the King's minister on the activities of the satrap and the general. The 
royal secretary accounted for taxes collected and remitted to the K i n g . 
The "King ' s eyes and ears," accompanied by a military escort, made surprise 
audits of the affairs of the provinces. These traveling government auditors were 
empowered to examine all records, question the satrap, the royal secretary, or any 
other officials and to take immediate corrective action if it was believed to be 
necessary. 
Extending his historical account, Stone points out that like the Persian Empire 
before it, the Roman Empire made effective use of accounting and auditing to 
control the generals of conquered territories. The counterpart of the "King's eyes 
and ears" were the "quaestors," who came into being about 200 B .C . They were 
financial officers responsible to Rome, who had custody of the treasury, super-
vised the scribes i n their duties of recording treasury receipts and disbursements, 
and examined the accounts of the governors of subjugated countries. The 
quaestors were required to report periodically to Rome and to have their records 
heard by an examiner. The word "auditor" came into use through this practice. 
The Roman Empire made use of a complete system of checks and counter-
checks. They separated the duties of collecting revenue, authorizing expenditures, 
maintaining custody of cash, and recording financial transactions. Expenditures 
were required to be supported by documents disclosing the identity and title of 
the creditor and attesting the completion of the work or receipt of the goods 
called for by the order. Magistrates authorized payment on the basis of these 
documents and after disbursement, treasury scribes recorded all transactions. 
Quaestors supervised and audited all government financial transactions. Tax 
examiners also were used i n Rome and played a prominent role i n the collection 
of government revenues. 
The Holy Roman Empire under the leadership of Charlemagne followed the 
example of the Persian and Roman Empires i n using government auditors to 
control the affairs of state. Missi dominici, "emissaries of the master," were sent 
to review the affairs of the various administrators. The emissaries carried instruc-
tions from Charlemagne to local officials, made audits of their records, reviewed 
their actions, and reported the results to the K i n g . Unfortunately for the Empire, 
after the death of Charlemagne (825 A . D . ) no strong organizer appeared to take 
his place and within one generation the missi dominici were disbanded, control 
of the local rulers was lost, and the Empire disintegrated. 
In the middle ages, accounting, along with the other arts, suffered a decline 
because of the general disorganized condition of government and the economy 
throughout Europe. Gradually, however, accounting was reestablished. 
R. Gene Brown 3 has pointed out that prior to 1500, accounting was concerned 
primarily with governmental and family units. The practice of internal control 
was evidenced by the use of two scribes who kept independent records of the 
same transactions designed to prevent defalcations within the treasuries of the 
ancient rulers. A secondary objective was assurance of accuracy i n reporting. 
Inventories were periodically taken to prove accountability and to establish the 
accuracy of the accounting records. 
D u r i n g the period 1500-1850, which L . Fitzpatrick, B. F . Foster and W i l l i a m 
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Jackson 4 have identified as the period in which a standardized system of double-
entry accounting became regarded as necessary, the recognition of the im-
portance of internal control also gained acceptance. 
1850 to 1940 
F r o m 1850 to 1905, the rise of the large corporation to permit exploitation of 
the technology produced by the Industrial Revolution was seen. The operation 
of the principal enterprises passed from the hands of the owners to those of the 
managers. T o protect the interest of the absentee owners a new professional class 
of auditors emerged, the independent auditors. 
R. Gene B r o w n 5 points out that although internal control was recognized as 
existing i n standardized systems of accounting, little interest was shown i n any 
systems of controls for assets other than that for cash, and not much attention 
was paid to internal control by the independent auditors. The built-in control 
inherent i n double entry accounting was often the only cross-check recognized as 
significant for all acounts. Because of this, the audits during the period 1850 to 
1905 usually involved rather complete reviews of transactions and the preparation 
of corrected accounts and financial statements. This was inefficient, expensive, 
and did not satisfactorily provide for strengthening of weak areas i n subsequent 
periods. The need for changes i n the accounting system to improve the accuracy 
of reported amounts and reduce the possibilities for fraudulent acts was obvious. 
A s the accounting system and the organizational structure were strengthened, 
and as the volume of transactions continued to grow, the technique of sampling 
became accepted practice for auditors. 
Brown points out that prior to 1905, a natural basis for l imit ing the amount of 
testing to be done in auditing would have been the improvements i n accounting 
systems, and consequently i n internal controls, which existed i n the larger corpora-
tions. However, it was not until the period 1905 to 1933 that auditors fully realized 
the importance of internal controls and the relation of strengths and weaknesses 
therein to their testing programs. 
Dur ing this period the literature began to reflect more fully the importance of 
internal control and its relation to the extent of audit testing to be done. Mont-
gomery and other authors including E . V . Spicer, E . C . Pegler, F . R. Carnegie 
Steele and De W i t t Car l Eggleston referred to the system of internal control as of 
primary concern to the independent auditor i n accepting the accounting data as 
being reliable, subject to the testing process. Brown notes that the literature was 
far ahead of actual practice. Practitioners continued to expand use of the tech-
nique of testing, but the decision as to the extent of testing was seldom directly 
tied to an appraisal of internal controls. 
In 1926, the N e w Y or k Stock Exchange's special Committee on Stock List 
campaigned for improvements in auditing. In 1929, the then American Institute 
of Accountants (now A I C P A ) undertook to revise the 1917 Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, "Approved Methods for the Preparation of Balance Sheet Statements." 
Of special significance i n this revision, which was titled Verification of Financial 
Statements, was the requirement that the extent of testing used i n an audit be 
based on an evaluation of the effectiveness of the system of internal control. In 
1930, the Institute established a Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges 
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to formulate methods that would avoid a future repetition of the misleading finan-
cial reporting practices and poor quality of auditing that were a factor in the 
1929 stock market crash. 
A subsequent revision of the 1929 A I C P A pamphlet by a special Institute 
Committee, was issued under the title, Examination of Financial Statements by 
Independent Public Accountants, i n 1936. It included important sections on the 
philosophy of financial statements, their significance and limitations, and broad 
responsibilities of the auditor and the propriety of reliance on effective systems 
of internal control. 
However, the great impetus for the development and elaboration of the system 
of internal control came from those practicing as independent auditors, spurred 
by the fear of legal liability. Unl ike the jurisdictions under the British Legal 
System, the cases decided i n the United States held that although management 
has primary responsibility for the system of internal control, the auditor has a 
duty to review the client's system. This duty was firmly established i n the 
investigation of the M c Kesson and Robbins case by the S E C . The Summary of 
Findings and Conclusions (Accounting Series Release N o . 19) stated i n part: 
W e are convinced by the record that the review of the system of internal 
checks and controls at the Bridgeport offices of M c Kesson and Robbins was 
carried out in an unsatisfactory manner. The testimony of the experts leads 
us to the further conclusion that this vital and basic problem of all audits 
for the purpose of certificating financial statements has been treated i n 
entirely too casual a manner by many accountants. Since in examination of 
financial statements of corporations whose securities are publicly owned, the 
procedures of testing and sampling are employed i n most cases, it appears 
to us that the necessity for a comprehensive knowledge of the client's 
system of internal check and control cannot be overemphasized. 
The M c Kesson and Robbins case prompted great disagreement as to the 
auditor's responsibility for the detection of fraud and the significance of fraud 
detection as an audit objective. D u r i n g this period of disagreement, the use of 
testing as an audit procedure became generally universal and internal control 
gained wide acceptance as a basis for determining the extent of examination 
required. 
1940 to the Present 
The importance of internal control has continued to grow. Some of the con-
tributing factors have been: 
1. The increasing impossibility of a detail audit due to the high volume 
of transactions 
2. The need to reduce the cost of the external audit 
3. The increasing complexity and size of business required more sophisti-
cated control techniques to 
a. provide timely feedback on errors and fraud 
b. provide special analyses 
c. insure internal administrative controls 
4. The needs imposed by the multi-plant and branch nature of operations to 
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a. insure uniformity of accounting procedures and consistency of ap-
plications 
b. verify interplant transactions and profit center reports 
5. The external audit procedure has shifted from a review of past opera-
tions to a review of the system of internal control. A s a result, the 
reliance on the system of internal control continues to increase. 
Conceptual Development of Modern Internal Control 
A study of auditing textbooks over the past half century reveals that the con-
ceptual development of internal control has kept pace wi th developments i n the 
concept and practice of management and i n the complexity of the f irm. Excerpts 
from several editions of Montgomery's Auditing are presented in an effort to 
trace that development. 
The 2nd Edit ion of Montgomery's Auditing (1912) made no mention of the 
terms "internal control" or "internal auditing." However, the related term, in-
ternal check, was discussed. The emphasis was that of reliance on internal check 
by external auditors. It stated that "Such a system consists i n the accounting 
records, methods and details generally of an establishment being laid out i n such 
a way that no part of the accounts w i l l be under the absolute and independent 
control of any one person; that, on the contrary, the work of one employee w i l l 
be complementary to that of another; and that a continuous audit w i l l be made 
of the details of the business." This description identifies the scope of internal 
check as including both internal accounting controls and internal auditing. Six 
pages were devoted to a discussion of the system of internal check. 
Twenty-two years later, the 5th Edit ion of Montgomery's Auditing (1934) 
devoted seven pages to the discussion of the system of internal check and the 
internal auditing department. The term "internal control" was not yet in use. 
The definition of the system of internal check was substantially the same, en-
compassing both internal accounting controls and internal auditing. T w o pages 
were devoted to internal auditing under a separate subheading. The verification 
of detailed records and the safeguarding of assets was considered the function 
of the internal auditing department. The author's interest in this area continued 
to be the need to avoid a detailed audit. The independence of the audit depart-
ment was discussed. However, concern was only to the extent independence 
assures a system of internal check on which the external auditor can rely. 
Montgomery's 6th Edit ion (1940) introduced the word "control" as an exten-
sion of the term internal check and devoted six pages to the discussion of the 
system of internal check and control and to the internal audit department. In the 
6th edition, internal check was defined as the "arrangement of bookkeeping 
methods and procedures so that no part is under the absolute control of one per-
son; and the work of each person is complementary to that of another." This is 
a narrower definition than that given in the 5th edition as it excludes internal 
auditing. Again , internal auditing is discussed under a separate subheading. In 
discussing independence, the 6th edition recognized that, although theoretically 
internal auditing should be independent of the accounting department, i n practice 
the internal auditor generally reported to the chief accounting officer. The author's 
concern was again with the use of the internal check and control system as a basis 
for l imit ing the scope of the audit. 
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Internal Control was the topic of an eight-page chapter in the 7th Edition of 
Montgomery's Auditing (1949). A Statement of Audi t ing Standards had been 
issued by the Committee on Audi t ing Procedure of the American Institute of 
Accountants i n 1947 which established the evaluation of the client's system of 
internal control as one of the standards of field work. The standard stated: 
There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal control 
as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the resultant 
extent of the tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted. 
In addition, the following formal definition of internal control was published 
i n 1949: 
Internal control comprises the plan of organization and all of the coordi-
nate methods and measures adopted within a business to safeguard its 
assets, check the accuracy and reliability of its accounting data, promote 
operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to prescribed managerial 
policies . . . a "system" of internal control extends beyond those matters 
which relate directly to the functions of the accounting and financial 
departments.6 
These events i n part probably account for Montgomery's 7th edition treatment 
which reflected a broadening of the scope and function of internal control. The 
discussion covered such topics as budgetary and cost accounting systems, and the 
enhanced status of the internal auditor including the dual reporting responsibility 
to the controller and to the board of directors. In commenting on the growth of 
internal auditing, the 7th edition reported that " A s business expanded, the need 
was seen for centrally controlled policing of the accounting function of many 
organizations composed of numbers of dispersed units. This need is filled by the 
internal auditor's department. . . . The internal auditor also acts as the direct 
representative of the controller to investigate and report whether prescribed 
accounting policies, procedures, methods, and routines are followed." 
The internal auditor is presented as "an important element of internal con-
trol. . . . Internal control is greatly strengthened by a well-operated internal 
auditing group." 
The 7th edition substitutes the term "internal control" for the term "internal 
check." Absolutely no reference is made to internal check. The 7th edition also 
introduced the standard questionnaire for the evaluation of internal control as a 
"practical and useful device for investigating and recording the auditor's inquiries 
into the system of internal control ." 7 
In the 8th Edit ion of Montgomery's Auditing (1957), the treatment of 
internal control accounted for twelve pages. Based on the definition of the 
Audi t ing Procedure Committee of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, the concept of internal control was classified into three areas: in-
ternal administrative control, internal accounting control, and internal check. 
The authors cautioned that the committee's definition was "very broad" and 
questioned whether the independent auditor should be concerned with internal 
administrative control. 
W i t h the 8th edition, terminology becomes definitive in ways markedly differ-
ent from earlier editions. The term "internal control," having first been intro-
duced in the sixth edition (1940) as an extension of the already established term 
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"internal check," is now presented as the broader term. Internal accounting con-
trol and internal check are considered as components of internal control. As an 
auditing text, the interest i n internal control continued to be its adequacy for 
reliance on by independent auditors. Internal administrative controls are con-
sidered to be beyond the responsibility of the independent auditor in an examina-
tion leading to an opinion on the financial statements. 
The impact of the work of the internal auditor on the quality of the ac-
counting data is recognized: " In weighing the effectiveness of internal control, 
he (the independent auditor) w i l l give due consideration to the work of internal 
auditors. H e w i l l , of course, investigate procedures of the internal auditing group, 
just as he investigates other features of its control." 8 However, the principal 
thrust of the discussion on internal control was the concern of the independent 
auditor for all three areas of internal control and the similarities and differences 
i n the roles and approaches of internal and independent auditors. 
The chapter on internal control in the 9th Edit ion of Montgomery's Auditing 
(1975) is 25 pages long. The fact that the concept of internal control has changed 
is acknowledged. According to this edition, however, internal control still consists 
of internal administrative or operational control, internal accounting control and 
internal check. 
In this edition, internal control is presented i n a logical structure. Systemiza-
tion, competence and integrity, and documentation are named as the three condi-
tions of control. The forms i n which basic control operations appear are stated 
as outlined below: 




Forms of Completeness Checks 
Numerical sequencing 
Control totals 
Hold ing files 
Reminder files 
Forms of Reperformance 
Double-checking 
Pre-audit 
Disciplinary controls are listed as segregation of duties, restricted access, super-
visory controls, and internal audit (optional). 
In this edition, as i n the other editions, the concern is for determining the 
extent and nature of the audit by independent auditors. It is suggested that 
effective internal control may transform auditing from tests of underlying data to 
tests of controls. 
The term "internal operational control" is introduced as synonymous wi th the 
term "internal administrative control." It is very likely that it w i l l become the 
more widely used term. Whereas, in the 8th edition, the authors are explicit i n 
stating that internal administrative control is not the responsibility of the inde-
pendent auditor, they question the wisdom of this position i n the 9th edition. 
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In support of their opinion that someday the independent auditor w i l l be expected 
to evaluate operational controls, they state: 
There are many instances i n which operational controls affect the reliability 
of accounting data i n direct and indirect ways; . . . Since operational con-
trols can have a profound effect on financial position and results of opera-
tions and can, on occasion, substitute for accounting controls, they are an 
appropriate subject of interest to an auditor. . . . If he does understand 
operational controls, however, he w i l l be able to plan a more efficient and 
effective engagement by relying on the controls, where appropriate, and by 
recognizing the potential for problems if controls are weak. 9 
Internal audit, as a part of internal control, is deemphasized i n this edition. 
One paragraph is devoted to internal audit as a disciplinary control. However, a 
more lengthy discussion is provided i n a chapter entitled " W o r k i n g with a Client." 
Development of the Internal Audit Function 
The internal auditing function, which had its beginning as an internal check 
procedure used to avoid the necessity of a detailed audit by external auditors, has 
exploded. Once defined as "the verification of detailed records and the safe-
guarding of assets," it is now defined thus: 
Internal auditing is an independent appraisal activity within an organiza-
tion for the review of operations as a service to management. It is a 
managerial control which functions by measuring and evaluating the 
effectiveness of other controls. 1 0 
This growth has been described by Brink, Cashin and W i t t : 
The first internal auditing assignments usually originated to satisfy very 
basic and sharply defined operational needs. The earliest special concern of 
management was whether the assets of the organization were being pro-
tected, whether company procedures and policies were being complied wi th , 
and whether the financial records were reliable. . . . Over a period of time, 
however, this situation has changed a great deal. The operations of the 
various organizations were increasing steadily in volume and complexity. 
The managerial problems thus created have resulted in new pressures on 
higher level management. . . . A t the same time, the internal auditors 
themselves were perceiving the existing opportunities and were more and 
more initiating new types of service. Thus, internal auditors took on a 
broader and more management-oriented character. Because the earlier 
internal auditing was very much accounting oriented, this upward trend 
was felt first i n the accounting and financial control areas. Subsequently, 
however, it was extended to the non-financial areas.1 1 
The establishment of the Institute of Internal Auditors (1941) and the pub-
lication of Internal Auditing by Victor Z . Br ink (1941) must be viewed as 
significant events i n the growth of internal auditing as a unique function practiced 
by a large group with its own professional organization, code of ethics and other 
pronouncements, and professional certification. Once viewed only as a part of the 
internal control system, but now constituting a system within itself, internal 
auditing promises to become "the tail that wags the dog." 
8 
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Discussant's Response to 
An Auditing Perspective of the 
Historical Development of Internal Control 
Rodney J. Anderson 
Clarkson, Gordon & Co . 
By way of explanation relative to my remarks as discussant, please consider 
that it was only yesterday that this paper reached my hands. 
The paper may be said to consist of three elements: 
1. A n overview of the historical development of auditing and internal 
control, 
2. The development of Nor th American thinking on internal control 
during the 20th century, and 
3. Present thinking on internal control and internal auditing. 
I w i l l organize my comments with respect to each of these three elements 
and finally use the third as a jumping off point for a few other related thoughts 
about control. 
Overview of Historical Development 
The first eight pages, indeed half the paper, deal with an overview of the 
historical development of auditing and control. I found this interesting and 
readable. I think it gives a good summary of the early beginnings. Perhaps it 
could have gone a little more into the big jump from Charlemagne to the 
Industrial Revolution—a period where, I think, the roots of many of our present 
practices may be found. I w i l l refer again to this presently. The authors state 
that control was the natural product of the profit motive. In the general sense of 
human acquisitiveness ("Let's protect what we've got."—and what we're getting), 
I agree. But in the narrower sense, profit motive suggests commercial transactions. 
In contrast, it was more commonly the wealth and the taxing power of the ruler 
or government which was being protected i n those precursory days. As an over-
simplification, we might say that control i n auditing began with public funds 
(if one may use that euphemism for the ruler's hoard). A n d perhaps if the gov-
ernment take of the G N P continues at its present rate, we w i l l soon come full 
circle. A n d future historians may look wistfully back at the 19th and 20th cen-
turies as the age of private enterprise. However, that's not the subject for this 
conference. 
In any case, whether the very beginnings were private-commercial or ruler-
public is always a little difficult to tell from the literature. Certainly the examples 
of Egypt, Persia and Rome are all public funds examples. O n the other hand, it 
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may simpy be that such archeological records survive more easily. The references 
to Sumerian transactions in 3600 B.C. may indeed be commercial. Similarly, I 
located an interested excerpt from one of the provisions of Hammurabi's code 
from Babylon of 2200 B .C . Article 105 read: " I f an agent has forgotten and 
has not taken a sealed memorandum of the money he has given to the merchant, 
money that is not sealed for, he shall not put i n his accounts." This would cer-
tainly seem to be commercial and would suggest the keeping of commercial 
accounts and rudimentary elements of internal control. 
A n d yet, one can find conflicting quotations. D r . Budge of the British 
Museum was quoted as saying i n 1905: "There is no reason for thinking that 
they (the Babylonians and the Syrians) managed their money affairs as we do. 
There are many contract tablets known, and hundreds of records of commercial 
transactions, but I know of none which could be considered as accounts in the 
modern sense of the word . " 
Be commerce as it may, the control and audit of government funds was surely 
the predominant influence on early developments. 
Mention is made of the division of duties among the Pharaoh's scribes—and 
certainly division of duties is still an important element of internal control. Like-
wise, mention is made of the Persian surprise audits. Similarly, one might add, 
the Greeks had a group of checking-clerks to check public officials' accounts. 
The paper goes on to refer to the quaestors and the division of duties over the 
Roman funds—and the source of the word audit as a hearing. Indeed, the division 
of duties there saw legislative control over public revenues and expenses vested i n 
the Senate, the power to order payments vested i n the censors, the farming of 
tax collection rights to publicans by the censors i n the presence of the quaestors, 
and the actual handling of receipts and payments by the quaestors. Certainly 
this was an elaborate system of control. 
The account then touches on the Ho ly Roman Empire and Charlemagne— 
and again this involves control and audit of government funds. 
Then comes the gap—a jump to 1850 and the Industrial Revolution. But it is 
during this gap that we see the main switch from control and audit of govern-
ment alone, to control and audit of commerce—at least more as we know it today. 
The authors merely refer to the period of 1500 to 1850 as a birth of double 
entry. I think this might have been explored further since double entry has 
surely become one of the most important, though rudimentary, elements of in-
ternal control. The first evidence of double entry seems to be in Genoa i n 1340 
and involved the stewards to the local authority (again government). F r o m 
there it moved to Venice and became known as "method of Venice." Later it 
moved to Florence. W h y this growth? O f course, it was due to the Italian mari-
time expansion. W e all remember that it was during this period that the Italian 
merchant fleets spread all over the world—indeed, providing the source of the 
name "America . " Ships coming from the East and from the N e w W o r l d were 
financed principally as joint ventures, and pre-eminent among these were the 
Venetian fleets. A n d so, in 1494 in Venice we have the first treatise on book-
keeping. 
The treatise was by a mathematician, Luca Paciolo (the spelling of his name 
varies), whose book Summa de Arithmetica, Geometria, Proportioni et Propor-
tionaiita included a section of 36 chapters on bookkeeping entitled " D e Computis 
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et Scripturis" (Of Reckonings and Writ ings) . Paciolo recommended the method 
of Venice. Three different accounting books were suggested. The first was a 
"memorial" in which one converted all the transactions to a consistent coinage 
(showing that foreign exchange translation problems did not originate with the 
F A S B ) . The. second was a journal to enter the converted amounts. The third 
was a ledger for posting. Other writers added to the literature on accounting 
and control in Venice in the following years. 
Reference to England might have been mentioned before arriving at 1850—if 
only because it leads to the birth of our modern profession. Some authorities 
maintain that the English royal revenue was audited from the reign of W i l l i a m 
the Conquerer. But generally the establishment of the English Exchequer is 
assigned to the reign of Henry I ( in 1100). Three independent records were 
maintained and were checked to each other at the end of the year. Originally 
they were audited by justices or barons (or their clerks) and later by official 
auditors. In England during the feudal ages auditors would travel on circuit to 
the manors and estates to check the accounting for disbursements and revenues. 
Indeed, there was a tradition that the best ale i n the house was opened on such 
occasions. Whether or not this contributed to clean opinions is no longer known, 
but the beverages were referred to as "audit ale." 
Some writers have argued that the stable financial controls i n Elizabethan 
England can be attributed, in part, to auditors appointed by the Crown. 
A n d that leads us to the 17th and 18th centuries and the growth of common 
law corporations in place of one-time joint ventures. Some of the bad speculative 
practices of this period led to the South Sea Bubble i n 1720. Dur ing this period, 
therefore, the practice of accountancy developed further in order to accommodate 
the investigation of bankruptcies and other disasters. 
Finally, we arrive at 1850—or perhaps more specifically 1844 with the passage 
of the English Joint Stock Companies Act . This Act provided for the appoint-
ment of auditors, though they were not independent. It generally ignored internal 
control, despite the earlier urgings of Paciolo, and during this period auditing was 
basically done on a 100% basis and was largely fraud-oriented. 
By the early 1900's, the paper points out, auditors were still doing 100% 
checking for clerical accuracy plus some examination of internal documentary 
evidence. Testing was not used and little, if any, external evidence was examined. 
Comparative Development of Thought on Internal Control in 
England and North America in the 20th Century 
The authors refer to the growth of the control concept from 1905 to 1933. 
I think it might be interesting to compare the trends in the United States, Eng-
land, and Canada during his period. Dur ing the early 1900's, the statutory audits 
i n Canada and the U . K . led to 100% checking. However, by 1930, the concept 
of testing had begun, though little attention was being paid to internal control. 
A slight amount of external evidence was being examined. 
Meanwhile, i n the United States, audits were being performed not for statutory 
purposes but for credit-granting purposes. This led to the idea of the balance 
sheet audit as opposed to the clerical checking of Canada and the U . K . Subse-
quently, the idea of the balance sheet audit spread to Canada. A t the same time 
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there was a move toward fairness of presentation. In 1913 and 1917 we have the 
advent of income taxes i n the United States and Canada with the result of 
further emphasis being given to earnings. Then came the stock market crash of 
1929 and following that more emphasis being placed on presentation, earnings, 
and the income statement as opposed to the balance sheet. In the 1930's with the 
formation of the S E C , the United States became, for those of us i n Canada, the 
dominant influence replacing the U . K . 
In 1934 we have the beginning of the examination of external evidence in any 
quantity. In 1939, the McKesson & Robbins case provided further impetus to 
these developments (I thought the quote i n the paper on control was interesting 
here as we usually think of this case as just being related to inventory observation). 
Then i n 1941 generally accepted auditing standards were called for by the S E C 
and i n 1948 promulgated by the A I C P A . I'm afraid in Canada, we did not arrive 
at a statement of generally accepted auditing standards until the 1960's at the 
provincial level and not until 1975 at the Canadian Institute level. 
I think it's interesting to note that with the gradual addition of external evi-
dence to Canadian auditing practice (following English precedents) and with the 
gradual addition of checking of transactions to U.S. auditing ( in order to justify 
reliance on control) the two audit streams in North America moved together. 
Meanwhile, the U . K . also shifted from fraud detection to assurance of fair 
presentation wi th due reliance being placed on control. A l l these trends are 
difficult to assess i n retrospect, as what historical writers now say and what 
actually took place may often be two different things. 
I thought it was an interesting idea to follow the changing views in the 
successive editions of Montgomery's Auditing. I don't have any particular com-
ment on this part. A lot of the material involves questions of semantics. Finally, 
with the 9th edition of Montgomery's Auditing i n 1975 we are up to "where 
we are now." 
Present Thinking on Internal Control and Internal Auditing 
The 9th Edit ion of Montgomery's Auditing presents a more elaborate analysis 
of the components of internal control and I think this is useful. It has become 
now not just an excuse for reducing tests but something that auditors have 
decided they really must study i n a systematic manner. W i t h the A I C P A 
Statement on Audi t ing Procedures N o . 54, we have the introduction of the con-
cept of compliance tests and with that another dimension was added. I might 
use these ideas as a jumping off point to discuss a few comments on internal 
control classification. 
Internal Control Classification 
Several different methods of classifying controls exist, some of which are sug-
gested i n the quotation from Montgomery's Auditing. Among the possible 
methods are: 
1. By attest or non-attest significance. 
2. By objective of the controls. 
3. By accounting controls versus administrative controls. 
13 
4. By preventive controls versus detective controls. 
5. According to the general nature of the control technique. 
W i t h respect to the attest versus non-attest significance, I think it is important 
to emphasize that internal control is primarily a management tool and only sec-
ondarily of audit use. It follows, therefore, that some controls w i l l be important 
for management but have no influence on the auditor's work and some controls 
w i l l be as good as it is practical for management to make them but still not 
sufficient to permit significant reliance by the auditor. 
W i t h respect to classification of controls by objective one could talk about 
safeguarding of assets, reliability of accounting records, the timely preparation 
of reliable financial information, profitability and minimization of unnecessary 
costs, the avoidance of unintentional exposure to risk, the prevention of detection 
of errors and irregularities, the assurance that delegated responsibilities are being 
properly discharged, and the discharge of statutory responsibilities by the manage-
ment group. O f course, some of these objectives overlap. In any case, this matter 
of classification is not particularly helpful in analyzing control techniques since 
the same technique can often serve several different objectives. For example, 
perpetual inventory records independent of the storekeeper may help to (a) safe-
guard inventory, (b) ensure accurate inventory records, (c) detect inventory 
shortages, and (d) prevent irregularities. 
The split of accounting controls and administrative controls has been in 
professional literature for some time. Originally, accounting controls were said 
to be related to safeguarding assets and influencing the reliability of financial 
reporting while administrative controls were concerned with promoting opera-
tional efficiency and adherence to prescribed management policies. However, 
some administrative controls affect the reliability of financial reporting as well . 
I confess I do not find it a very useful distinction. I rather think that the auditor 
must look at any type of internal control which could have a bearing on his 
expression of opinion on the financial statements. 
The distinction between preventive controls and protective controls can be a 
useful one. The idea was incorporated in a recent Canadian Institute publication 
"Computer Control Guidelines" though no doubt it has been discussed many 
other places as well . Preventive controls prevent errors or reduce the chance of 
error occurrence. Detective controls detect errors or increase the chance of their 
detection. O f course, usually one must have both types of controls. Preventive 
controls are perhaps what the 9th Edit ion of Montgomery's Auditing refers to as 
disciplinary controls. One distinction between the two types of controls is their 
auditability. The auditor can observe preventive controls relatively easily, though 
it may be hard to evaluate their effectiveness. The operation of detective controls, 
on the other hand, is very difficult to prove. That they are operating when an 
error is caught is clear. But whether they were really operating i n between the 
catching of successive errors is less clear. One can only assume that if another 
error had occurred it would have been caught but one cannot really prove that 
the detective control was functioning in those cases. 
Perhaps the most useful method of analyzing internal controls from the 
auditor's point of view is by the general nature of the control technique. There 
are many different ways i n which such an analysis can be made. One way would 
be as follows. 
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Organization controls may be said to deal with honesty and competence 
(hiring, supervision, training), segregation of functions (custodial versus re-
porting versus operating functions) and the overall plan of organization together 
with the accounting/financial organizational plan. Systems development controls 
deal with the development, approval and revision of systems—and must be con-
siderably more formal in the case of computer systems. Authorization and re-
porting controls deal with authorization, comparison, validity checking, budgets, 
responsibility reporting, etc. Accounting systems controls deal with initial re-
cording (document design), general ledger and account organization and balanc-
ing routines. Additional safeguarding controls cover things such as restrictive 
access, protection of records, periodic count and comparison, insurance, etc. 
Management supervisory controls deal with the personal supervision by manage-
ment, the monitoring of controls and the detecting of errors, and the internal 
audit program. A n d finally, documentation controls cover manuals of policies 
and procedures and, in the case of computer systems, more elaborate documenta-
tion of systems and programs. 
The Wagging Tail 
O f the foregoing seven different types of controls, one can see that internal 
audit is but a part—though admittedly a very important part. I believe it is 
logical to view internal auditing as a part of internal control. It is the delegation 
of the management monitoring function to a separate internal audit group. I 
don't think one should view this as a tail wagging the dog. Indeed, i n large 
systems the monitoring system may grow almost as complex as the system it 
monitors. But this is merely analogous to E D P housekeeping controls using up 
almost as much space as the actual working program they are controlling. 
Conclusion 
In summary, I thought the paper gave an interesting overview of the historical 
development. As in all overviews, it is something that could also be expanded— 
and indeed, might be of considerable interest in a more expanded form. The 
principal areas where some expansion might be of interest would be, as I have 
suggested, feudal England, Renaissance Italy, and the coming of Companies Acts 
to England, together with a comparison of the subsequent developments i n the 
United States, England, and Canada. 
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Management Behavior—An Auditing Horizon 
W. Donald Georgen 
Touche Ross & Co . 
The independent accountant has—and always had—a responsibility to look 
for management fraud and illegal acts. Less clear is the auditor's responsibility to 
discover these activities if they have occurred. The professional literature is 
ambiguous, and the recent Supreme Court ruling in the Hochfelder case did little 
to resolve the uncertainty. Speaking practically, however, the profession must face 
up to the expectations of the public. The question is not whether we have any 
responsibility i n these areas—the real questions today are, how far does that 
responsibility go, and how should the independent accountant go about executing 
that charge. 
Whi le not new, this responsibility is being given considerable attention by 
practitioners, academicians, and regulatory agencies, as well as the courts, because 
of the sensational disclosures recently regarding implied improprieties (most of 
which have not been proved conclusively), management fraud, and illegal pay-
ments. The public is concerned and dismayed, not only that such events could 
have happened, but also that they were not detected and reported on a timely 
basis. Ultimately, that concern focuses on the independent accountant. In the 
public view, the independent accountant has the best opportunity (and therefore 
the responsibility) to determine that proper controls are operative to prevent such 
events, or where those controls fail, to timely detect and report the events. The 
public must acknowledge that independent accountants w i l l never be able to 
guarantee that all instances of management fraud and other illegal acts have been 
detected—but on the other hand, it is my opinion that our detection "hit rate" 
must be substantially improved. 
Attributes of Management Fraud and Other Illegal Acts 
Before we attempt any analysis of the auditor's responsibility, we have to 
examine the attributes of management fraud (and analogously, illegal acts). Also, 
we must look at the traditional audit approach to see how it might be changed. 
Fraud, very simply, is a deceptive practice—one where the perpetrator hopes 
to avoid detection. (Armed robbery is not a fraud, because the overt act is 
obvious.) Frauds in the business environment fall into two broad categories— 
those occurring at the employee level and those occurring at the management 
level. 
Employee frauds generally have two basic characteristics: 
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—The object of the fraud is to convert cash or merchandise to the indi-
vidual's benefit. 
—The activities of the employees are or should be covered by an effective 
system of internal control. Although an effective system w i l l not prevent 
all acts of employee fraud, it should provide for early detection and 
preclude frequent repetition. 
The characteristics of management fraud are significantly different: 
—Generally, fraud at the management level does not involve direct theft of 
cash or merchandise; instead, it often involves "performance" fraud—the 
deceptive practices result in high reported earnings or they forestall the 
recognition of a decline. 
—Indirect benefits accrue to management from the fraud—salary, bonus, 
profit sharing, and/or value of stock options may be improved or pre-
served, and the likelihood of continued employment is increased. 
—The fraud is likely to operate outside of established business systems and 
related internal controls—in other words, the bosses are not subject to 
the system. 
—The nature of the deceptive act is not always apparent, for it may be 
difficult to determine whether deception or error in judgment is involved. 
I would particularly like to emphasize the last two points. Management most 
often has the ability to operate outside the system, simply because it is generally 
the top point of control in the system. A n d the independent accountant is often 
unable to distinguish deception from an "honest mistake"—at least unti l subse-
quent discernments provide a clue to management's motives. These two points 
underscore our dilemma. The traditional auditing approach is not really effective 
against management fraud. Also, the traditional audit approach, which is inde-
pendent and neutral, does not focus on the judgments necessary to evaluate the 
qualitative aspects of management activity. 
The Audit Approach 
Given the characteristics of management fraud, let us take a critical look at 
the usual audit approach. Traditionally, generally accepted auditing standards 
have allowed the independent accountant to assume that management's behavior 
w i l l conform to a predictable, set pattern. In other words, although he should be 
alert to fraud opportunities, the auditor's primary objective is the gathering of 
sufficient evidential material to form a series of judgments leading to the expres-
sion of a professional opinion on the financial statements—not the detection of 
fraud. The auditor's conventions tell h im to gather "enough" of the "right k i n d " 
of audit evidence. Although there are conventions which give guidance to the 
determination of "enough" and "right k i n d , " the auditor's judgment in the 
particular situation is the principal determinant of audit scope. 
Does this suggest that the auditor's scope or approach has to be changed to 
improve the fraud detection rate? The answer is probably yes. Does it suggest 
that all audits should be performed in the fraud mode—where you turn over 
every stone and peel every grape? The answer is categorically N O ! The cost to 
society would be prohibitive, given the relative number of actual frauds perpe-
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trated. A n d more importantly, given a dishonest management, the independent 
accountant would never be able to do enough work to satisfy himself—or anyone 
else—that all acts of fraud were detected. W e simply cannot assume the total 
responsibility for fraud detection, if we are to be honest with ourselves and 
society. However, i n the same breath I have to admit that we have to be con-
cerned with the consequences of the relatively few frauds. A n d even though we 
can't catch them all, I am convinced that we can catch substantially more than 
we have in the past. 
Coping with Fraud 
In my judgment, it's a matter of working "smarter" rather than "harder." W e 
say that the auditor's responsibility in the attest environment is to make an 
"informed judgment"—and I think the way to improve detection of fraud lies 
in that phrase. Further, I don't believe exponentially exploding the number of 
transactions tested and accountabilities verified necessarily results in a more 
"informed judgment." Although the scope of the evidence gathering is always 
important, the quality of the information gathered, how it is obtained, how it is 
correlated, and the overall evaluation process are equally important in arriving 
at an "informed judgment." 
Our f irm has spent considerable time and effort in developing an approach 
which we believe w i l l make us more effective in the detection of management 
fraud. The procedures are not new, but the emphasis is. The program has 
basically three features; and they are all related: 
—an effective client investigation program before we commence a new 
engagement and a similar periodic update on continuing engagements; 
—an in-depth understanding of the client's business—the economic condi-
tions, the inherent control problems, the peculiarities of the industry; and 
—concentration on material transactions—to determine their true nature 
and their arm's-lengthness, and to determine the proper accounting and 
the required disclosures. 
Client Investigation 
The client investigation feature of this approach puts emphasis on determining 
the reputation of the company and, in particular, its management. The questions 
asked and the information gathered are intended to answer the question—is this 
a company and are these people with whom we want to professionally associate? 
Is there any reason we should not associate? 
Some w i l l argue that this "exclusiveness" is socially irresponsible. Some w i l l 
argue that all public companies are entitled to the services of an independent 
accountant. However, society has decreed that an independent accountant's 
investigative tools are to be limited—there is no subpoena power and no right to 
take testimony under oath. Instead, society has inculcated that there be a pro-
fessional relationship between independent accountant and client. W i t h i n that 
structure, I believe the independent accountant is entitled to accept professional 
associations with care—indeed, I believe care is essential. 
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Understanding the Client's Business 
Understanding the business is part of the client investigation routine which 
carries over into the establishment of scope or depth of the audit. Here we 
concentrate on: 
—who is management, or who can make the business decision (Appendix 
A ) ; 
— i n what roles does the management group operate (Appendix B ) ; 
—what economic factors are present in this industry—in this company— 
which would be conducive to encouraging or enhancing the fraud oppor-
tunity (Appendix C ) ; 
—what is the business structure, and would it facilitate or prevent the 
management fraud act (Appendix D ) . 
When we have gathered, correlated and evaluated this information we then 
identify the areas of risk and set the scope of our audit procedures relative to the 
degree of risk. The evaluation is a professional judgment—but a professional 
judgment based on the relevant facts. Occasionally, based on our evaluation, we 
w i l l say that the business factors individually or collectively present a risk situation 
which we cannot audit. In these circumstances we should—and have—with-
drawn from the engagement. 
Material Transactions 
The third feature of our approach is a concentration on material transactions. 
Again, this part of our approach carries over from the client investigation and 
our efforts to understand the client's business. We do not pick a random selec-
tion of transactions and accountabilities and look for management fraud. Rather, 
we first identify all material transactions and accountabilities and then analyze 
those transactions i n depth, for management involvement and its consequences. 
In the absence of direction from the profession, the regulatory agencies, or the 
courts we have established the following standards of "materiality" for this 
process: 
—balance sheet items—measured at 5 percent of total assets 
—shareholders' equity items—5 percent of total shareholders' equity 
—income statement: 
—sales or purchase items—10 percent of total sales or purchases 
—operating income or expense items—5 percent of income before extra-
ordinary or unusual items 
—nonoperating items—5 percent of pre-tax income 
When we have identified a material transaction i n which management or a 
related party is involved, we audit to evaluate the transaction and the nature of 
the management involvement. W e study the transaction so that we can ask for 
and obtain the relevant documentation—we want documentation, not conversa-
tion. We then go one step further and request independent confirmation of the 
details behind the transaction. This is an important distinction from the tradi-
tional approach. W e go beyond the normal confirmation of transaction timing, 
amounts involved, balances due or owing, and terms. W e specifically ask for 
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confirmation of all of the facts—previous, continuing, and prospective—which 
are conditions of the transaction. This procedure is intended to determine if there 
might be additional documentation or even unwritten understandings which over-
ride the available records. 
A Professional Overview 
Our approach, although now in effect for 18 months, as a "state of the art" is 
still in the development stage. Other firms are experimenting with their programs 
under the general guidance of S A S 6 of the A I C P A on "Related Party Trans-
actions." The usefulness of this approach to fraud detection w i l l evolve as we 
all gain more experience. I seriously doubt if any "brand new" audit procedures 
w i l l come out of these efforts, but the auditor's attention w i l l be directed more 
explicitly. A management fraud approach must put emphasis on informed judg-
ment, insist on substantive rather than mechanical analysis, encourage probing of 
material transactions for a better understanding of the facts, and in general 
promote a "healthy skepticism." 
In the late '60s and the early '70s a number of famous management frauds 
surfaced. More recently, another, more wide-spread form of illegal activity has 
come to the fore. The press has been full of stories of illegal political payments, 
slush funds and apparent bribes. Again, the public is asking, where was the 
independent accountant? 
Illegal Payments 
As I indicated earlier, it is my judgment that this illegal payment problem is 
analogous to the larger management fraud problem, insofar as it challenges the 
role of the independent accountant. This is true because illegal acts are often 
the product of management's direct involvement or indirect forebearance because 
of industry practices, economic conditions, or systems and control weaknesses. 
But let's put these problems in their proper perspective. The public arousal 
over illegal payments and the cries for disclosure and "cease and desist" are in my 
judgment a product of the Watergate environment. Illegal payments are not a 
new phenomenon on the business scene, as evidenced by present disclosures. Many 
of the news stories report questionable payments, covering an extended prior 
period. W h y was there not earlier concern over these practices—by the public, 
the regulatory agencies and independent accountants? Whi le many w i l l profess 
ignorance—and I suspect most people were not aware of the widespread nature 
of the practice and the huge sums involved—I believe that, as a result of the 
concept that these payments are "accepted business practice," the problem was 
generally ignored. 
Without going into the developing morality or flailing ourselves for past 
omissions, I am wi l l ing to say that I believe it is our responsibility, as independent 
accountants, to be satisfied that our clients' audited financial statements taken as 
a whole contain adequate disclosure, and provisions for the financial effects (where 
applicable) of illegal payments. In the absence of direction or standards from the 
profession and the regulatory agencies, however, the specific ground rules for 
accomplishing this responsibility are very unclear. 
Rather than philosophize as to the ultimate direction the profession w i l l 
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take, I would like to share with you the policies and practices that we have 
adopted, in our firm, to deal with the subject of illegal payments. 
W e have decided that we cannot define illegal payments per se. W e say this 
determination is ultimately a judicial question and an opinion—as to legality or 
illegality—can only be given by competent legal counsel. W e then treat the subject 
based on defined illegal payments and "possibly" illegal payments. As in our 
approach to management fraud, we have identified possible situations where 
illegal payments may be expected. The purpose of this initial analysis is to direct 
the audit emphasis. For example, the independent accountant should be alert for 
the possibility of illegal payments when the client sells i n countries where those 
business practices are expected, or where there are substantial cash transactions, or 
where there are significant "soft expenses." W e have also developed standards of 
materiality i n determining the scope of our examination for such payments. 
Where we have knowledge that an illegal or possibly illegal payment has 
occurred, we require: 
—that the matter be discussed with the client's board of directors; 
—that an opinion be requested from the client's legal counsel as to the 
legality/illegality of the payment, the requirements for disclosure under 
the securities acts, and the form and content of that disclosure; 
—consultation with our national technical staff; and 
—finally, an objective evaluation of all the information and the legal opin-
ions to determine the propriety of financial presentation and disclosure, 
and the impact, if any, on our auditor's report. 
Although we are once again in a "state of the art" situation without specific 
direction from the profession, regulatory agencies or the courts, we believe our 
program is focused on the essentials of the problem—detection and disclosure. 
Some Concluding Observations 
In talking with you about management fraud and illegal payments, I have 
tried to avoid any suggestion that we were talking about specific procedures or 
standard steps. A n d I particularly want to emphasize that we are talking about an 
integrated whole. O r said a different way, we think this approach is simply a 
re-emphasis of the business approach to auditing—defining the "business ap-
proach" in the broadest possible terms. 
As a result of thinking through the approach to management fraud and illegal 
payments, we have given more thought to our overall audit objective. It is 
apparent that a successful audit depends on more than program details. It is 
apparent that a proper attitude or philosophical audit approach is necessary. For 
the last several years, we have summarized these "truths" in a year-end audit 
reminder to our professionals, and I would like to share them with you: 
• Our assignment is to independently challenge and evaluate, not to ra-
tionalize. 
• When we say we want to emphasize the "business approach" to auditing, 
we mean do the reported facts make business sense—not can we support 
what management has concluded. 
• O n each engagement, we have to ask the question—-are the statements 
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auditable? We have to make a rational judgment; the conclusion is not 
a given assumption. 
• Emphasis has to be placed on a basic evaluation of evidentiary material— 
not a mechanical analysis of reported transactions and accountabilities. 
• Aud i t evidence must be based on factual documentation, not conversation. 
• Accounting and reporting matters are governed by generally accepted 
accounting principles. In many areas G A A P parameters are fairly broad. 
In the application of accounting principles we have the responsibility to 
determine the appropriateness of the principles i n the circumstances. 
• The responsibility to perform an effective audit of the facts is just as 
important as the proper resolution of accounting and reporting issues. 
W e have to guard against a preoccupation with the solution of account-
ing and reporting issues to the exclusion of the audit of the underlying 
facts. 
• W e need the appropriate level of audit management involved on all 
audits. A significant part of the audit process is evaluative and judg-
mental. The skills necessary to execute these qualitative factors are 
developed largely through experience. W e cannot delegate experience. 
We cannot delegate these judgments in the critical areas of the engage-
ment. 
• The development of audit skills requires a basic methodology; a disci-
plined approach and experience. The methodology can be taught and 
experience is a product of time and variety of engagement assignments. 
Development of a disciplined approach is dependent on the environment 
i n the office i n which the professional works and the perceived attitudes 
and work habits of those for whom he works. The development of a 
proper disciplined approach from the bottom up can happen only if we 
have a properly disciplined approach at the top—in the management 
group. 
In my opinion, the problem of illegal payments w i l l largely disappear i n a 
relatively short time. The public outcry, the pain and embarrassment of public 
disclosure and censure, tighter corporate policies and controls, closer scrutiny by 
boards of directors and others, and specific Federal regulations w i l l effectively 
limit these practices. 
Management fraud, on the other hand, is with us and is not going to go 
away, i n the absense of any moral uplifting. The pressure for earnings growth 
has been a catalyst for management fraud in a stable or accelerating economy; 
the pressure for survival i n uncertain economic times may be an even greater 
stimulant. W e can say that other disciplines—the board of directors, the audit 
committee, the public and the regulatory agencies—have a responsibility to force 
management integrity. But we cannot deny our own responsibility. W e can say 
that we can't catch them all—and this is true—but we have to catch more of 
them. Some w i l l say that making an independent accountant look for fraud is an 
unreasonable burden; I would suggest to you that a properly balanced respon-
sibility offers us an opportunity to attain top professional status. 
22 
Appendix A 








• Principal Stockholders 
• Others 
Appendix B 
Management Involvement Role 
• Buyer • Debtor 
• Seller • Creditor 
• Guarantor • Nominee 
• Lessee • Franchisee 
• Lessor • Franchisor 
• Forebearer • Licensee 
• Licensor 
Not intended to be all-inclusive 
Appendix C 
Some Conducive Economic Factors 
• Insufficient working capital or credit 
• Urgent desire for good earnings to support stock price 
• Developing industry—massive demand for new capital 
• Dependence on a very few products, customers or transactions 
• Debt restrictions binding 
• A declining industry with many business failures 
• Company with excess capacity 
• Many lawsuits, especially from shareholders 
• Rapid expansion or numerous acquisitions, especially i n diversification 
• Collection difficulties from key customers, for instance, R E I T s 
• Inventories requiring non-auditor expertise 
• Long-term manufacturing cycle 
• Unrealistic sales projections 
• Obsolescence danger—high technology industry 
Appendix D 
Examples of Conducive Business Structure 
• Dispersal of locations, documents, evidence 
• Diversified company and accounting systems 
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• Management dominated by one or few 
• Divided audit responsibility 
• Inadequate internal audit function 
• Extreme mobility i n key financial positions 
• Mobility or lack of outside legal counsel 
• Constant crisis mode in accounting function 
• Numerous substantive adjusting entries in audit closing 
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Discussant's Response to 
Management Behavior—An Auditing Horizon 
Robert L. Grinaker 
University of Houston 
Although I am pleased to comment on Donald Georgen's paper, I also have 
something of a problem because, to a large extent, I agree with most of the things 
he has to say. It's a little difficult to discuss a paper that I wish I had written 
myself. Hence, I would like my remarks to be considered complementary to, 
rather than critical of, those presented in the paper. M y discussion w i l l be directed 
to the following specific topics: 
A . Under the broad area of auditor's responsibility, I shall make a few 
comments on management fraud and illegal payments. 
B. I shall address the following three additional topics: 
1. Evaluation of traditional auditing procedures. 
2. Understanding the client's business. 
3. Scientific research design—a prototype for auditing procedures. 
Auditor's Responsibility for Management Fraud 
Let me first comment that D o n Georgen makes a very useful distinction be-
tween employee and management fraud. Furthermore, I agree wi th h i m that 
most instances of management fraud are "performance" based rather than involved 
i n the direct theft of assets. However, certain classical cases—notably McKesson-
Robbins—did involve massive thefts of company assets. 
I further agree that the profession is becoming increasingly aware that it has 
significant responsibility for the discovery of management fraud. I also am con-
vinced that this awareness stems principally from public expectations which are 
reflected in actions of regulatory agencies and the courts. The processes appear to 
be by-passing the auditor, thus posing some significant dangers. T o me, the 
danger is that the auditor's responsibility for fraud losses may be completely dis-
associated from financial statements and their fair presentation. In my judgment, 
the only perspective that makes sense in defining the auditor's responsibility for 
fraud is its relationship to the fair presentation of the financial statements. In this 
regard, our professional literature, characterized in the paper as ambiguous, has 
been something less than helpful. Consider the following from AudSEC' s 
Statement on Audi t ing Standards N o . 1: 
In making the ordinary examination, the independent auditor is aware of 
the possibility that fraud may exist. Financial statements may be misstated 
as the result of defalcations and similar irregularities, or deliberate mis-
representations by management, or both. The auditor recognizes that 
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fraud, if sufficiently material, may affect his opinion on the financial state-
ments, and his examination, made in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards, gives consideration to this possibility. (§ 110.05) 
The foregoing seems to be a very clear statement right on issue. Fraud is identi-
fied as a source of error and the auditor is aware of the fact that any material 
error, including fraud, can have an impact on the fairness of the financial state-
ments. If this be so, the auditor's opinion and his responsibility are affected. If 
the statement stopped here, I would conclude that the auditor's responsibility for 
fraud is no different than for any other source of misstatement. I could then 
argue with force that, although the auditor must conduct his examination wi th 
due professional care, he is not a guarantor. Hence, despite an examination con-
ducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, material error 
may nevertheless remain undetected. Whether the source of the misstatement is 
fraud or honest error should be irrelevant. 
Unfortunatly, AudSEC' s statement continues, and like negative assurance, the 
meaning of an otherwise clear statement is considerably blunted. The next three 
sentences read as follows: 
However, the ordinary examination directed to the expression of an opinion 
on financial statements is not primarily or specifically designed, and cannot 
be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other similar irregularities, 
although their discovery may result. Similarly, although the discovery of 
deliberate misrepresentations by management is usually more closely asso-
ciated with the objective of the ordinary examination, such examination 
cannot be relied upon to assure its discovery. The responsibility of the 
independent auditor for failure to detect fraud (which responsibility dif-
fers as to clients and other) arises only when such failure clearly results 
from failure to comply with generally accepted auditing standards. 
What are these latter sentences attempting to say? Are they saying that the auditor 
is not responsible for detecting immaterial fraud? O r , are they saying that the 
auditor's responsibility for detecting error arising from fraud is different than for 
other kinds of error? For example, is the responsibility different i n the case of an 
honest error arising from the failure to account for obsolete inventory compared 
to an error arising from management deceit? If so, the auditor's opinion should 
be redrafted. O n the other hand, the statement may simply be pointing out that 
the auditor is not infallible. Hence, errors of any k ind may remain undetected 
even though the auditor has conducted an examination i n accordance with gen-
erally accepted auditing standards.1 
In any event, the statement as now drafted is ambiguous. Hence, any position 
inferred from this statement may be totally right or totally wrong. A clearer 
statement may not help, but I believe it would have a better chance than the 
current one. 
As to whether the auditor should specifically search for fraud, or any other 
source of error, I would assert that the audit mode should always be applicable to 
the circumstances. I believe that this statement simply generalizes from D o n 
Georgen's position that his firm would audit in the fraud mode only i n warranted 
circumstances—i.e., where the economic and other conditions may be conducive 
toward fraudulent activities. Rightly so, extensive tests are made i n the fraud 
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mode only in those circumstances where fraud is likely. But surely the general 
position also is right; i.e., extensive special tests of any k ind should be warranted 
by the circumstances. For example, if I am auditing a highly technical industry, 
characterized by ever-changing product specifications, I w i l l certainly apply rather 
special, and perhaps costly, tests for inventory obsolescence. Such tests would be 
totally unwarranted in other circumstances. I make this point not to be pedantic, 
but to support the position that fraud should be classified together wi th all other 
possible source of financial statement error. 
The Auditor's Responsibility for Illegal Payments 
W i t h respect to the auditor's responsibility for illegal payments, I hesitate to 
speak other than to confess my confusion. I am not greatly helped by recent 
court decisions or by statements of S E C Chairman H i l l . I could, perhaps, under-
stand the auditor's responsibility if it were related to either of the following 
circumstances: 
a) If failure to disclose such payments would cause financial statements to 
be materially misstated, or 
b) If the auditor had witnessed a crime and the failure to disclose were 
viewed as a conspiracy to cover-up. 
Thus, I find myself in agreement with D o n Georgen that our responsibilities in 
this area remain unclear. In the meantime, I believe his firm's position is exactly 
appropriate—i.e., audit i n the "illegal payment mode" i n those circumstances 
where illegal payments are likely to have occurred. 
Evaluation of Traditional Auditing Procedures 
In any consideration of the auditor's responsibility for the discovery of fraud, 
traditional auditing procedures warrant some attention. A number of traditional 
auditing procedures are directed to fraud detection. For example, since 1940, as 
the consequence of a classic case of massive management fraud, at least a portion 
of almost every audit is conducted in the fraud mode. In my judgment, a critical 
review of traditional auditing procedures would prove fruitful in suggesting 
modifications which could materially enhance the probability of discovering man-
agement fraud. I would like to use confirmation procedures as a caged example. 
In discussing auditing procedures, we often speak of independent confirma-
tion, i n which we represent that testimony is communicated directly from an 
independent third party to the auditor. T o assure such independence, we take 
some pains with the processes involved. As a personal indication of these con-
cerns, I once received some pointed criticism as a young auditor from a partner 
who observed my intention to mai l out confirmation letters i n the client's enve-
lopes. Never—before or since—have I heard such a lucid explanation of the 
importance of assuring independence i n the confirmation process. N o w , i n the 
Equity Funding case, we find revealed another significant "hole" in the process 
of independent confirmation. Although Equity Funding was replete with ques-
tionable auditing, the case also contains some significant lessons. 
Y o u w i l l recall i n the case that the auditor attempted to confirm the existence 
of securities i n the custody of a bank. However, he got burned by a very simple 
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ploy, totally unrelated to such traditional controls as "using the right envelopes" 
or "delivering of confirmation requests directly to the postal authorities." The 
special A I C P A Committee investigating Equity Funding describes the ploy as 
follows: 
A t the end of 1972 the auditors' request for confirmation of certain securi-
ties represented as being held i n safekeeping by the bank was addressed by 
company personnel to a mail drop set up under a name similar to the bank 
so company personnel would receive the request, sign the confirmation and 
return it to the auditors.2 
I wonder, are traditional auditing procedures adequate with respect to this matter? 
The special committee concluded on the issue with the following statement: 
Whi le this points up the need for auditors to ascertain that valid addresses 
are used, such a step is already a customary and integral part of confirma-
tion procedures.3 
Frankly, I would like to see the empirical evidence which supports the foregoing 
conclusion. M y own evidence, while admittedly limited and informally gathered, 
indicates that tests of the validity of confirmation addresses generally is limited to 
data contained in the client's records. If so, I suggest that such tests are inade-
quate to assure independent confirmation. 
In summary, based on my admittedly caged example, I suggest that traditional 
auditing procedures be subjected to continuing critical review on two fronts: 
first, we should test the logical connection between each l ink in the evidential 
chain, and second, we should study subsequently discovered misstatements not 
revealed in the auditing process. If auditing weaknesses are revealed, normal 
audit procedures should be corrected. 
Understanding the Client's Business 
A so-called "through the business approach" has been discussed in auditing 
literature, and particularly by Touche, for a number of years. I am pleased to note 
that the client investigation routine discussed by M r . Georgen places special em-
phasis on "understanding the client's business." I have come to believe that 
thorough prerequisite knowledge of the client's business is absolutely essential to 
effective auditing and, hence, to the discovery of material error—whether the 
source is fraud or an honest mistake. 
M y conviction on this point finds clear support i n philosophical literature 
dealing with the theory of knowledge. Marhenke states as follows, " Y o u cannot 
devise an observation test unti l you know the meaning of the sentence you are 
going to test."4 For example, with respect to auditing, consider the following 
sentence: "The inventory value on the balance sheet is fairly stated." T o test this 
sentence, the auditor must know not only the general meaning of inventory and 
inventory accounting, but also the special environment i n which this particular 
inventory is contained. Many special problems such as identification, physical 
condition, or obsolescence may be involved. If such special problems do exist, 
they form part of the meaning of the sentence to be tested. 
In discussing the nature of scientific inquiry, Susan Stebbing reinforces the 
point wi th the following statement: 
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A n examination of the examples we have given shows that a considerable 
amount of previous knowledge relevant to the situation is required before 
a problem can even be stated. Still more knowledge is required i n order 
that fruitful suggestions as to its solution should occur to the thinker. 5 
One may rightfully question why I am belaboring such an obvious point. 
Consider the following statement by the S E C i n A S R N o . 173 issued in July, 1975: 
Another lesson appears . . . where the auditors accepted assertions by man-
agement concerning the special circumstances of the business involved 
although presentation of the supposed results presented unusual accounting 
and auditing problems. In considerable measure this occurred because the 
auditors were not sufficiendy familiar wi th the business context to assess 
the representations of management. Auditors should be particularly careful 
when the client asserts that special circumstances require unusual account-
ing or auditing solutions and should either possess or avail themselves of 
sufficient industry knowledge to judge the substance of the situation. 
In A S R N o . 174, under a caption entitled " H F K ' s Understanding of Stirling 
Homex's Business" is the following statement: 
H F K , i n the opinion of the Commission did not fully understand the 
funding provisions applicable to Stirling Homex's operations under the 
H U D turnkey program and did not seek such advice. 
As was asserted by the S E C i n these two ASR's , failure to understand the client's 
business accounted for the failure to obtain competent evidence from which appro-
priate inferences could be drawn. More fundamentally, the auditors in these 
cases could not devise the proper observation tests because either (1) they did not 
know the meaning of the sentences they were trying to test, or (2) they did not 
know enough even to formulate appropriate propositions to be tested. 
In my judgment, prerequisite knowledge of the client's business is so funda-
mental to inquiry that steps should be taken to assure that such knowledge per-
vades the entire audit team. M u c h prerequisite knowledge is provided to younger 
staff members by recent university education and i n follow-on staff training pro-
grams. However, I wonder how many staff training programs are directed to 
specific industries and specific clients. I assert that inclusion of such programs i n 
the training budgets of accounting firms would be cost-beneficial. Although I 
have no evidence i n support of my assertion, I believe the concept can and should 
be empirically tested. 
Scientific Research Design—A Prototype for Auditing Procedures 
Georgen points out i n his paper that auditing procedures—particularly those 
procedures directed to the discovery of management fraud—are i n the develop-
ment state. As a matter of fact, all human knowledge is tentative and, hence, is 
subject to continuing mid-course corrections. Auditors w i l l continue to learn 
both from past mistakes and from research. As we learn more, auditing procedures 
w i l l continue to become more effective i n the discovery of fraud and other error. 
Experience, of course, is a great teacher. As some sage so wisely stated, "Foo l 
me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me." The SAS's are replete with 
auditing lessons learned from experience. However, the lessons of experience are 
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often bitter pills to swallow. Hopefully, therefore, we w i l l come, more and more, 
to rely on research for the development of auditing procedures. Research already 
has proved fruitful in the development of opinion modifications, understanding 
the application of statistical inference to auditing, and understanding the impact 
of the behavioral sciences on auditing. 
Compared to most other disciplines which evolve through research, auditing 
is unique in that a significant portion of the discipline itself comprises a system 
of inquiry. Thus, the principles of scientific research design stand as a ready-
made prototype for the investigative aspects of auditing. In my judgment, a 
significant positive step i n the development of auditing procedures would be 
recognition of this relationship by an authoritative professional body—say, 
A u d S E C . 
Every developing discipline has found that its problems begin to yield solu-
tions when the methods of organized inquiry are applied. We are just beginning 
to tackle accounting and auditing problems i n this fashion. Despite the many 
difficulties involved i n getting started, a number of problems are yielding solu-
tions. In my judgment, one of the blessings of the current high demand for 
accounting education is the concurrent demand for accounting doctorates—young 
people specifically trained to be researchers. The important point for auditing as 
a discipline is that research education implies the existence of a body of knowledge 
specifically about the research process. Because auditors, like trained researchers, 
are involved i n a system of inquiry, I assert that, i f all auditors were specifically 
trained i n the general methods of research design, auditing procedures and their 
ability to detect fraud and error would be significantly improved. Although I 
have no evidence to support my assertion, I am convinced that the concept can 
and should be empirically tested. 
In Summary 
In summary I would suggest the following: 
1. Fraud (and perhaps illegal payments) should be viewed by the profession 
as simply another possible source of financial statement error wi th re-
sponsibility and consequences no different than for any other source of 
error. Auditors would then be i n a better position to address with force 
the questions of due professional care vs. professional infallibility. 
2. So-called traditional auditing procedures should be subject to continuing 
review for logical "holes." Such review should assure maximum effec-
tiveness of normal auditing procedures to detect fraud and other errors. 
3. Thorough understanding of the client's business is an essential prerequi-
site to effective auditing and, hence, to the detection of fraud and other 
error. I further suggest that staff training be geared to developing the 
means of obtaining such an understanding by every member of the 
audit team. 
4. Because auditing is a system of inquiry, scientific research design should 
be adopted as a prototype for the investigative aspects of auditing. I 
further suggest that all auditors be trained i n the fundamentals of 
research design. 
Footnotes 
1. In May, 1976, A u d S E C announced the issuance of an exposure draft entitled The Inde-
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pendent Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities. The questions 
raised here may be answered by this statement. 
2. Report of the Special Committee on Equity Funding, American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, 1975, p. 23. 
3. Ibid., p. 32. 
4. Paul Marhenke, "The Criterion of Significance," Meaning and Knowledge: Systematic 
Readings in Epistemology, Edited by Ernest Nagel and Richard B. Brandt, Harcourt, Brace & 
World, Inc., New York, 1965, p. 35. 




Symbolism and Communication in the Auditor's Report 
Lee J. Seidier 
N e w Y o r k University 
The 1975 annual report of Arthur Andersen & Co . indicated that 6.6% of the 
firm's total revenue was received from five clients.1 Simple arithmetic applied to 
the total revenue figure leads to the conclusion that Arthur Andersen had five 
clients whose annual fees average about $5.1 mil l ion each. Us ing other averages 
given, the audit fee portion of the total was about $3.4 mil l ion for each client. 
Additional analysis of the data provided i n the report suggests that $3.4 mill ion 
of auditing fees would represent about 95 man years or 128,000 hours of work. 
Obviously, the precision of these manpower estimates is subject to some doubt, 
but even with a wide range of possible inaccuracy it is obvious that $3.4 mil l ion 
worth of auditing represents a prodigious expenditure of skilled accounting labor. 
Arthur Andersen did not indicate the particular clients that were the benefici-
aries of this lavish scrutiny. One might assume that the group includes Inter-
national Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, and Texaco, Inc., two of the 
largest corporations i n the world that are A A clients. Additional candidates 
among Arthur Andersen clients, considering size and complexity, might be U A L , 
Inc. (United Airl ines) , General Telephone & Electronics, and Occidental Pe-
troleum. 2 
Let us assume, for purposes only of a simple but significant point, that the 
above five corporations are, indeed, the five large clients referred to i n the Arthur 
Andersen & Co . annual report. Then, approximately 17 mill ion dollars, 475 man 
years, or about 640,000 man hours were expended in their audits. 
The Audit Reports to Five Largest Clients 
A brief, but rigidly conducted empirical study indicates that the audit reports 
to the shareholders of these five companies for the year 1974 (the audits most 
likely to have been performed in the Andersen fiscal year ended August 31, 1975), 
include a total of 875 words, or an average of 175 words each.3 
N o w consider the significance of this arithmetic. Arthur Andersen & Co. was 
required, within the confines of present, conventional practice, to communicate to 
tens of thousands of shareholders and other users, the nature, intent, scope, quan-
tity and results of the equivalent work of 95 professionals laboring for a year, 
in about 175 words—and no pictures. 
This , then, is the nub of the problem. Tradition, conventional usage, and 
ultimately the pronouncements of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants have developed a scheme whereby the auditor confines the report of 
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the results of an examination to a few dozen words; a few hundred if unusual 
complexities or exceptions manifest themselves. 
Audit Reports in Evolution 
Audits, as they commenced around the start of the 20th century, involved a 
fairly simple and straightforward verification of the existence of the company and 
its assets along with some assurance that substantial proportions of the wealth of 
a usually small number of shareholders had not been misappropriated by untrust­
worthy stewards. Since then, the corporations being audited have grown to 
staggering complexity and the auditor is now expected to attest the accuracy of 
the measured performance of management's attempts to maximize the wealth of 
hundreds of thousands of generally uninformed and disinterested investors. 
One might have expected that the vehicle for the auditor's communication of 
audit results would have undergone some comparable evolution, but that does not 
seem to be the case. Early audit reports issued in the United States (from 1900 
until after World War I) tended to be relatively brief: 
We have audited the books and accounts of the X Y Z company for the 
year ended December 31, 1915, and we certify that, in our opinion, the 
above balance sheet correctly sets forth its position as of the termination of 
that year, and that the accompanying profit and loss account is correct.4 
It appears that some "long" or descriptive "certificates" were issued in the 
1920's. D . R. Carmichael gives two examples: 1924 reports on American Loco­
motive Company and General Electric Company.5 The report of American 
Locomotive includes a number of statements which essentially describe the valua­
tion practices employed in the financial statements and provide an indication that 
proper accruals have been made. The General Electric report includes not only 
some valuation practices, but also a listing of many of the audit steps performed. 
Nevertheless, as described in an unpublished background paper prepared for 
the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities by Terry Aranoff, despite a number 
of wording changes, the opinion remained a brief, substantially unchanged 
document. 
References to conformity to generally accepted accounting principles and to 
generally accepted auditing standards were both included by 1941. The "short 
form" opinion probably reached a maximum modern length in 1941, when it also 
included a reference to a review of the system of internal control. Thereafter, 
the report evolved to the present standard opinion, accompanied by such critical 
debate as to the number of paragraphs which should be used. 
The Communication Issue 
Having established, or at least described, the massive communication problem 
that faces the auditor, I promptly disclaim any attempt in this paper to "solve" or 
offer a "solution" to that problem. This reluctance to grapple with the major 
problem stems not from limitations of space or time, but of knowledge. I would 
have preferred to offer a comprehensive approach to the communication issue. 
The staff of the Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities has developed several 
background papers that relate to the subject, including a long work on the history 
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of the auditor's opinion. The Commission has discussed the problem at length 
and a tentative paper has gone through several drafts. 
Notwithstanding this impressive volume of work and thought, there are few 
really new insights into either the problem or the solution. In short, I do not 
know the answer, and hence I cannot write a paper that provides one. 
However, some of the work of the Commission (that of one researcher in 
particular) and a modest amount of informal inquiry by the writer suggest that 
one element of the problem may have been missed in the past, or at least, not 
explored in enough detail. That element lies essentially in the description—and 
therefore nature—of the auditor's communication device. The auditor's message 
to the reader of audited financial statements has variously been styled as the 
"opinion," the "report," or the "certificate." The last appellation appears to be 
in some present disrepute, probably because of the degree of certainty it implies. 
The hypothesis of this paper is simple. The present auditor's report is not a 
certificate, a report, nor an opinion; it is a symbol. It is a symbol not only to the 
socalled unsophisticated user, but to the informed, professional investor as well. 
The Report as a Symbol 
The mere observation that the auditor's report is a symbol, or at least the 
implicit suggestion that the report functions in a symbolic manner is not novel. 
However, it appears that intimations that an auditor's report is a symbol are 
generally taken as a negative factor in the communication problem. There also 
appears to be a prevailing opinion that if the auditor's report is not carefully 
read by each user, it cannot convey the complex message that it contains. 
I suggest that if the auditor's report is essentially a symbol, then these limiting 
interpretations do not follow. To the contrary, if users do perceive the auditor's 
report largely as a symbol, then it can indeed convey the highly complex message 
that must inevitably result from the previously described enormous labors of 
the auditors. 
The Nature and Use of Symbols 
The classic 11th edition of Encyclopedia Britannica defines a symbol as " . . . a 
visible object representing to the mind the semblance of something which is not 
shown but which is realized by association with it." 6 
Modern analysis of symbols, signs and dreams, and the vastly increased use of 
symbolic logic in the sciences appear to have outdated both the "visible object" 
element of the definition, and even the ability of Britannica to provide a brief 
discussion of the subject. The current edition prefers to discuss "symbol" under 
a number of different subject areas, but not under its own. 
Freud and some of his interpreters, however, broadened the concept of symbols 
enough to permit themselves, at least, a brief definition. Erich Fromm suggests 
that a symbol might simply be, "something that stands for something else."7 
A symbol may merely be a visual abbreviation of a more complex object. Thus, 
the stick figures drawn by children serve to represent the full human figure. More 
commonly, and certainly of greater significance, a symbol may be a visible repre­
sentation of an object, idea or concept which bears no clear resemblance to the 
physical appearance of the symbol. In chemistry, alphabetical symbols represent 
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the elements. In mathematics, symbols may be used to represent that which 
cannot otherwise be conventionally represented; such as Π or ∞. 
Symbols, of course, are a major element in religion. The Greeks and Romans 
made direct representations of their Gods. The serpent represented evil in the 
first verses of Genesis and continues as such a representation to the present day. 
St. Peter is represented by keys; St. Paul by the sword. The principal symbol of 
Christianity, the cross, demonstrates the extraordinary power of a simple symbol 
to convey several different and sometimes extraordinarily complex messages. It 
may serve as the identification of a believer, as a protection against evil or the devil, 
and ultimately, as instant representation of an entire set of beliefs and teachings. 
Symbols play a major role in the modern world. The red star of Communism 
carries a vivid message to millions; a message that tends to contradict the symbol of 
Uncle Sam. However, while the rigidity of the five pointed red star largely defies 
artistic manipulation, the American symbol, Uncle Sam, is more flexible. He looks 
sternly demanding on the classic U.S. Army recruiting poster; slightly confused 
in Bob Grossman's liberal cartoons in New York Magazine; and threateningly 
sinister in his Pravda version. 
Thus, the same symbol may carry substantially different messages to different 
viewers. Actual alteration is not necessary. The red star means one thing to a 
member of the Russian Communist party, another to a member of the U.S. 
Republican party. Undoubtedly, a late 15th century Christian perceived a some­
what different message in the symbol of the cross than did a non-believer of the 
same period, being subjected to the not so tender recruiting techniques of the 
Inquisition. 
These differences in perception of the identical symbol stem from essentially 
different attitudes towards the underlying meaning of the symbol. The symbol 
is understood but its message is valued differently. 
Differences in the meaning of a symbol may also occur because of misunder­
standing or confusion about the symbol. A red traffic light is a symbol indicating 
"Stop" to most drivers. The symbol may not exist to the color blind driver who 
misses the message. In this case, the difference in perception of the symbol is the 
fault of the viewer. One assumes that the issuer of the symbol would prefer that 
all viewers make the same, unambiguous interpretation. 
In a contrary vein, different symbols may be perceived to be the same symbol. 
Certainly a major component of many advertising campaigns is the hope that 
just such confusion will occur. For example, it seems clear that some automobile 
designers believe that consumers perceive the unique front grill design of the 
Mercedes automobile to be a symbol of the quality of the car. Therefore, it appar­
ently is no coincidence that both the new Ford and Chrysler "quality" compact 
cars sport grills that are almost identical to that of the Mercedes. 
Symbol Recognition 
Logic suggests that visual complexity plays a role in increasing or decreasing 
the possibilities of correct recognition of a symbol. Thus, a circular symbol would 
rarely be confused with a square one. However, symbols based on six-sided poly­
gons might well be confused with octagonal symbols. The current economic and 
legal perils of such confusion of similar, but different symbols were recently 
demonstrated and well publicized when the highly paid creative staff of the 
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National Broadcasting Company labored and brought forth, at great expense, a 
television identification symbol that was almost identical to that generated at 
virtually no cost by the Nebraska educational television organization. 
The problem of uniform symbol recognition is quite different, however, from 
the problem of understanding or interpretation. Thus, virtually all drivers will 
recognize a "Drive Safely" sign; they may interpret and implement the message 
in quite different fashion. 
Developing Symbols 
The previous illustration leads to another basic point; symbols are not con­
fined to figures, signs or shapes. A language is essentially an aggregation of 
symbols. Each word is a symbol for a thing (noun), an action (verb), or a quality 
(adjective or adverb). However, the use of symbols as language is a conventional 
or neutral usage. There is no linkage between the form of the word-symbol and 
the object, action or quality represented. Thus, the letters b-o-o-k are merely the 
conventional representation of the object, book. Other than for purposes of re­
ducing confusion (of which there is a good deal in the English language), there 
is no particular reason to prefer one word symbol over another, as representations 
of the same object. 
Outside of their general use as language, words may acquire almost a universal 
symbolism. The conventional "STOP" sign is essentially a word symbol in many 
languages, reinforced by its being pointed on a red, octagonal sign. In New 
York, Chase Manhattan Bank has spent a great deal of money to popularize a 
simple geometric symbol. First National City Bank, however, abandoned a 
rather complex symbolic representation of the globe and is, instead, using its new 
official name, Citibank, as a word symbol. 
Language or written symbols need not be confined to one word. The conven­
tional disclaimer that identifies a preliminary prospectus as a "red herring" is five 
lines of small print. The symbolic content of the message is undoubtedly enhanced 
by the use of red ink, but it remains essentially a series of words. Once a novice 
investor discovers that the words are identical on every red herring, one doubts 
that the message is ever read again. The symbol makes the point. 
Written symbols need not be confined to relatively short messages. The 
Declaration of Independence (about 1,400 words) is the most important of all 
American historical documents. It is essentially a partisan document; a justifi­
cation for the American revolution. Yet, its unique combination of general prin­
ciples and abstract theory of government coupled with a specific enumeration of 
the conditions of freedom have made it one of the great Western political docu­
ments. Query, does the viewer of a framed reproduction of the original parch­
ment on a wall review all these complexities? Of course not; it is but a symbol 
of American democracy, and whatever democracy means to that viewer. 
As with so many symbols, the accuracy of representation and interpretation 
is not always perfectly clear. We celebrate July 4, the date on that document, as 
the symbol of Independence Day; the resolution itself was voted on July 2. It was 
not signed until several days later; no signatures were applied on the 4th. Far 
more important, of course, is the degree of comprehension of the philosophical 
content. It is apparent that the Declaration was viewed as almost officially binding 
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for some time; the Constitution of the United States and of many individual 
states clearly reflect the social contract it specified. 
Today, its influence and clarity may be somewhat different. Although repro­
ductions on the wall are honored, we are all familiar with occasional stories in 
the press of how enterprising "inquiring reporters" are unable to convince unsus­
pecting people to sign or endorse verbatim extracts from the Declaration of 
Independence. 
Interpreting Symbols 
Clearly, this long and detailed English language document has become a 
symbol whose actual original content is not known to many who pay it homage. 
Only at certain critical or celebrated times do people seem to refer back to the 
original symbol. Thus Watergate and the bicentennial celebration appear to have 
produced a good deal of rereading of two key symbols, the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution. 
Sometimes rereading or reexamination may lead to "agonizing reappraisal." 
Arthur Schlesinger, for example, in The Imperial Presidency confesses to current 
disenchantment with that former symbol of (modern) liberal dogma, the strong 
presidency. Thus, the same symbol may have different meanings to the same 
person, at different times, as experience tempers interpretation. 
A symbol need not have a tangible existence or even be visible in any way. 
As Fromm noted, man constantly engages in actions which are essentially sym­
bolic, from the simple removing a hat as a symbol of respect for a woman, to 
shaking hands as a symbol of friendly feelings, to the biblical rending of garments 
as a sign of mourning.8 
Of course, the Freudians consider dreams as symbols; complex symbols that 
require intense probing to determine their real meaning. However, the concept 
of a dream as a symbol, albeit interesting, leads to aspects that are not particularly 
fruitful in this discussion, for we are interested in the symbol as a vehicle for 
communication between people, not for the self revelation of one person. 
Herman Wouk points out the extraordinary complexity of the Old Testament 
symbol of Sabbath observance.9 The Sabbath strictures against work appear, at 
least superficially, as merely a rigorous means of enforcing a day of healthy rest 
for overworked farmers and merchants, seemingly reflecting the biblical rest of 
the Lord. However, the Sabbath observance rules prohibiting work are not to be 
interpreted literally. Indeed, in many cases the "work" required to obtain the 
literal rest of the Sabbath may exceed any concept of leisure and relaxation. How­
ever, the biblical concept of work is any interference by man, be it constructive or 
destructive, with the physical world. "Rest" is a state of peace between man and 
nature. Thus, reading of the scripture, which is "work" in a modern sense, is the 
"rest" of the sabbath, since it helps to achieve a state of peace between man and 
his God. The symbol "the Sabbath" may be interpreted on one level by orthodox 
intellectuals such as Wouk, and on a much lower, virtually automatic level, by 
ordinary believers, who simply light the candles, etc. at the right hour. 
Is the Auditor's Report a Symbol? 
Unfortunately, not a great deal is known about the way or ways in which 
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investors, creditors and others use the auditor's report, nor about the message(s) 
they derive from it. 
One starting place for consideration of the nature of the auditor's report is 
the reader of this paper. It is likely that the readers of this work will consist of 
persons reasonably familiar with annual financial statements and auditors' reports; 
indeed most are habitual readers of annual reports. 
Undoubtedly, during the course of reading an annual report (hopefully early 
in the reading) you examine the auditor's opinion. Now, consider just how you 
examine the auditor's opinion. Do you read every word, savoring each carefully 
constructed phrase until the full flavor of the delicious prose of the one or two 
paragraphs is clearly communicated? Of course not! You glance quickly, meas­
uring length and shape, at the same time noting the absence of several possible 
phrases such as, "except for" or "subject to." Probably one positive, searching 
element of your scrutiny will be absorbing the name of the auditing firm affixed 
to the report. 
Assuming that the troubling phrases are not detected and that the firm name 
does not connote any extreme reaction, you, as one of the better educated readers 
of financial statements, may then be completely finished with the auditor's report. 
Hundreds of thousands, possibly millions of dollars have been spent to obtain that 
report, and you complete your viewing in seconds. 
Was your speed of viewing due to any distaste for the wording, or to a belief 
that the report was unimportant? You will undoubtedly spend many multiples 
of the time devoted to the audit report on the notes to the financial statements; 
are they that much more important? 
The answer, of course, is obvious. You know the words in the auditor's report; 
indeed, if you are a practitioner or a teacher of accounting you probably know 
them by heart. You also know what you believe the words mean, although some 
searching would demonstrate that there are wide variations in the perceptions of 
that meaning, even among "experts." Only if the auditor's report looks "differ­
ent"—that is, if it contains an exception, will you devote any significant time to 
studying it. The auditor's report, at least in its most common form of a clean 
opinion, is a symbol. 
Unfortunately, such little exercises in personal exploration do not make the 
stuff of solid research conclusions. And equally unfortunately, there has been 
little formal research devoted to careful study of user perceptions of the auditor's 
report. 
Researching the Audit Report 
An elaborate opinion research study conducted for Arthur Andersen & Co. 
inexplicably focused comparatively little attention on the auditor's report. One 
question did indicate that approximately half of all shareholders read the auditor's 
report most or all of the time. The other half indicated that they sometimes, 
rarely, or never read the auditor's report.10 The Andersen publication also con­
tained a series of individual responses received in reply to the query, "What in 
particular do you look for in the auditor's report?"1 1 The number of responses 
reproduced is too small to permit any real analysis, but they do appear to be 
divided about equally between those who: 
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1. Were not clear what the auditor's report is (for example, versus the 
financial statements). 
2. Looked only to see if there were exceptions in the report. 
Respondents who had indicated that they rarely or never read the auditor's 
report were asked for their reasons. Virtually all the responses indicated ignorance 
of what the survey meant by the term "auditor's report."12 While this would be 
the expected response, explanations of reasons for negative action or inaction are 
rarely meaningful or useful. On the other hand, those who responded that they 
were only searching for exceptions would appear to be following the same 
symbol reading process that was described above. 
Marc Epstein's study on shareholder views of the annual report provided 
somewhat more interesting data.13 His study contains several unpleasant con­
clusions. Perhaps most upsetting was the indication that the annual report, the 
repository of the auditors report, was quite low on the scale of information sources 
preferred by investors. Almost half of the respondents considered "Broker's advice" 
to be the most preferred source of information. If broker's advice as a source is 
combined with those who indicated investment service and financial periodicals, 
fully 85% of the recipients preferred the use of a completely secondary source. 
Only 15% indicated the annual report as a preferred information source.14 
An additional 10% of the respondents indicated that they used "technical 
analysis." The use of this term was unfortunate, since it carries two different and 
quite contradictory meanings. To some it may connote conventional techniques 
of financial analysis. However, to many others, it undoubtedly means one or 
more of the chartist approaches, such as the Dow theory, which are in direct 
opposition to financial analysis. 
Attempts to draw strong conclusions from Epstein's results must consider the 
substantial proportion of his respondents who were unconcerned with the annual 
report, and hence, may be presumed to have no valid position (other than apathy) 
regarding the auditor's report. 
Nevertheless with this caveat, and helped by the reasonably large sample, 
some insight may be gained. 
On questions related to the reading and usage of the auditor's report, Ep­
stein's respondents gave results which he correctly labeled as "paradoxical."15 
Relative to investment decisions, the auditor's report ranked lowest in "useful­
ness" (p. 41), compared to all other parts of the annual report, including the 
"president's letter." The auditor's report also ranked lowest in "thorough" reader­
ship, as compared to all other parts of the annual report (p. 40). In a compari­
son of the responses of sophisticated and unsophisticated users of financial state­
ments, the utility of the auditor's report was about the same to both groups (p. 52). 
Epstein attempted to derive a relationship between readership of an item 
and its apparent utility to the reader. For the auditor's report, the results were 
again "paradoxical." 
. . . while the probability is close to one-half that a cursory reading (of the 
auditor's report) would be just as useful as a thorough one, the odds are 
8 to 1 that a thorough reading would yield more useful information than a 
cursory one in the other 50% of the cases. (p. 46) 
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The confusion was compounded by an indication that most respondents did 
not want additional information or explanation about the auditor's report. 
Epstein's results are indeed somewhat confusing, if the auditor's report is 
considered as an element of the annual report which contains what might be 
called "variable" information; that is, if the auditor's report contains information 
that would often be new and different when read by a user. 
However, if the auditor's report is a symbol to the reader, then Epstein's 
results are quite logical. Most viewers of symbols do not read them at length; 
they glance at them. This explains the low readership. However, if the symbol 
is unambiguous and easily comprehended, all readers should be able to gain the 
desired information in the same brief glance. Hence the similarity of apparent 
utility to sophisticated and unsophisticated investors; both get the same message 
quickly and easily. But, what about the supposed low utility of the auditor's 
report to both groups? Consider the symbol referred to earlier of a reproduction 
of the Declaration of Independence on the wall of an office or school room. Does 
that symbol—the reproduction—have any great utility? No. It is the concept, the 
existence of the democratic institutions underlying the Declaration of Independ­
ence that gives value and symbolism to the reproduction. The reproduction itself 
is of no importance, other than a reminder of the existence of the reality. 
The auditor's opinion is also only a reminder of the fact that an audit was 
performed. If the opinion is "clean," the audit itself is largely irrelevant to the 
reader, at least as far as investment decisions are concerned. Thus, the clean 
opinion has little apparent utility in investment decisions, so long as it is there. 
Unfortunately, Epstein did not (and probably could not) test the utility of the 
audit report against the situation where the audit report was not there; that is, 
the utility of audited financial statements versus unaudited statements. 
Note too, that the symbolic concept also explains the results quoted above: 
that in one-half of the cases, a cursory reading is as valuable as a thorough one, 
and that in the other half of the cases, a thorough reading might carry much more 
value. Epstein did not distinguish between clean and qualified opinions. One can 
easily hypothesize that a clean opinion yields the same information in any type 
of reading, while the opinion with exception provides more information to the 
thorough reader. 
In sum, portions of the paradoxes suggested by Epstein could be explained if 
the auditor's report is perceived to be a symbol by most readers. 
If the Auditor's Report Is a Symbol 
There appears to be reasonable evidence, along with common sense perception, 
that many readers of many auditors' opinions do, indeed, regard the report essen­
tially in the nature of a symbol. If the opinion is a symbol, what then are the 
implications for the communication problem? 
One obvious consideration would involve a determination of the message, or 
messages now being drawn by users from the symbol. As we noted earlier, the 
same symbol may well produce substantially different messages to different 
viewers. For the seasoned auditor, the "clean opinion" probably conjures up a 
variety of images, possibly varying depending on personal experiences with clients. 
An auditor whose experience has been limited to "clean" audits may well perceive 
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the opinion in the light of these pleasant jobs. An auditor with a more varied 
client base may well be reminded of less than satisfactory resolutions of difficult 
problems. By imputing personal experiences to auditors' reports in general, the 
view might be quite skeptical. 
Auditors, of course, constitute only a small fraction of the total audience for 
auditors' reports; the reactions of investors and creditors are of far greater interest 
and importance. Unfortunately, as suggested by the earlier discussions, little is 
known about the messages received by users of audited financial statements. The 
comments given by respondents to the Epstein study suggest that at least some 
investors—with no apparent distinction between sophisticated and non-sophisti­
cated—seem to view the clean opinion as a "Good Housekeeping Seal." 
Given the lack of information about the symbolic message(s) users received 
from the auditor's report, there appears to be little value in additional guessing 
in this area. Clearly, however, research to determine the nature of the message(s) 
received by users should have high priority. 
For purposes of this paper, let us hypothesize that users of audited financial 
statements do receive a message from (clean) opinions that is essentially a seal of 
approval. Let us also hypothesize that it is agreed that users ought to receive some 
other message, not merely one which connotes "approval." This hypothesis begs 
the very real question of whether or not a simple message of "approval" is the 
appropriate information that should be derived from the auditor's report. Mautz 
and Sharaf suggest an audit report that states: 
We have examined with due audit care the data found in (name of state­
ment or statements) and find that they present fairly (the purpose of 
the statement).16 
Thus, they appear to be sanctioning just such a message. Nevertheless, let us 
assume that it is desired that the auditor's report carry some other message than 
the one(s) presently conveyed to users. 
Small Changes in a Symbol Are Useless 
A great deal of effort has been expended by members of the accounting pro­
fession in devising rather minute changes in the wording of the standard form 
opinion. The differences between the usage of "presents fairly" and "true and 
correct" (by the British) produced many articles and an almost fundamental 
schism between the U.S. and the British professions. Today, the accounting 
profession continues to consider small changes in the wording of the report. 
A basic point in symbol perception is that small differences in complex symbols 
are not readily perceived. Slight modifications in the wording of the opinion, 
although possibly perceived to be of great import to the accounting profession, 
are likely to go unperceived by users of auditors' reports. 
It is possible that a small difference in the wording of the opinion would have 
an effect in a court case, but it is doubtful. While accountants and others are fond 
of ridiculing the lawyers' preoccupation with fine differences of wording, there 
appear to be few, if any, court cases where the decision has hung on a few words 
in the opinion. On the other hand, there are many court cases where the total 
(symbolic) impression created by the opinion was the central focus. 
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Thus, the first conclusion to be drawn, if the auditor's report is a symbol, is 
that small wording changes in the opinion are probably futile exercises. The 
opinion will be viewed as a whole, as a symbol. Slight changes in the symbol will 
not be noticed, examined, or internalized by users. 
It follows, then, that any changes in the auditor's opinion to be meaningful 
should be significant changes, both in substance and in form. The user of the 
report must quickly perceive that a different symbol is present. That perception 
will be necessary to force a further investigation of the new symbol. 
Is Education the Answer? 
A related conclusion concerns efforts at "education" of the users of financial 
statements. It has frequently been asserted that since the user of the auditor's 
report does not appear to understand what the report connotes, the user must be 
educated. A number of persons appearing before the Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities suggested the development of a booklet or other device that would 
inform users about the meaning of the auditor's report. 
While such educational efforts would probably not be harmful, their effective­
ness, alone, is doubtful. First, there is now no shortage of auditing textbooks that 
clearly explain what auditors do. More important, however, is that in the absence 
of a significant change in the symbol—the auditor's report—the educational effort 
will most likely be wasted. Users already have perceptions of the meaning of the 
symbol. It is extremely difficult to explain to them that the symbol means some­
thing else. Indeed, it is much easier to change the symbol, for a new symbol will 
be perceived as potentially meaning something else. 
Note that business organizations have grasped that concept. When corpora­
tions attempt to change their "image," they inevitably change the visual symbol, 
sometimes even the name of the corporation, in order to produce a quickly under­
stood message. It is apparently of little use merely to "explain" that there has been 
a change; a symbolic indication appears necessary. 
Thus, any intended changes in the meaning of the auditor's report should be 
accompanied by a clearly visible change in the size, form or other make-up of 
the report. 
This conclusion suggests a corollary with regard to opinions with exceptions. 
Since it seems clear that readers regard the clean opinion as a symbol, efforts 
should be made to assure that the different symbol, namely an opinion with an 
exception, can be noted quickly and easily. This again suggests some substantial 
difference in form, rather than a small wording change, to indicate an exception. 
This difference could be accomplished in several ways. A l l clean opinions could 
be written in single paragraph form, with a two or three paragraph form used 
for opinions with exceptions. Alternatively, or in addition, the entire exception 
could be included in the opinion, rather than as is currently common, by making 
a brief reference to a footnote that describes the exception in detail. 
Symbols Can Carry Simple or Complex Messages 
As noted early in this paper, there appears to be a persistent tendency among 
auditors to shorten the conventional standard form opinion. There are obviously 
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several reasons for this tendency, one of which is the probably misguided belief 
that a shorter opinion reduces potential legal problems. 
Another element of the tendency towards brevity, however, appears to be the 
feeling that the opinion cannot be made to carry a complex message. Stated 
another way, the current readership of the opinion appears to be cursory (as 
explained above). Therefore, if a longer explanation of the auditing process were 
included in the opinion, it too would not be read. 
If the lack of interest of readers of the present short-form report were due to a 
general lack of interest in the audit and the audit report, then the previous logic 
would indeed follow. However, as has been suggested earlier, it is more logical 
to suppose that users do not now read the short form report because they do not 
have to; it is a symbol and they think they understand it without reading it again 
and again. 
It was earlier noted, however, that symbols need not be brief or simple in 
meaning. Some symbols convey simple messages; some convey complex messages, 
and some convey both simple and complex messages, depending upon the reader. 
There is no logical reason for believing that the auditor's report cannot be made 
to convey a complex message. In addition, it might be possible to convey, at the 
same time, a simpler message. 
Consider, for example, the possibility of substantially enlarging the current 
short form opinion to include a brief description of the principal assumptions of 
auditing—testing, sampling, evidentiary limitations, etc.—along with a brief sum­
mary of the principal audit steps. Certainly, some of the present beliefs by many 
users (as expressed in many court cases) in the apparent infallibility of auditors 
and the audit process (and even the accounting process) might be dispelled. 
Would users read such an expanded version of the audit report? Epstein's 
study seems to suggest that users read that part of the annual report that they be­
lieve contains new or variable information. If the opinion were substantially 
expanded, readers would find a new symbol. It seems logical that if the new 
symbol appeared sufficiently different from the old, then users would be virtually 
forced to attempt to understand the new symbol. That process would involve a 
reading of the new, long report and attempts to comprehend its meaning and 
import. 
Assuming that such comprehension were eventually achieved, through either 
repeat reading or other sources, the new, longer report would once again become 
another (usually) unread symbol. But, the message of the symbol would have 
been changed and presumably understood (or misunderstood) by users. 
Note, that this analysis also suggests the possibility of "two tier" disclosure, 
which has been advocated frequently by the SEC. The longer audit report could 
well convey one important message to certain readers, such as the courts, while at 
the same time, it could provide a simpler message of approval to the ordinary 
investor. 
The key point, however, is that if the opinion is a symbol it does not follow 
that it must be simple or brief. To the contrary, a symbolic interpretation suggests 
substantially greater possibilities for complexity. 
Of course, the concept of the report as a symbol could also be used to support 
a shortening of the current, standard form report. As cited above, Mautz and 
Sharaf suggested a shorter form. However, if the clean opinion is only a symbol 
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of approval, then, in its simplest and most readily comprehended form, it might 
merely state:17 
C L E A N OPINION 
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Discussant's Response to 
Symbolism and Communication in the Auditor's Report 
Charles W. Lamden 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
Professor Seidler's analysis of symbolism as a major factor in the auditor's 
report is most perceptive. Intuitively, I have felt for some time that the standard 
wording of the audit report should be retained. However, the arguments that the 
auditor's report should be expanded or contracted, clarified, simplified, or what­
ever it was felt was necessary to improve communication also sounded reasonable. 
The concept of the audit report as a symbol resolves my dilemma. 
Changes in the Wording of the Auditor's Report to Improve the Symbol 
It is a fact that the standard wording of the auditor's report has been adopted, 
utilized and well recognized. Except for those trained in accounting, who under­
stand the overall scope of the examination and the background and meaning of 
the terms "auditing standards," "accounting principles," and "opinion," the only 
way to understand the general use and acceptance of the audit report is as a 
symbol. 
Upon reflection, as Professor Seidler points out, even those who have the back­
ground and knowledge to understand the technical meaning of the words do not 
concern themselves with the standard words, but rather look only for the excep­
tions. The standard wording is a symbol also for the technicians. 
It becomes quite clear, then, that changing a few words or adding explanatory 
comments in the standard audit report are not the answer for improving com­
munication in the auditor's report. 
The communication problem results from the fact that the same symbol may 
carry different messages to different viewers. For example, certain users of the 
audit report interpret it as a guarantee rather than an expression of opinion as to 
overall fairness of the presentation of the financial statements. Some may argue 
that an explicit statement such as "This is not a guarantee as to the value of the 
assets included in the financial statements" would improve the communication. 
But even this explanatory comment could convey different messages to different 
readers. Knowledgeable readers would say "Of course the auditor is not a 
guarantor." But others could interpret such a comment as an adverse statement. 
Nor would listing the auditing standards or the detailed procedures followed 
in the audit necessarily increase the effective communication for most users. As 
indicated by the studies to which Professor Seidler referred, ". . . most respondents 
did not want additional information or explanation about the auditor's report." 
Moreover, the listings would tend to become repetitious, and users looking for a 
symbol of credibility would be concerned only with any exceptions. This has 
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already been demonstrated historically with the decline in the use of the auditor's 
long form report. The concepts embodied in the phrases "generally accepted 
auditing standards" and "the procedures necessary in the circumstances" convey 
the message adequately. 
Psychological Impact of the Auditor's Report 
If one accepts the proposition that the audit report is a symbol and changes in 
wording will have little or no effect on improving the communication between 
issuers and users of the report, this still leaves the question as to what message the 
symbol should convey. The issuer, in general, wants to indicate the scope of the 
examination, that the examination has been made in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards, that tests of the accounting records and other audit 
procedures were those considered necessary in the circumstances, and that the 
opinion attests to the fairness (in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles) of the financial statements that were examined. The issuer also wants 
the message to indicate that generally accepted accounting principles have been 
consistently observed in the current period in relation to the preceding period, that 
the informative disclosures are reasonably adequate, and that the degree of 
responsibility being taken is clearly shown. 
The reference to "generally accepted auditing standards" connotes the entire 
professional background of the auditor and the methodology of conducting an 
audit which takes years of education and experience to acquire and adequately 
comprehend. The issuer of the reports uses the standard wording to convey this 
message. Consciously or sub-consciously the issuer must recognize that the words 
used are only a symbol for the message intended to be conveyed. The psychological 
impact of the issuer's background and training make it possible for the issuer to 
be satisfied that the message is being conveyed. 
While some critics of the report may be dissatisfied with the adequacy of the 
message, the consensus is certainly that a message is being conveyed. This con­
sensus may be even more pervasive if the audit report is recognizd as a symbol. 
The psychological impact of the symbol to the user of the report would seem 
to be even more evident. Seidler makes the point well when he says, ". . . if 
users do perceive the auditor's report largely as a symbol, then it can be used to 
convey the highly complex message that must inevitably result from the previ­
ously described enormous labors of the auditors." In any event the psychological 
impact both for the issuer and the user of the audit report is reflected in the fact 
that the independent auditor's attestation to the credibility of financial statements 
is generally accepted. 
Some Limitations to the Symbol Concept 
If all opinions were unqualified, the basic hypothesis that the auditor's report 
is a symbol would be even more meaningful. However, the fact that there are 
qualified opinions, disclaimers, and adverse opinions gives rise to degrees of 
credibility. When there is a modification of the standard wording due to a 
qualification of the auditor's report, it then becomes important to read the auditor's 
report carefully. Further, various types of "special reports" require careful reading, 
since the standard wording and, accordingly, the basic symbol are not applicable. 
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One cannot dispute Seidler's observation that ". . . if the opinion is 'clean,' 
the audit itself is largely irrelevant to the reader, at least as far as investment 
decisions are concerned. Thus, the clean opinion has little apparent utility in 
investment decisions, so long as it is there." But that is the main point—SO 
L O N G AS IT IS T H E R E . Other audit reports such as qualified opinions, dis­
claimers of opinions related to unaudited financial statements, and "special re­
ports" cannot be classified as covered by the basic symbol. Accordingly, the basic 
symbol concept can be utilized only for "clean" opinions. 
It is quite evident that minor changes in the wording in the basic symbol (the 
clean opinion) will not be effective. No matter how important such wording 
changes are to the auditor who prepares the report, they will probably have little 
or no effect on the user. Accordingly, if the intention is to utilize a different 
symbol (e.g., an opinion with an exception), then an overt effort must be made 
to distinguish between the basic symbol and a new symbol. Seidler makes it clear 
that the new symbol must be significantly different in both substance and form. 
This can be implemented, for example, if a Statement on Auditing Standards 
were issued which would require that all unqualified (clean) opinions be written 
in a single paragraph, whereas qualified opinions, adverse opinions, disclaimers 
of opinion or "special reports" must be in a format of two or more paragraphs. 
These "one:two" symbols would be more readily differentiated than today's 
"two:three" symbols. 
While one can concur, substantially, with the thesis that the standard short 
form report is a basic symbol, it is not necessary to agree with the idea that the 
symbol can be reduced to just the two words, "Clean Opinion." As indicated 
earlier, especially from the viewpoint of the preparer of the audit report, there is 
merit in stating the scope of the examination and repeating in each report the 
reference to "generally accepted auditing standards," "generally accepted ac­
counting principles," "fair presentation," and "consistency." 
The Impact of the Symbol on the Issuer of Financial Statements 
In his presentation, Professor Seidler refers primarily to the communication 
between the auditor and the third party user of the financial statements. In dis­
cussing communication as related to the auditor's report, it is also appropriate to 
recognize the communication involved between auditor and client (the issuer of 
the underlying financial statements). While much of this communication is con­
ducted through other media (e.g., the "letter to management"), the psychological 
impact of the "clean opinion" symbol on the issuer of the financial statements 
should not be overlooked. It is important to the issuer of the financial statements 
(the client) to have an auditor's report symbolic of a "seal of approval." Ac­
cordingly, the client will adapt recording procedures, presentation, valuation of 
assets or liabilities, or disclosures in order to receive an unqualified opinion. 
Some Considerations Related to the Future 
Accepting the hypothesis that the present standard short form unqualified 
auditor's report is a symbol, does not, as Seidler recognizes, solve the massive 
communication problem that currently faces the auditor. The search for a solution 
of that overall problem is left to the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities. 
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Even as the Commission grapples with the problem, the complications in­
crease. Auditors are now called upon to report on interim financial statements 
and footnotes related to "replacements costs," neither of which is encompassed 
by the basic symbol. Moreover, the future portends new types of disclosures and 
the reporting and attestation to many new types of information. For example, 
reporting on such matters as forecasts, systems quality, and social accounting 
information will not only require considerably more knowledge and skill for the 
auditor, but will also have a significant impact on communication and the nature 
or types of symbols that can or should be used. 
Auditors functioning as reviewers of and attestors to new types of information 
will undoubtedly face great obstacles in attempting to communicate with users. 
The new information will reflect many unfamiliar concepts, judgments and im-
precisions. Moreover, much of the new data will be more subjective and less 
quantifiable than the data underlying current financial statements. 
In summary, the recognition of the auditor's report as a symbol is significant 
in giving an important perspective to the communication between the auditor 
and the users of the audit report. But the overall solution of the auditor's com­
munication problems—both in the present and in the future—leaves a fertile field 
for exploration, research and analyses by auditors, researchers and educators. 
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Risk and Uncertainty in Financial 
Reporting and the Auditor's Role 
D. R. Carmichael* 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Grant's Is Going Out of Business 
Just as the newspaper, radio and T V ads say, this is an honest-to-goodness 
closeout sale. W . T . Grant Company, one of the nation's major retailers, has 
filed for bankruptcy. 
Predictably—and it's one of the few accurate predictions possible when a 
company declares bankruptcy—everyone involved in the issuance of the financial 
statements, including the independent auditors, has been named in a class action 
suit alleging past financial statements were false and misleading. Such events 
raise a critical question: What is the auditor's obligation to warn investors of 
impending trouble? 
A Look at the 1974 Annual Report 
The untutored eye of the ordinary investor only had to be open to see W . T . 
Grant was in trouble. In his opening message to stockholders, James G. Kendrick, 
Chairman of the Board and President, outlined ". . . the three most serious prob­
lems facing the Company: 
• A serious merchandise imbalance. 
• The severe burden posed by the accelerated store expansion program. 
• The excessive build-up of credit receivables, financed at high interest rates 
and administered through an exceedingly expensive credit program." 
For the year ended January 30, 1975, sales dropped slightly, but $24 million was 
charged for store closing expense, net credit expense went from approximately 
$6 million to $161 million, and earnings showed a loss of nearly $177 million, 
after having declined to $11 million for the year before. Short-term debt had in­
creased steadily over the last five years to $600 million. The current ratio dropped 
from a range of 1.5 to 1.7 in past years to 1.2. Dividends per share of common 
stock were cut from $1.50 in prior years to 30¢. 
A l l that information was spelled out in detail for investors. Anyone who con­
tinued through the annual report to the notes to financial statements found more 
* This paper presents the author's personal views and is not necessarily representative of the 
views of any AICPA Committee, the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, or other AICPA 
or Commission staff members. 
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distressing news. Changes in the company's borrowing agreements revealed 
creditors and suppliers of merchandise were very concerned with Grant's ability 
to pay. 
The Auditors Were Uncertain 
Grant's independent auditors issued the following "subject to" qualified 
opinion dated April 18, 1975. 
We have examined the consolidated statements of financial position of 
W . T . Grant Company and consolidated subsidiaries as of January 30, 
1975, and January 31, 1974, and the related consolidated statements of 
operations, capital and changes in financial position for the 52 weeks ended 
January 30, 1975 and the year ended January 31, 1974. Our examinations 
were made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and, 
accordingly, included such tests of the accounting records and such other 
auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. The 
financial statements of Zeller's Limited, used as the basis for recording the 
Company's equity in net earnings of that corporation, were examined by 
other independent accountants whose reports were furnished to us. Our 
opinion expressed herein, insofar as it relates to the amounts of net earnings 
included for Zeller's Limited, is based solely on the reports of the other 
independent accountants. 
As discussed in Note 10 to the financial statements, the Company has 
protested certain deficiencies in consolidated Federal income taxes proposed 
by the Internal Revenue Service for the years ended January 31, 1964 
through 1971, and is presently in litigation regarding such proposed de­
ficiencies for the years ended January 31, 1964 and 1965. It is not prac­
ticable to estimate the additional income taxes and interest payable, if any, 
at this time. As discussed in Note 2 to financial statements, the continuing 
value of the Company's total investment in the common stock and con­
vertible notes of Granjewel Jewelers & Distributors, Inc., a 51% owned 
subsidiary, may be impaired as a result of the potential inability of such 
subsidiary to continue as a going concern. 
In our opinion, based on our examinations and the reports of other 
independent accountants, subject to the effects, if any, on the financial state­
ments of the ultimate resolution of the matters discussed in the preceding 
paragraph, the financial statements referred to above present fairly the 
consolidated financial position of W. T . Grant Company and consolidated 
subsidiaries at January 30, 1975 and January 31, 1974, and the consolidated 
results of their operations and the changes in their financial position for 
the 52 weeks ended January 30, 1975 and the year ended January 31, 1974, 
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a 
consistent basis after restatement for the change, with which we concur, 
in the method of accounting for finance income as described in Note 1 to 
the financial statements. 
What Is the Purpose of the "Subject to" Qualification? 
Is the auditor pointing to something that is wrong with the financial state­
ments? The answer has to be "no" because then the report would indicate a 
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departure from generally accepted accounting principles and the qualification 
would be introduced by "except for." 
Is the auditor only emphasizing a matter that is already apparent from or dis­
closed in the financial statements? Note 2 discloses that ". . . because of the net 
loss incurred by Granjewel and difficulties in obtaining adequate financing suffi­
cient for continued business operations and compliance with terms of loan agree­
ments, it is not presently determinable as to whether such subsidiary will be able 
to continue as a going concern." The dispute with the IRS is also fully explained 
in a note. 
Should the "subject to" qualification be viewed as a withholding of an opinion 
on a portion of the financial statements that is indeterminable because of the 
uncertainty? Does the qualification, therefore, indicate a possible future adjust­
ment of that portion of the statements? 
Perhaps the function of the "subject to" qualification is only to post a warning 
of impending trouble. If that is its purpose, how serious or imminent should the 
matter be before qualification is required? Should investors have expected the 
auditor's report to point to the information in the annual report that showed 
W. T . Grant Company might not continue in existence? Certainly that possibility 
should have been apparent to the investor from a quick reading of the annual 
report. But why then is any qualification necessary? 
The auditor's reporting obligation for significant or unusual uncertainties is 
far from settled. The answer ultimately depends on the view taken of the 
independent auditor's role. The auditor's role is to add credibility to financial 
information. The auditor cannot change the risk of doing business. Neither is it 
possible to guarantee the success of the businesses that are audited. One im­
portant facet of the free enterprise system is that every business has the oppor­
tunity to fail. 
Information Risk vs. Business Risk 
Two distinct types of risk accompany investment in securities.1 Information 
risk is the risk associated with production and distribution of financial informa­
tion. It represents the possibility that the same business conditions will appear 
to be different because of errors in the process of accumulating, summarizing, or 
presenting information. Reducing information risk is the auditor's job. 
Business risk represents the forces in an uncertain economy. Success in busi­
ness requires taking chances. Big success requires huge gambles. Investors who 
want to share in the possibility of success assume the risk that naturally accom­
panies the uncertainties inherent in business activities. 
How Do Uncertainties Affect the Auditor's Concern with Information Risk? 
The auditor's responsibilities for reporting on financial statements are covered 
in the AICPA's Statements on Auditing Standards. Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 2 advises independent auditors that ". . . when there are material 
uncertainties the outcome of which is not susceptible of reasonable estimation, the 
auditor should consider whether to express an unqualified opinion or to qualify 
his opinion. . ." An opinion qualified because of an uncertainty takes the general 
form of the auditor's report on W. T . Grant's financial statements. The form of 
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an auditor's qualified opinion is spelled out in detail, but the meaning and 
significance of a "subject to" qualification and what should require it are still 
debated by accountants. 
For example, Henry H i l l recently expressed the view that "the proper method 
of reporting on uncertainties seems to be the greatest uncertainty of all." 2 Louis 
H . Rappaport has described the major point of contention in these words: 
Some accountants contend that the "subject to" qualification . . . is re­
dundant and unnecessary. In most cases where it is used, there is a clear 
reference to information in the statements, indicating that the matter can­
not be resolved. A lawsuit, for example, is awaiting judicial determination, 
and counsel is unable or unwilling to forecast the result. An important tax 
case is awaiting decision in the Tax Court. A company's claim for reason­
able profits on government contracts is before the Renegotiation Board. 
A company's basic patents are being challenged by competitors. A com­
pany's application for rate increases is being heard by a regulatory com­
mission having jurisdiction over rates. Where these or similar circum­
stances exist, in all likelihood they are set forth in the financial statements 
or in notes to the statements. Since the statements with their notes do set 
forth the company's financial position and results of operations, what good 
purpose is served by the "subject to" language in the accountants' certifi­
cate calling attention to what is in the statements? These accountants con­
tend that qualifications and exceptions should be restricted to those matters 
with respect to which there is a disagreement between the accountant and 
his client. In the circumstances which we have been discussing there is no 
dispute; the accountant presumably is completely in agreement with the 
representations in the statements. 
Other accountants, however, contend that in these circumstances the com­
pany's financial position and/or results of operations are indeterminate 
and they are therefore not in a position to form an opinion in respect of the 
matter in question. For that reason, and for reasons of emphasis, they 
believe the "subject to" qualification is appropriate.3 
The debate on "subject to" qualifications has been going on for some time. 
Some accountants have the impression that proper use of "subject to" qualifica­
tions was settled long ago. Actually, an accounting series release by the SEC as 
recently as 1962 set the present ground rules and caused the "subject to" qualifica­
tion to assume its current significance. Independent auditors had recognized the 
possible need to qualify opinions in the early 1900's and the "subject to" phrase 
was one of the earliest used. However, as late as the 1950's the phrases "subject to" 
and "except for" were used interchangeably. 
In Accounting Series Release No. 90, the SEC specified the following dis­
tinction: 
A "subject to" or "except for" opinion paragraph in which these phrases 
refer to the scope of the audit, indicating that the accountant has not been 
able to satisfy himself on some significant element in the financial state­
ments, is not acceptable in certificates filed with the Commission in con­
nection with the public offering of securities. The "subject to" qualification 
is appropriate when the reference is to a middle paragraph or to footnotes 
explaining the status of matters which cannot be resolved at statement date. 
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Shortly after ASR No. 90 was issued, one accountant observed: 
It has been our opinion for many years, dating back to pre-SEC days, that 
the words "subject to" in an opinion paragraph were so ambiguous that 
they conveyed no clear-cut meaning to the reader. There is no way of 
telling whether they are intended to be a qualification of the opinion, or 
whether they are intended merely to direct the attention of the reader to 
some significant fact which has been more fully disclosed elsewhere.4 
A newcomer to the financial reporting scene might reasonably wonder what all 
of the fuss is about. What difference does it make if auditors' opinions are 
qualified and, if they are qualified, why does use of "subject to" rather than 
"except for" make any difference? 
The Importance of Being Uncertain 
For one, the SEC is very concerned with the form and content of the auditor's 
report. Under the administrative procedures followed by the SEC staff, the type 
of auditor's report has important consequences. Generally, financial statements 
will not be acceptable in a filing if the auditor is unable to express an unqualified 
opinion because of a departure from generally accepted accounting principles or 
a limitation on the scope of the examination. On the other hand, a qualification 
caused by an uncertainty is not automatically unacceptable. 
In practice, the "subject to" qualification has become an administrative con­
venience. Since it is relatively easy to recognize that a qualification is introduced 
by "subject to" rather than "except for," the "subject to" phrase has become the 
password for an acceptable qualified opinion. Thus, one of the problems caused 
by the "subject to" qualification is that since it is acceptable to the SEC, any 
matter that can possibly be regarded as an uncertainty may receive a "subject to" 
rather than an "except for" qualified opinion. 
A "subject to" qualified opinion, however, may not be so acceptable to in­
vestors. In its 1972 annual report, Boothe Computer showed a $36.5 million 
write-off of additional depreciation on its portfolio of I B M 360 equipment. Com­
menting on Boothe's annual report, Forbes magazine described a "subject to" 
qualification in this exuberant language: 
Now we read that even with the decks thus cleared, Boothe's auditing 
firm, Touche Ross & Co., had still qualified its opinion of the company's 
1972 statements. A qualified opinion is no laughing matter. It's like 
tacking a quarantine notice up on a company's door. Bankers, creditors, 
beware! Bondholders, stockholders, on your guard! Touche Ross was say­
ing that even with the carrying value of Boothe's rental equipment pared 
way, way down by the write-off, it still had serious reservations about 
the company's ability to recover the remainder of its computer investment 
through future rentals.5 
Thus, a "subject to" qualified opinion has several consequences. In compari­
son to other types of qualifications, the company's financial statements are ac­
ceptable to the SEC, but investors are warned reported results may at some future 
date be adjusted. Also, the general belief has been that by pointing out the 
uncertainty the auditor will be absolved of responsibility if the uncertainty is 
resolved unfavorably. 
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The influence of a "subject to" qualification makes resolution of questions 
concerning its meaning or its necessity important. What are the relationships 
among the auditor's opinion, the uncertainty, and the financial statements? Is 
the opinion or the financial statements "subject to" the uncertain outcome? What 
purpose is the "subject to" qualified opinion intended to serve and does it do so 
effectively? 
Forbes' consideration of Boothe's 1972 annual report, for example, points out 
that two other computer leasing clients of the same public accounting firm re­
ceived clean opinions that year. Both Leasco Corporation's leasing subsidiary and 
Greyhound's subsidiary, Greyhound Computer Corporation, are in the same 
business as Boothe. A l l three companies had similar-sized rental portfolios in the 
$200 million plus range and all were facing the same competitive problem of 
IBM's new 370 computer line. Forbes expressed the following conclusion on the 
merits of "subject to" qualifications: 
As for us, we could only conclude that Touche Ross would have done us 
all a greater service if it had explained in more specific detail exactly what 
it was that it was certifying—that all three companies face significant 
uncertainties, but that in its opinion Boothe's uncertainties are more 
significant. Shareholders would not assume, as they may have by the 
absence of write-offs and dirty opinions, that Leasco and Greyhound are 
home free in computer leasing.6 
In other words, investors may believe the absence of a "subject to" qualifica­
tion means a company's financial statements are not affected by significant 
uncertainties, but business risk is unavoidable. 
A Horse Is a Horse—Of Course 
A simple analogy may put the question concerning the auditor's responsibility 
for reporting on uncertainties in perspective. When he was later questioned about 
the significance of the hearings held by his committee on Watergate, Senator 
Ervin is reported to have said: "You can either draw a picture of a horse or you 
can draw the picture and put a caption under it that says 'a horse.' We drew a 
picture of a horse." The auditor's "subject to" qualification is analogous to the 
caption on the picture. Is it necessary to put a caption on the picture, or is it 
adequate simply to draw a clear picture? 
If the financial statements adequately portray the uncertainties and their 
possible effect, is it really necessary for the auditor to issue a qualified opinion? 
Future Shock Hits Accrual Accounting 
The basic problem of portraying uncertainties in financial reporting is that 
financial statement amounts are traditionally presented as single values, but only a 
probability distribution giving a range of values can reflect reality under conditions 
of uncertainty. The present accounting model developed when the world was 
simpler and the task of accounting less complex. 
Accrual accounting developed in the fifteenth century. The usual venture took 
about a year, the approximate time of a ship's roundtrip voyage, and at the end of 
each voyage the accounts would be settled and the investors would receive their 
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share of profit. Accounting for a single venture such as the voyage of the ship 
is much simpler than reporting the continuous activity of modern business.7 Also, 
events that affect business are taking place at an increasingly rapid rate. One 
accountant has observed that a shoe manufacturer in 1870 would have experi­
enced little difference in his products, customers, or techniques either twenty years 
earlier or twenty years later. Today, however, a shoe manufacturer is likely to 
run the gamut from Indian sandals to kinky boots in two to three years.8 
Financial statements are imprecise for several reasons, but the major problem 
in measuring earnings is uncertainty about the future. The current concept of 
earnings is an index of success, and earnings under accrual accounting are 
determined by a long-range averaging process. Ideally, under accrual accounting 
earnings and cash ultimately will be equal in amount but there will be differences 
in timing. 
Earning Power and Earnings Cycles 
The essence of a company's earning power is its ability to generate cash in the 
future, but ability to generate cash is not the same as cash generated. The True-
blood Report on the objectives of financial statements explains the relationship 
between cash generation and earnings: 
. . . Cash generating ability and earnings are closely related and the longer 
the period, the closer the relationship. For a relatively short period like a 
month, a quarter, or even a year, net cash flows . . . will differ from earnings 
because of changes in such items as receivables, payables, inventories, and 
plant. For such relatively short periods, the accrual basis provides a more 
useful measure of enterprise progress than the cash basis. Over longer 
periods, cash generation and earnings come closer together. Over the 
entire life of an enterprise, they are the same.9 
At various points in a company's life span not all transactions will be com­
plete. Some series of related transactions extend over several annual periods. The 
Trueblood Report refers to these related activities as earnings cycles: 
A simple earnings cycle may be identified quite easily; but for most series 
of transactions, it is usually quite difficult to determine when a cycle has 
been completed. For example, an enterprise makes a sacrifice by purchasing 
a plant to produce goods. In this case, the sacrifice (the cash disbursed) 
can be identified. But the benefit (the cash receipt) relates in some way to 
each unit being made, sold, and eventually realized as cash. A further 
benefit may arise from a cash receipt on disposal of the plant. Until the 
plant is sold, some of the benefits relating to the initial sacrifice for the plant 
will have been realized through its use in manufacturing, and some will 
not. Therefore, this requires estimates of the amount of the sacrifice 
applicable to a certain time period, whenever all benefits are not realized 
within that time period. Such allocations of sacrifices (or of benefits in 
other situations) introduce the need for additional judgments in accounting 
for cycles.10 
Debits and Credits in an Uncertain World 
Accountants have adopted various concepts and conventions to deal with the 
problems caused by incomplete earnings cycles. These concepts, however, attempt 
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to eliminate the effect of uncertainty rather than explain i t . 1 1 One of these con­
cepts is realization. Revenue is not normally recognized without some objective 
evidence such as an exchange transaction and the receipt of cash, or some evidence 
that receipt is highly probable. An attempt is made to match the sacrifices made 
in earning revenue against the revenue recognized in a period since the effort to 
earn revenue may stretch over several accounting periods. Costs incurred for 
future benefit are assets. A cost is not carried forward to future periods unless 
the amount is expected to be recovered through future operations. 
Another accounting convention adopted to facilitate allocating costs among 
future periods is the going concern assumption. A company is assumed to have 
an indefinite life unless some major event, such as bankruptcy, proves the assump­
tion wrong. This allows the allocation of costs over the useful life of an asset 
and avoids the problem of determining the remaining life of a company. 
Another traditional accounting convention is conservatism. The operating 
rule for conservatism is "anticipate no gains but provide for all losses." Predicting 
the future is extremely difficult. Consequently, in the absence of an exchange 
transaction, for example, indicating that merchandise has been sold for a loss, 
or the occurrence of an event such as a fire that destroys a company's plant, 
knowing when the value of an asset has been impaired and when the loss should 
be recognized is also difficult. 
Anticipating Future Costs and Losses 
When the Pennsylvania-New York Central Transportation Company was 
formed by the merger of two railroads in 1968, the company charged off costs 
and losses of $275 million. Penn Central's controller described that charge as 
"a bookkeeping loss" and stated that the company was only clearing the decks for 
the merger and that the substantial charge would avoid a drag on earnings for 
the next ten years. 
Leopold A . Bernstein surveyed the reserves for future costs and losses so 
popular in the late 60's and early 70's and concluded that charges like the Penn 
Central's indicated real problems in accounting. Professor Bernstein questioned 
the appropriateness of reaching ten years into the future and expressed the view 
that reserves for future costs and losses were all too frequently income smoothing 
and shifting devices.12 
The problem of when to recognize future costs and losses is important, but it 
is only a symptom of deeper problems in accounting for uncertainties. 
The FASB Puts a Hold on the Future 
Anticipating future costs and losses is an application of conservatism in 
accounting and independent auditors have had difficulty arguing that such 
anticipation is not in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 
At one time, the applicable pronouncement was the AICPA's Accounting 
Research Bulletin No. 50 on contingencies, issued in October 1958. Contingencies 
were defined as "an existing condition, situation or set of circumstances involving 
a considerable degree of uncertainty which may through a related future event 
result in the acquisition or loss of an asset or the incurrence or avoidance of a 
liability." ARB No. 50 indicated that when contingencies were not sufficiently 
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predictable to permit recording, they should be disclosed if there was a reasonable 
possibility of an outcome that might affect financial position or operating results. 
However, when the outcome of a matter was reasonably foreseeable, the expected 
result should be recorded. 
ARB No. 50 made the recording of a loss dependent entirely on the ability 
to estimate the amount, and anticipated losses due to a contingency could be 
recognized in a period prior to the actual incurrence of a loss. The legacy of 
ARB No. 50 was a paradox for independent auditors. 
Under ARB No. 50 accounting principles required that if an item could be 
estimated, the effect should be recorded. If an estimate could not be made, the 
conformity of the financial statements with generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples was indeterminable. The resolution was identifying the "subject to" qualifi­
cation as the hallmark for the existence of an uncertainty precluding conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board took up the question of con­
tingencies in 1973 because of abuses in accounting for future losses. The project 
was expanded to a consideration of accounting for all contingencies. In March 
1975, the FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, 
"Accounting for Contingencies." It was intended to eliminate the practice of 
accruing for potential future losses that would not be incurred until a period 
after the date of the financial statements. The FASB added a requirement that a 
loss must relate to a current or a prior period in addition to being reasonably 
estimable. Thus, the requirement of reasonable estimation of ARB No. 50 is no 
longer sufficient to support recording. 
FASB Statement No. 5 also redefines a contingency as an ". . . existing con­
dition, situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible gain 
. . . or loss . . . to an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more 
future events occur or fail to occur. Resolution of the uncertainty may confirm 
the acquisition of an asset or the reduction of a liability or the loss or impairment 
of an asset or the incurrence of a liability." Recording of a loss is, therefore, 
dependent on the outcome of some definable future event that may or may not 
occur. This definition distinguishes estimates required for contingencies from 
other estimates that relate to matters requiring approximation of amounts or of 
the timing of transactions. Also, there must be a possibility that the event may 
not occur. If occurrence is not uncertain, the matter is not a contingency. For 
example, amounts owed for services received such as advertising and utilities may 
need to be approximated, but there is no doubt that the service has been received. 
All Contingencies Are Not Alike 
Contingencies can be conveniently classified into two types. Some contin­
gencies are a recognized part of incomplete earnings cycles. They result from 
normal recurring activities and the need to make estimates is known even though 
the amount and timing of future receipts or payments may be uncertain. Examples 
are estimation of the collectibility of receivables resulting from credit sales, loans, 
or similar transactions and recognition of obligations under warranties for products 
or services sold. If, based on available information, future collection or payment 
of such items is probable and their amounts can be estimated, the effects should 
be recorded and reflected in financial statements. 
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Other contingencies result from events that are unusual or infrequent. Since 
these events are not inherent in earnings cycles, identifying those that should be 
recorded or disclosed can be difficult. Statement No. 5 applies the same criteria 
to these events as is applied to estimates inherent in earnings cycles. If occurrence 
of a future event is probable and the amount can be estimated, the effects should 
be recorded. If occurrence is only reasonably possible rather than probable, the 
event should be disclosed. 
Gulf & Western was told by an Appellate Court that its tender offer to Atlantic 
and Pacific Tea Company's shareholders was deficient because it failed to disclose 
a contingency arising from an antitrust violation. The court held: 
The fact that, at the time it announced its tender offer, an antitrust action 
had not been commenced against G & W, and that its liability was uncer­
tain, does not excuse G & W's failure to disclose all these relevant circum­
stances so that A & P shareholders could weigh them in reaching their 
decision whether or not to tender their shares. As we said in SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F 2d 833,849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), the 
disclosure requirements of the securities laws require "nothing more than 
the disclosure of basic facts so that outsiders may draw upon their own 
evaluative experience in reaching their own investment decisions with 
knowledge equal to that of the insiders." Those "basic facts" bearing upon 
G & W's possible liability for antitrust violations were of obvious concern 
to those A & P shareholders who retained part of their holdings.13 
A possible antitrust action is one example of an unasserted claim. FASB 
Statement No. 5 requires that such claims be disclosed if their assertion is probable 
and an unfavorable outcome is reasonably possible. Unasserted claims may be 
known to management of a company, but they can be difficult for an auditor to 
identify unless the auditor is informed of the possible claims by a company's 
management or its legal counsel. The outcome is usually impossible for anyone 
to predict. 
Antitrust actions frequently result in "subject to" qualifications when auditors 
are aware of the action. For example, the Otter Tail Power Company's auditors 
qualified their opinion on its 1974 financial statements and included the following 
description of the uncertainty in their report: 
As discussed in the second paragraph of Note 7 to the Financial State­
ments, the Company is a defendant in suits brought by three municipalities 
charging antitrust violations and seeking treble and punitive damages 
totaling $4,386,593. Since the ultimate outcome of the lawsuits cannot 
presently be determined, no provision for any liability that may result has 
been made in the financial statements. 
In our opinion, subject to the possible effect on the financial statements of 
the outcome of the litigation discussed in the preceding paragraph, the 
above-mentioned financial statements. . . . 
Other government actions resulting in possible losses may be equally difficult 
for the auditor and the company to identify. In 1971, for example, Abbot Lab­
oratories' operations were interrupted by the government's recall of its U.S. 
produced intravenous solutions. Abbott was unable to reenter the market for 
intravenous solutions for four months, which had a depressing effect on its results 
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of operations. The beverage industry was also seriously affected when products 
containing cyclamates were banned. Events of this type are difficult or impossible 
to predict and future operations may be seriously affected when they occur. 
The impossibility of predicting all events that may materially affect a com­
pany's operations has led some accountants to agree that uncertainty qualifications 
may result in undue expectations by investors. The absence of a "subject to" 
qualification may lead investors to incorrectly conclude that a company has no 
significant uncertainties. 
Should New Guidance on Contingencies Change Auditors' Responsibilities? 
FASB Statement No. 5 supplies welcome clarification of when to record and 
when and what to disclose concerning contingencies. Given the possible im­
portance of such uncertainties to a company's operations, clear guidelines are 
beneficial to investors, auditors and the management of companies. Since State­
ment No. 5 has clarified this area of financial reporting, some accountants believe 
that "subject to" qualifications are now unnecessary. 
The possible outcome of a lawsuit is perhaps the best example of a significant 
unusual uncertainty. Armstrong Cork Company's 1974 annual report discloses it 
was involved in litigation concerning patent infringement. The auditors' report 
and related footnote disclosure appear in Exhibit I. When such contingencies are 
disclosed, it is relatively easy to separate the business risk from the information 
risk. As long as investors are given enough information, there is no information 
risk. Financial statements may disclose but cannot reduce the business risk. The 
ultimate effect on the financial statements depends on the outcome of an identi­
fiable future event. The type of probabilility evaluation involved here should be 
distinguished from the probability of events that are inherent in an earnings cycle. 
The estimation of the collectibility of receivables, for example, depends on a 
probability evaluation that normally involves a large number of homogeneous 
items. This is the classical view of probability—a concept of relative frequency 
which is normally applicable only to a large number of items with similar charac­
teristics. On the other hand, a lawsuit is a unique event and the classical view of 
probability is not applicable. A unique event will have only one outcome—either 
favorable or unfavorable. 
For unique events, the auditor's "subject to" qualified opinion can only empha­
size a matter already spelled out for investors in financial statements. An auditor's 
qualification adds little and may lure investors into a false sense of security. 
Since Statement No. 5 provides understandable guidance on when accounting 
for the future should stop, some justification exists for removing the auditor's 
reporting obligations for uncertainties. However, Statement No. 5 does not cover 
all uncertainties and the prohibition against recording certain contingencies raises 
other problems. 
Thou Shalt Not Record 
Statement No. 5 prohibits recording if the amount cannot be reasonably 
estimated or if the event on which the amount is contingent is not probable. The 
difficulties that might be caused are highlighted by a current problem of hospitals. 
Malpractice suits normally involve astronomical sums and some result in 
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significant settlements. As a result, doctors and hospitals are having difficulty in 
obtaining malpractice insurance. Insurers are reluctant to offer malpractice cover­
age because of the difficulty of estimating future losses. That gives the hospitals 
both operating and accounting problems. If a hospital is unable to obtain mal­
practice insurance or must co-insure a large amount of the risk, an individual 
hospital will have even more difficulty than an insurer estimating the losses for 
malpractice claims. 
If a hospital makes a provision for malpractice losses when the amount cannot 
be reasonably estimated, it will violate FASB Statement No. 5. A hospital's 
auditor might then include the following middle paragraph in the audit report: 
As described in Note X , claims for alleged malpractice in excess of insur­
ance coverage have been filed against the hospital by various claimants. 
In addition, the hospital has no assurance that additional material claims 
will not be asserted arising out of services provided to patients in the past. 
The ultimate liability of the hospital resulting from these claims is not 
presently determinable. Further, as discussed in Note X , the hospital has 
charged to income a provision for losses, relating to uninsured malpractice 
claims. Because of the uncertainties described above, the amount of such a 
provision and the related liability cannot be reasonably estimated. 
Someone familiar with the requirements of FASB Statement No. 5 might 
conclude the auditor's opinion paragraph should object to the departure from 
generally accepted accounting principles—an "except for" qualification. How­
ever, some auditors can be expected to conclude a "subject to" opinion is per­
missible. After all, "subject to" qualified opinions are supposed to be used for 
uncertainties and this is an uncertainty. 
When faced with similar past problems, auditors have sometimes opted for 
"subject to" qualifications. In the "big bath" days of the late 60's and early 70's, 
the special reserves for future losses complained about by Professor Bernstein also 
produced some interesting auditor's reports. 
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, in its 1968 annual report, announced 
a change in management. The incoming officers adopted new policies on organi­
zation, products, production facilities, marketing, and relations with dealers and 
customers that resulted in recording special reserves in the last quarter of 1968 
totaling $68.7 million. For the year, the final loss was $54 million after recording 
future tax benefits of $43 million. 
Even after that loss, the auditors were not certain enough to express an 
unqualified opinion and issued an opinion "subject to" two uncertainties. This 
is the middle paragraph of their report: 
As explained in Note 3 to the financial statements, in the last quarter of 
1968 the Company recorded substantial amounts associated with (a) re­
serves for anticipated costs and losses, and (b) estimated income tax 
benefits expected to be realized in the future. Although these reserves and 
anticipated tax benefits reflect the best current judgment of the Company's 
management, we cannot determine at this time the amounts of costs and 
losses which ultimately will be charged against the reserves, and the 
amounts of future tax benefits which ultimately will be realized. 
The unusual aspect of this special reserve was the effect on the auditor's 
opinion of the related income tax effect. Allis-Chalmers obtained a refund of 
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only $14 million on past taxes. That left $50 million plus to be claimed in future 
years should earnings be adequate. Even though the auditors were uncertain 
about future tax benefits that would be realized, those tax benefits were recorded 
as an asset and the related gain reduced Allis-Chalmers' loss for the year. 
APB Opinion No. 11 explains the generally accepted accounting principles for 
handling the complex differences between the taxes paid in a year and the tax 
expense recognized in an income statement. Opinion No. 11 provides that ". . . in 
those rare cases in which realization of the tax benefits of loss carryforwards is 
assured beyond any reasonable doubt, the potential benefits . . ." may be recorded. 
Thus, generally accepted accounting principles require a significant degree of 
certainty before recognizing future tax benefits. The prohibition against recording 
future tax benefits is similar to the prohibition in FASB Statement No. 5. In both 
cases, a significant uncertainty may exist that would prevent recording. When 
generally accepted accounting principles prohibit recording, an auditor should 
object to the violation with an "except for" qualification. Nevertheless, the desir­
able features of a "subject to" qualification may cause auditors to focus on the 
uncertainty rather than on the resulting departure from generally accepted 
accounting principles. 
In addition to the murkiness that may be caused by the uncertainties that 
Statement No. 5 prohibits recording are the uncertainties on which Statement 
No. 5 offers no guidance. 
Contingencies, Commitments and Conundrums 
Statement No. 5 excludes several matters that come under the heading of 
uncertainties in accounting. 
Among the matters excluded are contingencies inseparable from other measure­
ments inherent in earnings cycles. For example, depreciation is excluded because 
"the eventual expiration of the utility of the asset is not uncertain." 
Another major category of accounting measurements excluded from Statement 
No. 5 is impairment of asset values arising from current conditions rather than 
depending on the outcome of future events. Some of these measurements are 
covered by other pronouncements: marketable securities (FASB Statement No. 
12), inventory pricing (ARB No. 43), investments in common stock accounted 
for by the equity method (APB Opinion No. 18) and losses arising from disposal 
of a segment of a business (APB Opinion No. 30). 
Losses on operating assets, such as plant and equipment, arising from changed 
current economic conditions are also excluded. 
The appropriate accounting period to be charged for a loss from a con­
tingency is also not covered by Statement No. 5. The criteria for prior period 
adjustments established by APB Opinion No. 9 remain unchanged. 
The Silver Lining of "Subject to" 
The correct period to be charged for a loss causes difficulty in accounting. 
There will always be differences between the estimations made and the actual 
results. Consequently, accountants have developed criteria for deciding whether 
the difference should be charged to the period when the estimate was made or to 
the period when the difference between the estimate and the result is determined. 
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If the difference is viewed as a correction of income reported in earlier periods, 
substantial losses or gains may escape the income statement and the attention 
of investors. On the other hand, reporting the differences in the current income 
statement may distort the measurement of a company's normal, recurring earning 
power. 
Opinion No. 9 limits prior period adjustments to material adjustments that: 
(a) can be specifically identified with and directly related to the business 
activities of particular prior periods, and (b) are not attributable to eco­
nomic events occurring subsequent to the date of financial statements for 
the prior period, and (c) depend primarily upon persons other than 
management, and (d) were not susceptible of reasonable estimation prior 
to such determination. 
Opinion No. 9 also observes that in most cases the opinion of the independent 
auditor on the financial statements of the prior period would have contained a 
qualification because of the uncertainty. A "subject to" qualification is not one 
of the criteria for determining a prior period adjustment, but there is a strong 
implication that the presence of a qualified opinion will make prior period treat­
ment more justifiable. Research by Samuel Laibstain and Thomas Huff suggests 
that the type of auditor's opinion does have a direct relationship to the accounting 
period charged for subsequent adjustments. They observe that the relationship 
between the auditor's opinion and prior period adjustment treatment may make 
management more inclined to accept "subject to" qualifications: 
If the auditor's opinion does govern subsequent accounting treatment of 
the error, another result may be that management often will readily accept 
a qualified opinion if it suspects that actual results may be significantly 
worse than its estimate, reasoning that subsequent adjustment will be to 
retained earnings.14 
Indeed, in its 1974 annual report the management and independent auditors 
of Del E . Webb Corporation complain bitterly about the denial of prior period 
adjustment treatment. The middle paragraph of the auditor's report explains 
the matter as follows: 
Our previously issued accountants' report dated February 28, 1974 on the 
1973 consolidated financial statements was qualified subject to the effect of 
the resolution of the claim against the Government of Honduras. Included 
in the accompanying consolidated statement of earnings for the year ended 
December 31, 1974 is a charge of $2,749,444, representing the write-offs of 
amounts recorded in connection with this claim (as more fully explained 
in note 2 to the consolidated financial statements), which the management 
of Del E . Webb Corporation believes should have been recorded as a 
prior period adjustment. It is our opinion that it would have been prefer­
able to accord this charge prior period adjustment treatment, which would 
have increased 1974 net earnings by $1,474,549 ($.17 per share). 
Note 2 to the financial statements explains that the SEC insisted that the $2.7 
million charge appear in the 1974 results of operations. 
This SEC action does not seem to be an isolated example. In fact, the SEC 
staff seems to have embarked on a campaign to eliminate prior period adjustments 
and the FASB is also reported to be working on the subject. If prior period 
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adjustments become a thing of the past, "subject to" qualifications will make even 
less sense. 
The auditor's qualification could be viewed as pointing out to investors that 
the financial statements being reported on might be adjusted at some future date 
when the uncertainty is resolved. Some accountants have suggested "subject to" 
qualifications should be used only when the financial statements might be adjusted. 
If any gain or loss would be shown in the financial statements of a future period, 
the financial statements reported on would never be changed. Henry H i l l states 
the case: 
Auditors should take care that they let the financial statements speak for 
themselves. When uncertainties arise, a careful analysis should be made 
to see whether unfavorable resolution will have an effect on the current 
financial statements. "Subject to" opinions should be limited to events that 
will have such an effect. Other contingencies should be clearly recited in 
the financial statements in the interest of full disclosure, but this does not 
mean they are a proper component of the auditor's report. In other words, 
as far as uncertainties are concerned, the factors that lead to retroactive 
restatement should be precisely the same as the factors leading to a 
"subject to" opinion. 1 5 
The fact that either favorable or unfavorable resolution of uncertainties with 
respect to an earlier year's financial statements may cause no adjustment of those 
statements violates intuitive logic, but as Mr. H i l l observes. 
Logic may not always prevail. . . where debits and credits are involved, for 
such a solution invites debits to the rear, credits to the fore. The policing 
instinct of auditors makes them shrink from encouraging practices which 
permit omission of recording of losses from the current year's financial 
statements. . . . One way to resolve the problem would be to do away 
completely with "subject to" opinions where estimates are involved. This 
would not further the interests of the financial statement reader, however, 
and it would deny the auditor some protection.15 
Prediction, Protection and Professionalism 
Two critical questions are whether the interests of financial statement readers 
are furthered by "subject to" qualifications and whether the independent auditor 
receives any protection from them. 
A "subject to" qualification does post a warning to investors that financial 
statements reported on by the auditor may need to be changed. However, many 
uncertainties when resolved will not result in retroactive restatement of financial 
statements and the number of uncertainties that will receive prior period adjust­
ment treatment grows smaller every day. Another reason for posting a warning 
might be implementation of a new idea being pushed by the SEC staff that 
disclosure is required whenever historical operating results may not be indicative 
of future results because of some matter within management's knowledge.16 
At this date, however, generally accepted accounting principles and the rules 
of the SEC do not require such disclosures in financial statements. The only 
place that the SEC requires such disclosure is in management's discussion and 
analysis of the summary of operations which is not part of the financial state-
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ments. Even if the necessity of disclosing such matters in the financial statements 
were acknowledged, there is no compelling reason to believe that adequate dis­
closure would not sufficiently warn investors. 
The essential question then becomes whether investors need or want a pre­
diction of future events or whether they would be better served by information 
that would allow them to make their own assessments of whether the risk inherent 
in the company's activities is one they will accept. Contingencies by definition 
depend on the outcome of future events. Contingencies involving infrequent or 
unusual future events are not susceptible to normal estimation methods. The 
Trueblood Report recognizes distinctions are necessary among different kinds of 
measures that vary in the certainty of their ultimate impact on cash. The view 
taken of earnings measurement in the Trueblood Report assumes ". . . users 
generally will want to make their own judgments about uncertainty."17 
Contingencies involving infrequent or unusual future events should be fully 
disclosed. Investors should be given enough information to make their own 
assessment of risk. This conclusion does not fully resolve the auditor's respon­
sibility because other uncertainties may also cause a "subject to" qualification. 
Are Asset Evaluations Uncertainties? 
The carrying amount of an operating asset may exceed the amount expected 
to be recovered through future use of the asset because of current conditions that 
make recovery of the carrying amount doubtful. For example, the Callahan 
Mining Corporation at the end of 1974 did not know whether one of its mines 
could be operated because of geological risks involved in deep shaft exploration. 
The auditor's qualified opinion and the related note to management's financial 
statements appear in Exhibit II. 
Operating assets are used over many accounting periods and a company may 
not intend to dispose of the assets in the near future. Even though the estimation 
of the appropriate carrying amount of the asset depends on current conditions, 
the accuracy of that estimate cannot be determined with certainty unless the asset 
is sold or abandoned. Also, if the asset is disposed of at a loss at a future date, the 
loss may have arisen in subsequent periods. Thus, the amount realized may not 
indicate the appropriate carrying amount at an earlier date.18 
Another problem in determining the appropriate carrying amount of an asset 
is that most assets are used jointly to generate future receipts of cash. The contri­
bution of an individual asset to the earnings process cannot be determined 
uniquely when it makes a joint contribution. 
The contribution that the auditor can make has some limitations because of 
the number of factors involved in determining the appropriate carrying amount 
of an asset. The auditor can determine that the asset exists and that it is owned 
by the company, but the uncertainty surrounding the future cash receipts that will 
result from using the asset makes evaluation of the appropriate carrying amount 
difficult. 
Auditors' opinions are qualified "subject to" the company's ability to recover 
the carrying amount of assets. Whether disclosure of those uncertainties would 
be sufficient without qualification is a critical question. Statement No. 5 offers 
no guidance. 
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The SEC Fills the Disclosure Gap 
In late 1974 the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 166 on the dis­
closure of unusual risks and uncertainties in financial reporting. ASR No. 166 
recognizes that additional disclosures may be necessary when: 
• Special circumstances affect a company's ability to measure current 
results. 
• Current economic conditions have changed the risk characteristics of 
assets. 
• Assumptions underlying the use of certain accounting principles have 
become subject to substantial uncertainty. 
A l l of the examples in ASR No. 166 relate to the carrying amount of assets 
such as loan loss reserves for financial institutions, marketable securities, and the 
operating assets of some companies with a small number of projects that have a 
dominant effect on operating results. Examples of projects with a dominant effect 
include major aircraft by aircraft manufacturers and construction contracts by 
contractors. 
The following recommendation in ASR No. 166 seems to be the prototype: 
The disclosure should include a description of the unusual circumstances 
involved, a description of the types of assumptions made by management 
when preparing financial reports, and an indication of the sensitivity of 
current and prospective earnings to changes in such assumptions caused 
either by changing circumstances or the final determination of the uncer­
tainties involved. 
The thrust of the ASR seems to be to put disclosure of uncertainties concerning 
the carrying amount of assets on the same basis as contingencies. The disclosure 
recommendations highlight uncertainties and describe the sensitivity of operating 
results to estimates. The notes, in effect, suggest the probability distribution 
behind the single amount in the financial statements. 
When Is Disclosure Not Enough? 
The recent decisions, one by the Federal District Court for the Southern 
District of New York and the other by the SEC in an administrative proceeding 
illustrate that a "subject to" opinion will be of little value to an investor, or to an 
auditor defending an action, if the extent of the disclosure about the uncertainty 
causing the qualification is inadequate. The administrative proceeding involved 
an audit of Talley Industries, Inc. (Talley) by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
(PMM) . 
Talley was engaged in the manufacture and distribution of various products, 
including bomb racks and pyrotechnics designed for the U.S. Armed Forces. In 
connection with a proxy statement being distributed to solicit approval of the 
merger of Talley with another company, P M M issued a qualified opinion on 
Talley's financial statements for the year ended March 31, 1969. The opinion was 
qualified "subject to" Talley's ability to obtain sufficient future contracts as referred 
to in Note 3 to the financial statements. Note 3 stated: 
The Company bases its calculation of inventories and of cost of sales ap-
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plicable to fixed price United States Government contracts on the costs 
(including administrative overhead) incurred and estimated to be incurred 
on the relative production programs. For the purpose of computing sales, 
these costs are prorated over the estimated total revenues for such programs. 
The estimates are based on actual contracts on hand and future contracts 
expected by management to be obtained. The resultant value of inventories 
on this basis at March 31, 1969, is approximately $8,900,000 in excess of the 
prorated cost of actual contracts on hand and such excess is believed to be 
larger at December 31, 1969, but management expects sufficient future 
contracts to be received to recover such excess. 
The SEC found the opinion and related footnote to be materially deficient in 
the following respects: 
• The note did not disclose the dollar amount of future contracts ($100 
million) which Talley's management estimated would be obtained. 
• Since recovery of excess costs was dependent in part on Talley's achieving 
projections of material savings in production costs, the report should also 
have been qualified with respect to Talley's ability to perform contracts 
in a profitable manner. 
The P M M proceeding does not have the authority of case law, and P M M for 
purposes of the settlement order neither admitted nor denied any of the state­
ments or conclusions of the SEC, but the position taken by the SEC on qualified 
opinions is instructive. The lesson is that the SEC will look beyond the words 
of qualification to determine whether adequate disclosure has been made in the 
auditor's report, the financial statements, or in the related footnotes, of the 
uncertainty causing the qualification. 
The SEC's analysis of the Talley case emphasized the difficulty and subjectivity 
of the prediction. In projecting future sales, Talley had to predict the total dollar 
amount of future contracts for a particular product to be awarded by defense 
agencies and the portion of the total market for that product they would be 
successful in capturing. Underlying the SEC's criticism seems to be the belief 
that the projection of $100 million in sales when Talley had a backlog of orders 
of only $24 million required something more than a "subject to" qualification. 
The SEC stated: 
. . . we believe that the auditors relied too heavily upon the representations, 
projections and estimates made by Talley's management and did not re­
quire sufficient documentation and evidential matter to enable them to 
review adequately the sales projections and cost estimates for reasonableness. 
In such circumstances, disclosure may not be enough. 
Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About an Uncertainty and More 
The other case implies that disclosure may sometimes be enough, but that a 
"subject to" qualification is a poor substitute. In Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krek-
stein, Horwath & Horwath,20 the critical transaction involved the purchase by 
The Firestone Group, Ltd. (FGL) of certain nursing homes on November 22, 
1969 for $13 million and their subsequent sale four days later for $15 million to a 
company run by a Mr. Ruderian. Both the purchase contract and the sales contract 
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provided for a payment of $5,000 on execution of the contract, $25,000 approxi­
mately one month later, a payment of $4 million (on FGL's purchase) or $5 
million (on FGL's sale) on January 30, 1970, with remaining amounts to be 
paid over a period of 25 years in monthly installments. The auditor's opinion on 
FGL's financial statements was qualified "subject to the collectibility of the 
balance receivable on the contract of sale (see Note 4 to the Notes to Financial 
Statements)." Note 4 set forth the basic terms of the contracts of purchase and 
sale and stated that of the total profit of approximately $2 million only $235,000 
was included in income, with the remainder deferred until payment was made 
on January 30, 1970. 
The sale of the properties by F G L was never accomplished as F G L went 
bankrupt, and certain investors in F G L brought suit against the auditors, alleging 
that the financial statements did not disclose material facts known by the auditors 
concerning the purchase and sale contracts. The auditors argued that their quali­
fication and the disclosures in the note to the financial statements adequately 
alerted potential investors to doubts the auditors had about the collectibility of 
this significant account receivable. 
The court rejected the auditor's argument, stating that: 
We agree that the qualification throws some doubt on whether the trans­
action would be culminated, but we think more was required of Laventhol 
as an independent auditor. Each investor was entitled to decide for himself, 
on the basis of the stark facts, whether the transaction had a realistic 
prospect of being completed. The information needed to make that judg­
ment and known to Laventhol was not disclosed in the Laventhol report. 
(Emphasis in original) 
The court stated that the auditors should have disclosed such facts as that the 
party buying the properties had a net worth of only $100,000, and that the presi­
dent and controlling stockholder of the buyer, Mr. Ruderian, was not personally 
liable on the sales contract. 
The full litany of the disclosures suggested by the court follows: 
Thus, we believe that the full disclosure mandated by the Act required 
Laventhol to include in its report at least the following facts: (1) Conti­
nental's net worth; (2) the ambiguity of the language in the contracts 
which might have suggested to some that they were options; (3) Ruderian, 
on whose reputation and representations Laventhol was depending, was 
not personally liable on the contracts; (4) Ruderian's practice of reselling 
property before he paid for it; (5) neither of the transactions was recorded 
in FGL's books of original entry or corporate minute books; (6) this 
transaction was the largest in which F G L had ever participated; (7) F G L 
would show a loss if the income from the Monterey transactions were not 
realized; (8) F G L had not acquired title to the nursing home properties 
from Monterey; (9) no deed, title search or title insurance on the prop­
erties had ever been obtained by F G L ; and (10) the legal opinion sought 
by Laventhol, on which it relied in treating the transaction as an enforce­
able purchase and sale, had been obtained over the telephone from an 
attorney who not only never saw the contract but never even had it read 
to him on the telephone. 
The court seems to have emphasized the need for adequate disclosure by 
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throwing in everything that might possibly be disclosed. The decision is presently 
being appealed and the disclosure burden imposed has been criticized. However, 
the court's message is clear. The important thing is the adequacy of disclosure and 
providing the investor with enough information to make a personal assessment 
of the possible outcome of the uncertainty. The auditor's "subject to" qualifica­
tion alone does not do that. The inescapable question is: If the financial state­
ments contain enough disclosure to allow the investor to make appropriate 
assessment, is there any need for the "subject to" qualification? 
Many accountants are coming to the conclusion that the "subject to" qualifica­
tion serves little purpose for most uncertainties. The financial statements can 
and should give a clear picture of the company's status and prospects along with 
a description of the uncertainties that make an accurate picture impossible. How­
ever, these accountants would like to hang on to the "subject to" qualification for 
the ultimate uncertainty of all—doubt about the company's ability to continue 
in operation. 
The Going-Going-Gone Concern 
This point brings us back to where the analysis started with W. T . Grant. A 
company's ability to continue to operate as a going concern is one of the most 
fundamental uncertainties faced in the preparation of financial statements. When 
such doubts exist, auditors have expressed "subject to" qualifications or in severe 
cases disclaimed an opinion. 
The qualification of an opinion because of doubts about a company's going 
concern status has a number of drawbacks. First, there are no accepted criteria 
for determining when a company has changed from a going concern to a gone 
concern. Even the fact that a company has filed for bankruptcy is not conclusive 
evidence that it will be forced to liquidate. Second, if the decision is made that 
financial statements should be prepared using liquidating values rather than 
amounts that would be appropriate for a continuing company, there are no gen­
erally accepted accounting principles to explain how those financial statements 
should be presented. 
Research indicates that analysis of financial statements is probably a better 
method of evaluating a company's future prospects than relying on a qualified 
opinion. Edward Altman and Thomas McGough prepared a quantitative model 
based on ratios of financial statement amounts. Generally, their bankruptcy 
model proved to be the better predictor of company failure. Altman and McGough 
explained the relationship between their model and the auditor's report as follows: 
The bankruptcy model and the auditors' report have different but analogous 
functions. The model was developed to predict bankruptcy. The auditor 
does not attempt any such prediction. An unqualified opinion is not a 
guarantee that a company will continue as a going concern, but an excep­
tion because of going-concern problems is not a prediction of liquidation. 
An opinion expressing doubts concerning a company's ability to continue 
as a going concern is based on the uncertainty of the fairness of presentation 
of the financial statements. It would be possible for financial statements 
based upon historical cost to be fairly presented when the company is facing 
bankruptcy if the carrying value of the assets of that company represents 
the realizable value of those assets.21 
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Thus, the effect of the going concern question on the auditor's report is not 
significantly different from the concern with the impairment of asset values based 
on an evaluation of current economic conditions. It is doubtful that the going 
concern assumption adds anything to the concept of realization. The auditor's 
concern with asset realization and the amount and classification of liabilities 
would be the same without any going-concern assumption because of the realiza­
tion concept. 
Another drawback is that the auditor's qualification is a "self-fulfilling proph­
ecy." A company's financial and operating difficulties should be apparent from 
its financial statements. A "subject to" qualification only adds to a company's 
problems and may hasten its demise. Accounting Series Release No. 115 adds a 
new dimension because it puts the auditor in the position of deciding whether a 
company is able to obtain more funds to continue operations. The SEC will not 
accept a "subject to" qualification based on a company's going concern status in 
a registration statement. Thus, a company unable to continue operations unless 
it obtains more funds cannot obtain those funds by a public offering of securities.22 
The auditor's present responsibilities for reporting on uncertainties may force 
him to predict future events and analyze the company's future prospects. These 
may be useful functions, but the question is whether they are compatible with the 
auditor's role and whether an auditor is competent to effectively perform them. 
What Is the Auditor's Role? 
The auditor's role is to add to the credibility of financial information. In­
formation risk and business risk should not be confused. Financial information 
should portray the risks under which a company operates. Predicting the out­
come of future events and hence attempting to eliminate those risks from financial 
statements is incompatible with the auditor's basic role. 
If disclosure in the financial statements is adequate and the auditor's "subject 
to" qualification adds nothing, the availability of that qualification may cause the 
auditor to stop short of insisting on all the disclosures necessary to inform 
investors and place them in a position to evaluate the outcome of uncertainties. 
Further, the fact that auditors do issue "subject to" qualifications may lead 
investors to think that the absence of a "subject to" qualification means that the 
company has no significant uncertainties. In other words, investors may be led 
to rely on the auditor to evaluate business risk when the essence of investing is 
evaluating business risk and taking a chance on the outcome. Auditors should 
not accept a responsibility that would tend to shift some portion of business risk 
to them. Their function is to minimize the information risk. The auditor's 
attention should be freed for an evaluation of the adequacy of disclosure con­
cerning uncertainties. 
Under present requirements, some matters closer to departures from generally 
accepted accounting principles that cannot be evaluated by investors receive "sub­
ject to" qualifications because they contain an element of uncertainty. A distinc­
tion is called for between contingencies involving unusual or infrequent events 
that depend on an unpredictable future outcome and questions concerning the 
impairment of asset values based on current economic conditions. Disclosure is 
probably adequate to inform investors about such contingencies. For other 
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matters presently called uncertainties, auditors must evaluate the adequacy of 
disclosure and consider whether the failure to recognize a loss or recognizing an 
uncertain profit is in reality a departure from generally accepted accounting 
principles. A departure will exist whenever generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples require a reasonable estimate that does not depend for its resolution on the 
outcome of a future event. If the auditor does not believe disclosures of the type 
recommended by ASR No. 166 adequately portray the business risk, a "subject 
to" qualification is inadequate. 
Thus, I recommend that the requirement to issue a "subject to" qualification 
be eliminated. It is not an appropriate responsibility for auditors. However, the 
term "uncertainties" has been used too broadly, and careful distinctions must be 
drawn between contingencies for which no qualification is required and other 
matters that under my recommendation may be either departures from generally 
accepted accounting principles or matters of insufficient evidential matter re­
quiring the auditor to issue a qualified opinion or disclaim an opinion because of 
a restricted examination. 
Future Accounting for the Future 
As generally accepted accounting principles are developed, much more will 
have to be done to make investors aware of the uncertainties involved in the 
preparation of financial statements. 
The Trueblood Report contains recommendations that would improve the 
ability of investors to identify and evaluate uncertainties.23 For example, it 
recommends that ". . . basic underlying assumptions with respect to matters 
subject to interpretation, evaluation, prediction or estimation should be dis­
closed." It also contains a number of other ideas that would improve disclosure 
and presentation of uncertainties. For example: 
• Classify assets and liabilities by uncertainty of amount and timing of 
cash flows rather than on the basis of liquidity. 
• Separate operations into complete and incomplete earnings cycles and 
disclose the results of those cycles separately. 
• Disclose ranges of precision, reliability, and uncertainty rather than single 
valued estimates. 
Implementation of the recommendations of the Trueblood Report may be a 
long way off and until the new ideas about providing information concerning 
the effect of uncertainty on the financial statements can be implemented, some 
intermediate measures would be worthwhile. 
First, the type of disclosure recommended by the SEC in ASR No. 166 
could be implemented on a more wide-scale basis. The sensitivity of operating 
results to the matters affected by significant uncertainties should be routinely 
disclosed. 
Another possibility would be to expand the note on disclosure of significant 
accounting policies to better explain the assumptions and estimates involved in 
certain accounting methods. The percentage of completion method for recogniz­
ing revenues would be an outstanding candidate for elaboration. 
Significant uncertainties are important enough to deserve their own financial 
statement note, similar to the note on significant accounting policies. Thus, in-
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vestors would have one place to look for a description of significant uncertainties 
instead of being required to read long notes on litigation to pick out an antitrust 
suit that could put the company out of business. Investors would not need to 
probe credit agreements to find that one recent agreement has locked up the 
company's ability to pay dividends, dispose of assets, or enter into any new 
debt arrangements. 
The auditor's role in evaluating these disclosures would be difficult. In many 
ways it may be more difficult than the present responsibilities for reporting on 
uncertainties. However, the auditor's task is to evaluate whether or not the 
company's financial picture adequately portrays the business risk and not to 
reduce or assume that risk. An auditor should decide whether the picture is 
clear enough, rather than worry about whether a caption is necessary to let 
people know what a poor picture represents. 
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Exhibit I 
Example of Auditor's Report and Related Note 
on Outcome of Lawsuit Against the Company 
ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY 
Auditor's Opinion 
The Board of Directors and Stockholders, 
Armstrong Cork Company: 
We have examined the consolidated balance sheets of Armstrong Cork Company and sub-
sidiaries as of December 31, 1974 and 1973 and the related consolidated statements of earnings 
and changes in financial position for the years then ended. Our examination was made in 
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and accordingly included such tests of 
the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in 
the circumstances. 
The company is involved in continuing litigation relating to patent infringement. The 
amount of damages, if any, resulting from this litigation cannot be determined at this time. 
See Litigation on this page for further details. 
In our opinion, subject to the effect on the accompanying financial statements, if any, of 
the resolution of the matter referred to in the preceding paragraph, the aforementioned con-
solidated financial statements present fairly the financial position of Armstrong Cork Company 
and subsidiaries at December 31, 1974 and 1973 and the results of their operations and the 
changes in their financial position for the years then ended, in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles which, except for the changes in 1974, with which we concur, 
in the method of valuing inventories and the method of accounting for fluctuations in foreign 
exchange rates explained on pages 19 and 20 of the financial review, have been applied on 
a consistent basis. 
Notes to Financial Statements 
In February, 1975, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the earlier decision 
of the United States District Court holding that the company infringed chemical embossing 
patents held by Congoleum Industries, Inc. The decision applies only to the company's United 
States manufacture of a certain type of rotovinyl flooring during the period 1967 through 1972. 
A request for the review of this decision by the Supreme Court of the United States is now 
being actively pursued. 
In 1973 the disputed chemical embossing process used by the company was modified to avoid 
further claims of infringement. The trial to determine if the modified chemical process infringes 
the Congoleum patents has been held, and a decision should be forthcoming in 1975. 
By January 1, 1975, the company had replaced the chemical embossing technique with a 
mechanical embossing process involving no question of patent infringement. Accordingly, any 
injunction issued will not prevent the continued production of rotovinyl flooring by the company. 
Suits also are pending in the United Kingdom and Canada involving comparable chemical 
embossing patents. Neither of these suits has reached the trial stage. 
The amount of potential damages, if any, will not be known until all legal procedures have 
been exhausted. However, with the sales of the disputed rotovinyl material constituting a 
relatively small share of consolidated sales, it is management's opinion that the potential 
liability could have no material adverse effect on the business or financial position of the 
company. 
Exhibit II 
Example of Auditor's Report and Related Note 
on Recoverability of Asset Book Value 
CALLAHAN MINING CORPORATION 
Auditors' Opinion 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders of 
Callahan Mining Corporation 
We have examined the consolidated balance sheet of Callahan Mining Corporation and 
Subsidiaries as of December 31, 1974 and the related statements of income and retained earnings 
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and of changes in financial position for the year then ended. Our examination was made in 
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and accordingly included such tests of 
the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the 
circumstances. We previously examined and reported upon the financial statements for the 
year 1973. 
The Company's investment in the Caladay Project is carried at cost, the recovery of which 
is subject to the success of the project which cannot be forecast at this time, as described in 
Note 2 to the consolidated financial statements. 
In our opinion, subject to the effects on the financial statements of the ultimate realization 
of the carrying value of the investment in the Caladay Project, the aforementioned consolidated 
statements present fairly the financial position of Callahan Mining Corporation and Subsidiaries 
at December 31, 1974 and 1973 and the results of their operations and the changes in their 
financial position for the years then ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles applied on a consistent basis. 
Notes to Financial Statements 
2. At December 31, 1974, the Company's investment in the Caladay Project aggregated 
$3,265,000, including $247,000 representing the cost of property contributed by Callahan and 
$980,000 representing the net book value of buildings and equipment. The recovery of this 




The Caladay Project, which adjoins the Galena mine on the east, remained on a care and 
maintenance basis during 1974. Escalating costs have made reactivation of the proposed deep 
shaft exploration program unattractive at present in light of the geologic risks involved. Dis-
cussions continue on a less costly alternative approach under which initial exploration of this 
property may be carried out from one or more of the lower levels of the Galena mine. 
In the interest of increased public awareness of mining activities in the District and else-
where, the Caladay tunnel and underground workings were made available during Expo 74 for 
underground tours by some 15,000 visitors to the area. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Risk and Uncertainty in Financial 
Reporting and the Auditor's Role 
J. Herman Brasseaux 
University of New Orleans 
Let me begin by saying that Doug Carmichael's paper is a most comprehen­
sive, if not overwhelming, treatment of an extremely timely issue in our profession. 
The issue has been raised before but not treated in this fashion. The paper is 
provocative; it calls for a basic change in reporting on uncertainty, and as such, 
will undoubtedly generate some lively debate. 
My views are basically parallel to Doug's (and others') on the central theme 
of the paper. So, rather than contest his thesis, I will attempt to deal with some 
of the practical reasons why it may be some time before the profession is ready 
and willing to take the step recommended in Doug's paper. 
The Problem of Uncertainty 
A discussion of the auditor's role in this area must include a consideration of 
the nature of uncertainty as it affects the business enterprise and a consideration 
of the methodology of reflecting and reporting on uncertainty in financial state­
ments. The business enterprise has experienced increasing complexity over the 
past two centuries, but especially in the most recent 30 years, and the uncertainty 
within the business environment has greatly accelerated. Measuring income for a 
short period such as a quarter or a year and measuring financial position at a 
given date, when one considers the risk environment of business entities in today's 
world, is a heroic undertaking indeed! Coupled with this is the fact that our 
methodology and capability to measure, portray and communicate business uncer­
tainty to the average reader have been and remain inadequate. 
Given these problems, it is encouraging that we are making progress in getting 
a better understanding of the impact of uncertainty and in reporting thereon. 
FASB Statement No. 5, SEC disclosure requirements in this area, the Trueblood 
Report, and the soon to be released FASB proposal on the conceptual framework 
project are but a few examples of our efforts to get a better handle on the 
uncertainty issue. 
A quick look at annual reports being published at this time of the year attests 
to the literal explosion which is taking place in financial statement disclosure. 
The notes to the statements frequently run several pages longer than the basic 
statements and much of the increased disclosure relates to the complexity and 
uncertainty of the firm's environment. To cite one case in point, the 1975 
Annual Report of Occidental Petroleum presents the basic financial statements in 
five pages, but the notes require nine pages. The note on contingent liabilities 
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and commitments, alone, runs over two full pages. The increased disclosure in 
footnote form may be an indication of the inadequacy of the basic financial state­
ments to convey the full message in technical language form, and hence our 
tendency is to revert to narrative explanations which are long and inefficient and 
probably not well understood. One observation is that comparability of financial 
statements, if this ever was a realistic goal, has suffered a serious setback. Another 
observation may be that with so much disclosure, the auditor needs a means of 
calling attention to the most or more important items. 
Our greater awareness to the uncertain environment of business and our 
efforts to better reflect this condition in financial statements are quite germane 
to our concern with the auditor's reporting responsibility. A difficult question, 
or perhaps the central question, facing us is whether we have made sufficient 
progress in the standards for financial statement presentation (especially now 
that FASB No. 5 is part of our literature) to justify a change in the auditor's 
reporting on uncertainty. 
Time for a Change? 
Doug says the time has arrived for us to make a change, i.e., eliminate the 
use of the "subject to" qualification. In other words, we should limit audit 
qualifications to those situations where the financial statements fail to conform 
to generally accepted accounting principles and for conventional scope limitations. 
The central recommendations of the paper revolves around two basic issues. 
They are (1) the benefits of the "subject to" notation to users when the financial 
statements otherwise disclose material uncertainties and (2) the protection afforded 
to auditors by the addition of the "subject to" clause in the opinion. 
When we look at the developing nature of accounting standards and auditing 
reporting standards over the last 40 years, there have been sound and under­
standable reasons for the type of audit reporting which has prevailed. Not only 
have accounting standards (and the auditor's reporting thereon) been gradually 
evolving, but the extensiveness of use of financial statements and the expectations 
of users have increased. The auditor has felt obligated to make up for some of 
the deficiencies in accounting standards by using the "subject to" and sometimes 
the "disclaimer" as signals to the reader. Thus for some years the auditor has 
used these signals whenever it was felt that the financial statements failed to 
adequately convey the risk situation or that there was a need (and/or expectation) 
of additional emphasis. 
The conditions which gave rise to the use of "subject to" and sometimes the 
"disclaimer" opinion have been fully explained by Doug. Further, the reasons 
why we should now move on to a new period in reporting on uncertainty are well 
documented. Why, then, should we not make this move? 
Reader Expectations 
Basic to the question of the continued use of the "subject to" opinion is the 
role (or the perceived role) of the auditor when associated with a firm facing 
unusual uncertainties and/or serious financial difficulty. Many feel (within and 
without the profession) that regardless of nice sounding phrases such as "audit­
ing standards," "present fairly," and "conformity with generally accepting ac-
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counting principles," if serious or potentially serious financial consequences are 
looming for the firm under audit, the auditor had better be on record, up front, 
with some appropriate warning. If practitioners perceive that stockholders and 
creditors (and likely courts and juries, too) expect some explicit warning from 
the auditor, this constitutes a bias on the part of the auditor which is difficult, 
in the extreme, to dislodge. The matter becomes not what users and society 
should expect, but rather what many in the profession perceive their expectations 
to be. 
We should not overlook the fact that the communication pattern (i.e., the 
auditor's reporting on unusual uncertainties) has been established and utilized at 
least since the early 1960's. A l l the parties to the communication "message" have 
been conditioned. A change in the form of the message will require re-education. 
It is certainly difficult in the mass communication arena to change well-ingrained 
behavior patterns. Are the arguments supporting a change strong enough to 
justify the efforts? 
Other Considerations 
On a related point, when the Auditing Standards Executive Committee was 
considering an SAS on the wording of the standard auditor's report, a decision 
was made not to change the words "present fairly . . ." but rather to "explain" 
the existing words. There was concern that changing the words would cause 
excessive complications. 
In evaluating Doug's thesis on "subject to" qualifications, we must assess, 
from a judgmental point of view at least, whether, given the state of the art, we 
have indeed made sufficient progress in accounting standards and the accounting 
framework to warrant a change in audit reporting for uncertainties. Doug's paper 
cites the improvements of FASB No. 5 and other sources such as SEC require­
ments. His paper also points out that FASB No. 5 does not treat all areas of 
uncertainties. Maybe the FASB upcoming pronouncement on the conceptual 
framework will help fill the remaining gaps in our literature. Until we are able 
to treat uncertainties in a comprehensive manner in the financial statements within 
accounting standards, should the profession deny the auditor this reporting tool? 
On the other hand, if we can conclude that FASB No. 5 has internalized 
uncertainty (or, at least loss contingencies) within accounting standards, then we 
can argue that the auditor's role should be to determine that the financial state­
ments conform to accounting standards. This reasoning supports the notion that 
there is little added benefit provided to the reader by the auditor's use of the 
"subject to" opinion if the uncertainty has been adequately disclosed in the 
financial statements. 
Auditor Protection or Small Comfort? 
If, however, the use of the "subject to" opinion cannot be strongly supported 
on the basis of (added) utility to statement users, does its value as protection to 
the auditor support its continued use? Doug has pointed out to us that in at least 
two instances, viz., Talley Industries and Herzfeld vs. L K H & H , the presence 
of the "subject to," absent what was deemed therein to be adequate disclosure, 
did not provide much protection to the auditor. However, to most practitioners 
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there may still be some comfort in being able to point to "something" in the 
opinion if unfavorable consequences overtake the client. 
The great reluctance on the part of practitioners to give up any reporting 
tools was clearly demonstrated, I believe, in the controversy which preceded the 
issuance of SAS No. 2 on "Reports on Audited Financial Statements." Much 
argument and support had developed in the profession and in the Auditing 
Standards Committee to support the position that there was little benefit to 
readers or protection to auditors in the use of a "disclaimer" in cases of material 
(even very material) uncertainties, beyond that which a "subject to" with ade­
quate disclosure could provide. As you may know, the compromise (which was 
necessary to get a two-thirds vote) was to "permit," although not recommend, 
the use of "disclaimer" where an auditor felt a need to flash a warning that might 
have greater impact than that provided by "subject to." 
Prognosis 
The profession has experienced a period of unprecedented litigation where the 
tendency has been for auditors to look to all existing professional rules and guide­
lines as protection and to resist strenuously giving in on any point. Courts and 
regulatory bodies have stepped in and are defining and redefining professional 
responsibilities. This environment is not at all conducive to our taking bold, 
progressive steps in the audit reporting area. 
Of great practical significance is the fact that the "subject to" opinion is the 
one departure from the auditor's unqualified report (other than the consistency 
exception) which is acceptable to the SEC. It is undoubtedly true, as Doug 
points out, that this departure is sometimes used when an "except for" may be 
more appropriate. Nevertheless, the "subject to" opinion has become institu­
tionalized and is used by the auditor whenever it is felt that a signal should be 
given to the reader, or more likely, whenever it is felt that there is a need for 
some protection in case of adverse consequences. 
In summary, I believe Doug has made a strong case for his proposal. I ques­
tion whether the time is right from the point of view of practitioners and perhaps 
even from the point of view of users and regulatory bodies. 
I believe progress, such as suggested by Doug, should and will come about. 
It will simply take longer than some of us may feel it properly should. 
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5 
Status Report on Auditing in the European Community* 
Richard L. Kramer 
Arthur Andersen & Co., Brussels 
My comments will be principally directed towards practice within the Euro­
pean Economic Community (EEC) . There are, of course, European countries 
who are not members of the EEC, but the nine member states of the EEC 
include Europe's largest economic entities, and the major developments in the 
accounting scene are taking place within the E E C . That scene is, however, one 
of deep contrasts, so that endeavoring to comment on any aspect of accounting 
or auditing within the E E C presents a considerable challenge. 
The E E C encompasses the countries of Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, and West Germany. 
The nine member states have a population of approximately 255 million and a 
gross national product of approximately $1,000 billion (the United States equiva­
lents being approximately 211 million and $1,400 billion). 
Historical Developments 
A little history is helpful to put our topic in perspective. Considerable differ­
ences in accounting philosophies and practices have always existed among the 
original six member states. The admission in 1973 of Great Britain and Ireland 
(who share a substantially common approach) and of Denmark brought yet 
further and deeper diversities. The expanded EEC then had to resolve not only 
the differences already present in Continental practices but also to accommodate 
the very different philosophies and practices held by Great Britain and Ireland. 
The result was an encounter which, sparing a blow-by-blow description, has 
fortunately moved the accounting harmonization process quite clearly in the 
direction of U.S. practices. This resulted not only from strong recognition of 
British-Irish practices but also because several member states have taken advan­
tage of the time delay to make needed changes in their own professions and 
accounting practices. This encouraging progress should not, however, lead us to 
underestimate the magnitude of the harmonization task itself nor the time con­
suming nature inherent in the process of getting nine sovereign countries to first 
* Author's note: For purposes of presentation at this symposium, comparison of the EEC 
generally was made to U.S. accounting and auditing practices. Such a comparison suffers on 
two accounts. First, European practices are so diverse that country-by-country analyses and 
comparisons are really needed to do justice to the subject. Michael Lafferty's recent book 
Accounting in Europe (Woodhead Faulkner Ltd., 1975), is highly recommended for the 
interested reader. Second, a more correct, but time-consuming and overly ambitious, approach 
would have been to compare European and U.S. practices to an international standard. Hope-
fully, the worldwide professions, including the U.S., will move in this direction. 
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agree and then to implement anything which is such a basic part of their 
political and economic structures. 
Accounting harmonization within the E E C has received wide coverage in 
academic circles within the U.S. in recent years. The discussions have, however, 
tended to concentrate on accounting principles and reporting philosophies rather 
than upon auditing. Any meaningful discussion of auditing must first deal with 
the diverse accounting and reporting environment, after which we can explore 
the present and prospective auditing scene in more depth. 
Major Accounting Differences 
Accounting within the E E C is characterized by five important differences 
compared with the United States: 
1. Public interest (largely a function of share ownership) in business varies 
tremendously between countries. In most member states, share owner­
ship is either not extensive or is channeled through banks and other 
institutions (particularly in Germany) with the result that there is little 
demand for improved reporting standards. Hitherto, only in the British 
Isles and The Netherlands has there existed a sufficiently wide public 
interest in business for it to have an impact on financial reporting. 
2. Company law in a number of countries, rather than "fairness," domi­
nates financial reporting. In such countries, notably Germany and 
France, prime importance is attached to conformity of financial state­
ments with the detailed provisions of the law rather than whether such 
financial statements provide a fair presentation. It is probably only in 
the British Isles and The Netherlands where "fairness" is at present 
considered to be the overriding objective in financial reporting. 
3. Tax laws in certain countries, notably Belgium, France and Germany, 
have constituted a major obstacle to the development of meaningful 
financial reporting by requiring that income and expenses be treated the 
same for both book and tax purposes. Since the objectives of tax legis­
lation and financial reporting frequently diverge, these countries have 
thus created a seemingly impenetrable barrier to the development of 
improved accounting standards. 
4. Creditor protection is emphasized, rather than communicating with 
shareholders. In Belgium, for example, we observe that unions are 
working vigorously for adequate disclosure, while management, share­
holders, and the financial community are disinterested. This attitude 
combined with the requirements and economics of the tax laws tends to 
result in more conservative financial statements and less complete dis­
closure than might otherwise prevail. 
5. The accounting professions within the E E C have generally had only a 
weak to moderate influence in the establishment and development of 
accounting standards and, until recently, such endeavors were highly 
diffused. 
In such an environment, it is not a surprise that auditing standards and 
procedures tend to vary from very poor to barely adequate by comparison with 
generally accepted auditing standards in use in the United States. 
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Fortunately, the seeds for reform are present in the form of the harmonization 
of accounting and reporting practices. 
Accounting Harmonization 
The Treaty of Rome establishing the original E E C provided for the eventual 
overall harmonization of corporate law within the Community, and to this end 
the Commission of the European Communities has issued a series of proposed 
directives. The proposed Fourth Directive, originally issued in 1971, is concerned 
with the presentation and content of annual financial statements, methods of 
valuation, and the publication of such financial statements. While it is hard to 
imagine nine countries with greater differences in their present practices, there is 
one unique common feature in that each member is charged under the Treaty 
with responsibility for minimizing these differences. There is thus a driving 
force behind their efforts which is not generally present in other forms of 
accounting cooperation. The Fourth Directive has been gestating for over a 
decade and it is now possible to see the likely content and to envisage its inclusion 
in the statute books of the member states by approximately 1980. 
The underlying philosophy of the revised proposed Fourth Directive may be 
summarized as follows: 
Concept of fairness. The overall concept of "fairness" rather than conformity 
with the law is to be the cornerstone of financial reporting. This, however, is 
to be achieved not by establishing detailed accounting rules but by the acceptance 
of existing practices backed by elaborate disclosures. 
Present practice accepted. The proposals are principally based on existing 
laws, generally accepted accounting principles, and business practices within the 
Community. This does not mean that new norms have not been established— 
they have. But it does recognize that some practices (such as the insistence of 
certain member states that book and tax reporting be in conformity) cannot be 
overcome through the present legislation. 
Prescribed basic principles. In spite of permitting a variety of accounting 
practices in certain areas, the proposed Directive establishes a number of highly 
desirable basic reporting standards. For example, depreciation of fixed assets will 
be required, and the use of hidden reserves to normalize income will be pre­
cluded. Although it can be argued that the basic principles represent little more 
than the lowest common denominator within the E E C , it must be continually 
emphasized that the E E C , because its accounting and reporting had languished, 
has had far to travel in recent years and must, therefore, frequently settle for 
pragmatic, partial advances. 
National standards may be established. The proposed Directive permits the 
application of a variety of accounting principles. In addition, matters not covered 
may be prescribed by the legislature or, more likely, the professional bodies of the 
member states. Thus, the more progressive members of the E E C who have 
already established more ambitious standards or programs than those envisaged 
by the proposed Directive will generally be free to pursue these programs. 
Application is selective. The proposed Directive will apply to all forms of 
companies that limit the liability of owners for the companies' debts; these types 
of companies in each of the member states are specified in Article 1 of the 
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proposed Directive. However, it contains a provision that would authorize mem­
ber states to permit certain small private companies to publish abridged balance 
sheet and profit and loss information. 
Auditing 
With the foregoing background, I can now turn specifically to auditing 
standards and procedures within the E E C . My comments will be directed mainly 
to the more significant differences between the EEC and the United States. For 
this purpose, my comments will refer to the primary headings of generally ac­
cepted auditing standards as used in the United States; namely, general standards, 
standards of field work and standards of reporting. Auditing procedures as 
distinct from auditing standards are also discussed. 
I will then offer some comments on the possible course of future develop­
ments. 
Because of the many contrasts between member states, an overall comparison 
between the E E C and the United States becomes complicated. To cut through 
the diversity, one must concentrate on the factors that are common to a number 
of the EEC countries that differ from practice in the United States. Therefore, 
I must generalize and generalizations by their nature will be charitable to some 
and uncharitable to others. 
Accounting and Auditing Contrasted 
Probably the most striking difference between the E E C and the United States 
is the degree to which the development of auditing standards and procedures has 
lagged behind the development of accounting and reporting standards. 
In most member states, auditing standards and procedures are far from 
maturity and in some member states are hardly embryonic. While differences in 
accounting and reporting have received much attention in recent years and the 
proposals for harmonization are at a relatively advanced stage, the establishment 
of generally accepted auditing standards is really still an embryo. Even in the 
British Isles, which is generally viewed as the most advanced of the member 
states, the accounting profession acknowledges it has yet to develop auditing 
standards and procedures in many areas and has therefore recently announced 
its intention to devote much greater effort in this area. 
This is generally in deep contrast to the situation in the United States, where 
it has long been recognized that the development of accounting practices and 
auditing standards must move in unison if the end product is to be improved. 
Such unison of development has not generally been present in the EEC. 
Concept of an Audit 
While the accounting professions of most member states aspire to using the 
basic concepts of auditing accepted in the United States, the laws of certain 
countries, for example, Belgium and Italy, provide for the appointment of auditors 
in circumstances which do not even remotely resemble an examination using 
generally accepted auditing standards. In these countries, it is recognized that 
the statutory audits required by the law involve little more than a cursory review 
of the financial statements and that the whole exercise is very perfunctory. 
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Government Involvement 
While the governments of the member states have established the legal 
framework for auditing by requiring audits of various types of entities, the 
approach has varied significantly between countries. 
One of the most interesting differences is the type of entity that must be 
audited. Most continental member states began by requiring that only listed 
companies be audited and then expanded the requirement over the years to other 
companies meeting certain criteria, generally size. In contrast, the law in the 
British Isles requires that all companies with limited liability be audited irrespec­
tive of size. This means that in the British Isles, over half a million companies 
are audited annually, theoretically to the same auditing standards since neither 
the law nor the professional literature recognizes any differences in this regard. 
However, the profession tacitly recognizes the differences in the auditing pro­
cedures it applies and it would appear that legal and professional recognition of 
the impossibility of auditing all companies to the same standard is a necessary 
prelude to improvement of auditing standards in the British Isles. 
In addition to stipulating the entities to be audited, the governments of most 
member states have established provisions relating to the qualifications, appoint­
ment, responsibilities, etc., of auditors. Although there are many differences, they 
are not significant to the overall view. 
Professional Institutes 
While the laws of most member states have provided a legal environment for 
auditing, the auditing standards to be applied have invariably been left to the 
respective national professional institutes. The standards established by the pro­
fessional institutes have hitherto been principally concerned with what are termed 
"general standards" in the United States. They have thus been primarily con­
cerned with training and proficiency, independence, and related professional 
matters. 
Even in countries where the respective institutes have issued pronouncements 
on more detailed auditing procedures, the approach has been ad hoc. In no 
country within the E E C does there exist a comprehensive body of published 
auditing standards building from the general to the particular equivalent to that 
issued by the American Institute. 
Qualifications 
Most member states share the philosophy that auditing is a highly respon­
sible activity that should be conducted only by parties who have obtained recog­
nized professional qualifications. With a few exceptions, the obtaining of a 
professional qualification is essential to a right to practice and the laws of most 
member states restrict auditing to members of certain recognized professional 
institutes. Admission to such institutes is invariably by examination, accompanied 
by varying periods of internship aimed at providing a thorough grounding in 
accounting and auditing practices before admission. The educational standards 
necessary to commence training are generally high although a university degree 
is not universally required. Overall, the professional accountant within the E E C 
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is generally well prepared to play a more vigorous role as the auditing pro­
fession develops. 
Independence 
While it has generally been recognized that independence is a significant 
factor, the concept does not have the sanctity it has in the United States. Thus, 
while it is generally accepted that an auditor may not be an employee of the 
company and that no member of the auditing firm should participate in the man­
agement of the company, there are few rules with regard to share ownership in 
client companies. Thus, in the British Isles, share ownership by an auditor in a 
client company, which had been a requirement for appointment, has in the past 
year been finally officially viewed as an impairment to the independence. The 
current regulations do, however, provide for a period of transition in which 
auditors may continue to hold shares in client companies. In Germany, the com­
mercial banks are among the major shareholders of most companies and a 
number of the major German auditing firms are owned wholly or partly by 
such commercial banks, thus creating a situation in which the auditor is also 
a shareholder. 
Some examples can be cited in which EEC countries are ahead of the United 
States. Guidelines in the United Kingdom state that an auditor should derive no 
more than 15% of total fees from any one client; a guideline basic to inde­
pendence which the United States could consider importing. Perhaps the U.S. 
was following a European lead in 1975 when the AICPA announced SAS 7, 
dealing with communications between predecessor and successor auditors, since 
the Dutch Institute had established a similar rule of conduct (specifically Rule 
29) several years ago. The Dutch rules carefully cover the request of information 
from the preceding auditors and require receipt of such information (except for 
unreasonable delays) before acceptance of an appointment. Perhaps this is one 
of the major reasons why the Dutch profession has such stature, and members of 
the profession have such strong, yet independent, relationships with their clients. 
Standards of Reporting 
Standards of reporting in terms of expressing an opinion with regard to 
adherence to generally accepted accounting principles, the adequacy of informa­
tive disclosures and the overall "fairness" of the financial statements, present 
many contrasts with practice in the United States. 
As we have seen, there are at present few generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples recognized in all countries within the E E C , and two member states, notably 
Belgium and Italy, are virtually without any established accounting principles. 
Although this situation is in the process of change through the legislative efforts 
of the European Commission, the final directive will provide for no more than 
certain basic ingredients for financial statements. Accounting principles will still 
vary substantially between countries for the foreseeable future; in fact, the 
differences appear to be growing. Most Continental countries continue to be 
wedded to cost while the British Isles is moving rapidly towards value-based 
financial statements. (Of course, my friends in The Netherlands quickly point 
out that the introduction of replacement value accounting dates back to 1924; 
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however, there is by no means widespread application and no observable trend to 
extensive usage such as exists today in the British Isles.) 
Thus, an intelligent reading of financial statements from within the E E C 
demands a thorough knowledge of the accounting principles pertaining in a 
particular member state. However, even with such knowledge one is not neces­
sarily fully equipped, in that no member state has developed a body of generally 
accepted accounting principles which approach those in existence in the United 
States. The absence of generally accepted principles in many areas combined 
with an acknowledged reticence toward disclosure in many member states, fre­
quently leaves many unanswered questions concerning financial statements. 
Turning to the adequacy of disclosures, we have seen that conformity with 
the law continues to be the benchmark for financial statements in certain states. 
Even where "fairness" is an acknowledged objective, the law has continued to 
play a significant role in financial statements. For example, while "fairness" may 
be considered the overriding criterion for financial statements in the British 
Isles, companies and the accounting profession have been slow to expand dis­
closures beyond those required by the law. Thus, information relating to such 
matters as pension costs, leasing obligations, and related party transactions are 
rarely covered in financial statements in the British Isles. Overall, in the E E C 
the adequacy of informative disclosures falls far short of present standards in the 
United States. 
With regard to auditors' reports, we have seen that the range is from the 
concept of conformity with the law (as in Germany) to one of "fairness" (as in 
the British Isles and The Netherlands). A number of states specify additional 
matters that must be included in auditors' reports, but these are not significant 
to an understanding of overall standards. 
Auditing Procedures 
Detailed auditing procedures within the E E C are almost unbelievably varied 
and hence generalizations are particularly difficult. 
Generally, there is much less emphasis on what is termed in the United States 
"competent evidential matter." While some independent corroborative procedures 
are followed, they tend to be limited. Circularization of receivables has been 
endorsed by the professions in the British Isles, Germany, France, and The 
Netherlands as has the observation of physical inventories. Accounts payable are 
not generally circularized and the obtaining of legal representations is rare. 
Even greater differences are created by the fact that professional endorsement 
of a procedure does not necessarily mean it is universally followed since pro­
fessional pronouncements in auditing are generally no more than recommenda­
tions and compliance is not mandatory. Thus, while the confirmation of 
receivables and the observation of physical inventories are recommended by the 
professions in the British Isles, France, and Germany, such procedures are by no 
means universally followed in those countries. 
It should be noted that in many respects auditing is a relatively new science in 
certain member states. For instance, in France prior to 1966 only listed companies 
had to be audited and the most that other companies received was a cursory 
review. Thus, the present Commissaires aux Comptes are very much in the early 
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stages of developing and implementing procedures that approach generally 
accepted standards in the more advanced member states. Actual practice in 
France is still far behind the professional pronouncements. An even more 
embryonic situation prevails in Belgium and Italy. In these countries, significant 
improvements will require a generation to change significantly, which requires a 
time consuming educational process. 
What of the Future? 
My comments so far have painted a picture of somewhat backward auditing 
practices in the E E C . On a positive note, recent years have seen the establish­
ment of the foundations that should provide a base on which to elevate auditing 
standards, and it is clear that there is a growing awakening to this problem. 
Generally, the accounting professions within the member states are increasingly 
well-equipped to elevate their standards. Further significant developments in the 
area of auditing will undoubtedly take place in the coming years and I will 
mention the more significant likely developments. 
In this connection, I have emphasized the magnitude of the task facing our 
European contemporaries. When we consider the energy, devotion, and traumas, 
that have accompanied some of the major auditing developments in the United 
States, the prospect of conducting the same exercise with the representatives from 
nine different member states with deeply rooted traditions, practices, etc., presents 
a task that is, to say the least, formidable. Great credit is due to our European 
contemporaries for undertaking this endeavor and for the efforts that have and 
will be made. My feeling is one of guarded optimism about the probable outcome. 
What has to be done? In summary, the effort hitherto brought to accounting 
by member states and combined institutions now needs to be mirrored by similar 
efforts in auditing. Without such redirection, financial statements may look fine 
but whether they are right will remain questionable. 
Fourth Directive 
The Fourth Directive has now received a second reading by the Council of 
Ministers working party and will probably be enacted by the Council within the 
next year. The enactment of the Fourth Directive by the Council will require 
each member state to incorporate its provisions into its national laws within a 
period of 30 months. The enactment of the Fourth Directive will, I suspect, act as 
a sort of watershed for progress within the E E C . The professions will realize how 
much has been achieved and begin to see the potential for further progress. 
Fifth Directive 
The Fifth Directive on the Structure of Sociétés Anonymes (1972) contained 
a number of important measures with regard to auditors. The proposed directive 
would apply to each company that is organized under the law of a member state 
as a société anonyme, which term is used to describe a corporation whose capital 
is represented by freely transferable shares and whose shareholders have no per­
sonal liability to creditors beyond the amount of unpaid subscriptions for shares. 
Among the more important provisions concerning auditors are the provisions con­
cerning the independence of auditors and the appointment of auditors. 
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A person would not be eligible to become the auditor of a company if then or 
during the last three years the person was a member of the company's super­
visory board, management board, or staff. Similar restrictions would apply to 
an enterprise or firm if any member or partner in the firm or member of its 
supervisory or management board or person having power to represent the firm 
is or during the past three years was a member of the company's supervisory 
board, management board, or staff. Auditors would be appointed for a specified 
period, which would have to be at least 3 and not more than 6 years although 
auditors would be eligible to be reappointed to successive terms. 
While the provisions of the Fifth Directive relating to auditors will undoubt­
edly find their way to the statute book eventually, the overall Directive contains 
many contentious matters with regard to worker participation in management and 
it may be necessary to present the provisions relating to auditors in a new 
document. 
National Progress 
The gradual integration of many EEC institutions and the advent of a single 
capital market is likely to provide a tremendous impetus to certain national 
laggards. In other words, the example being set in certain member states will 
undoubtedly be emulated by others. The changes that have occurred in France 
in the last decade illustrate the sort of development that is likely to evolve in 
other member states. 
However, leaving developments to individual member states may result in 
slow and fortuitous progress and it seems likely that substantive progress will 
only be made through the combined efforts of the member states. 
International Development 
As in the United States, governments appear content to leave the logistical 
aspects of auditing to the accounting professions—provided, of course, satisfactory 
progress is made. Accordingly, responsibility for raising auditing standards pres­
ently rests squarely with the professions. 
A number of organizations presently exist which could act as a catalyst to 
improve auditing standards. The Union Européenne des Experts Comptables 
Economiques et Financiers (the "UEC") and the EEC Accountants Study Group 
(the "Study Group") would be the natural forums. The U E C , which is an 
international organization embracing virtually all the European countries, has 
already issued some statements on auditing but they have been relatively low key 
and are no more than recommendations. Accordingly, a much more likely 
forum is the Study Group. 
The Study Group comprises representatives of the professional bodies of the 
member states. For a number of years, the Study Group has assisted the Euro­
pean Commission in the study and development of accounting, and it has become 
recognized as the principal body with which the Commission and its various 
agencies consult on accounting matters. The Study Group has played an active 
role in the development of the Fourth Directive but hitherto its efforts have been 
largely confined to accounting principles and reporting practices. As I have 
illustrated, there is an urgent need within the E E C for the harmonization of 
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accounting and reporting practices, to be followed by the harmonization and 
elevation of auditing standards. This will require the combined efforts of the 
professional institutes of the various member states and I believe that it is inevi­
table that the Study Group or similar body will be charged with the harmoniza­
tion of auditing standards. Exactly how this will be achieved is unknown. 
However, countries are presently cooperating in accounting and reporting matters 
in a manner which was almost inconceivable only a few years ago, and it is clear 
that such study and eventual harmonization must, of necessity, reach auditing 
standards and procedures. 
Value Reporting 
No current commentary on the accounting scene within the EEC would be 
complete without mention of the move towards value orientated reporting in the 
British Isles. Following the issue of the Sandilands Committee recommendations 
last year, the accounting profession is now rapidly developing the disciplines 
necessary to implement a system known as Current Cost Accounting (CCA) . 
This system will report fixed assets and inventories at current value and also 
report the impact of inflation on reported results. The end product is a system 
very similar to that set forth in the Arthur Andersen & Co. publication Ac-
counting Standards for Business Enterprises Throughout the World. 
The significance of value reporting to auditing lies in the fact that it 
demands a significant change in mentality on the part of the auditor. The auditor 
is charged with reporting on amounts which are highly relevant but not necessarily 
subject to the precise determination that has been possible under the historical 
cost system. This will, of course, inject greater subjectivity into the role of the 
auditor and as a result, demand much greater judgment and caution. 
Auditors' Liability 
And now to end on a lighter note. One significant memorandum issued by 
the Study Group in 1974 concerned the liability of auditors. It clearly reflects 
recognition that with progress will come responsibilities that must be defined 
and limited. The principal recommendations and conclusions contained in the 
memorandum were that: 
1. Any damage arising from reliance placed on a company's annual finan­
cial statements that do not present a true and fair view should be 
primarily the responsibility of the company's management board. 
2. Legal liability proceedings should be brought against auditors only after 
all recourse against members of the management board relating to the 
statements has been exhausted. 
3. Because all auditors in member states do not have professional liability 
insurance, the present unlimited liability of auditors in certain member 
states offers false security in that compensation frequently cannot be 
made beyond the means of the auditor and thus the right to unlimited 
damages is purely theoretical. Accordingly, it is proposed that in any 
case of civil liability, where the wrongful act was not committed 
intentionally: 
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a) any loss that is estimated at an amount of approximately $100,000 or 
less, must be made good in full, and 
b) any loss of a higher amount shall be made good up to an amount 
equal to ten times the annual audit fee relating to the accounts in 
question or an amount of approximately $1,000,000, whichever is less. 
4. Professional insurance up to the recommended maximum liability 
amounts should be made obligatory. 
In the light of experience in the United States, our contemporaries within the 
E E C may have many shortcomings, but they most certainly have communicated 
the message loud and clear with regard to reasonably limiting their obligation. 
This is but one example of an area where the U.S. may have much to 
learn—that of working out an effective, constructive working relationship be­
tween government and the profession. This may, in fact, be one of the main 
reasons for the U.S. to take increased interest in future E E C developments. If the 
past few years are any guide, the E E C countries will increasingly encounter 
terrain familiar to the United States, and their highly pragmatic solutions may 
increasingly provide comparisons and contrasts to be studied, and additional 
lessons to be learned. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Status Report on Auditing in the European Community 
Jan Klaassen 
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam 
(Visiting faculty, Oklahoma State University, Spring 1976) 
The task of preparing a report on the status of auditing in a single country is 
a difficult one because of the many auditing aspects involved; preparing a status 
report on auditing in nine countries is even more difficult because of the 
differences among the countries. Taking this into account, Richard Kramer's 
report gives a clear analysis of the current accounting and auditing situation. 
I will not focus my discussion on the description of the current situation as 
such, but try to add some aspects that are relevant for an evaluation of that 
situation and for formulating expectations. 
I will cover mainly three topics: 
(a) The evaluation criteria used to analyze the status of auditing. 
(b) The current status and future expectations about accounting. 
(c) The current status and expectations concerning the future of auditing. 
Evaluation Criteria 
The problem of using appropriate criteria is probably the most difficult prob­
lem that one faces in evaluating the current status, since the outcome of the 
evaluation is very much dependent upon these criteria. 
The author compares the situation of the E E C as a whole with that of the 
U.S., taking in most instances the American situation as a standard. It is 
undoubtedly interesting for U.S. accountants and auditors to compare their 
situation with the European situation. Unfortunately, however, this method of 
comparison obscures the fact that the E E C is so different from the U.S. that the 
two cannot realistically be compared. 
First, the E E C consists of nine different states, each one having its own 
economic, political, and social system. To consider the E E C as a whole is at the 
present time only justified in the areas of agricultural and trade policy. The 
corporations in each of the member states are mainly operated under company 
laws, which are different in each state. There is not yet a European company 
operating under E E C rules. 
A unified European capital market, in the sense that banking systems, stock 
exchanges, etc., are integrated, does not exist. Although there are, of course, in 
the E E C a number of multi-national corporations, the capital sources, ownership, 
and employees for most companies are concentrated in the countries where the 
companies have their main operations. So the financial statements and the 
attached auditing reports are mainly only of importance within each country. 
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Auditing work is done in each country according to national standards. The 
educational system in each country has the purpose of providing the required 
knowledge for an auditor to operate at a national level. Generally state laws 
require certain corporations to be audited, and at the same time set requirements 
for the auditor's qualifications. Foreign accountants are generally allowed to audit 
those corporations only if they have the same qualifications as national accountants. 
The foregoing means that in each country auditing is mainly of national 
importance, and it has some specified meaning which is recognized within each 
country. Therefore, the status of auditing and accounting would be better 
judged by taking into account the national circumstances. In other words, the 
evaluation criterion could be: Do auditing and accounting, under the national 
political, economic, and social circumstances of a certain country, perform their 
functions well? 
This statement of the problem does not take into account that there is a 
tendency toward economic, political, and social integration. But for the moment, 
this integration is not at all realized. Therefore, it is in my opinion that it is 
better to discuss this as a prospective issue, although this perspective clearly 
requires very important changes. 
Accounting: The Current Situation and the Future 
The author mentions five points, describing differences between accounting 
in the E E C and in the U.S. Some of these points are probably connected. Thus, 
if shareholdership is less important, it is to be expected that creditor protection 
receives more emphasis. Then too, it should be added that the interests of 
employees tend to become an increasingly important factor that should be taken 
into account. 
Government involvement in setting rules for financial reporting is probably 
connected with the degree of freedom for national accounting professions to set 
accounting standards. With the author, I believe that too much government 
involvement can be a hindrance to prepare meaningful and fair financial state­
ments, but on the other hand, if certain laws exist which prescribe certain strict 
rules, their appropriate evaluation criterion is whether or not those rules are good, 
taking into account the purposes and uses of financial statements in those coun­
tries. Especially since the investing public is less important in the E E C than in 
the U.S. and other groups are more important as users of the services of auditors 
and accountants, U.S. criteria are not valid in judging the adequacy of disclosure 
and valuation in the E E C . 
From this viewpoint, undoubtedly, the situation in certain countries is not 
optimal (especially not in Italy). Additionally, tax laws requiring certain treat­
ments of income determination in the financial statements can be obstacles to 
improvement of accounting standards, as Kramer has indicated. 
The prospects for harmonization are, however, clearly laid down in the 
Fourth Directive of the European Community. Its second draft is influenced by 
the accounting profession, via the E E C Accountants' Study Group. This proposal 
is a basis for future development by means of its design. It is mainly directed 
toward disclosure, but it allows flexibility. However, it is still unclear to what 
extent there will be room for accounting standards, although it can be expected 
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that these will to some extent be proposed on an EEC level. The resulting system 
is not likely to be as extensive as the U.S. system of generally accepted accounting 
principles, and it will also be considerably more flexible. 
As long as the economic and political integration is still in statue nascendi, 
it is in my opinion not a disadvantage that there remains some room for national 
financial reporting differences. The trend towards value accounting in the 
British Isles is very much comparable to the trend in the Netherlands, where we 
clearly see a tendency to show both historical cost and replacement cost-based 
profit caclulations. This tendency is also present in Germany where the 
Accountants Institute recommended that financial statements should show the 
effect on profit of price changes of assets consumed in sales, as far as they were 
financed by stockholders' equity. 
Auditing: Present and Future 
The paper presents the following picture of the current situation: 
(a) Auditing standards are different in the member states and are in 
some countries even absent. 
(b) Standards of reporting are less developed. 
(c) Auditing procedures are less stringently prescribed than they are in 
the U.S.. 
The auditing standards in each country are a reflection of the concept of 
auditing prevalent in that member state. The differences among the states can 
probably be expressed in the following generalizations. As far as the examination 
of the accounting system is concerned, there is a distinction between professions 
emphasizing the formal correctness of the books and those emphasizing auditing 
techniques that are more directed to problems of insuring that all the economic 
activities of a firm are properly reported. In the area of financial reporting, a 
distinction might be made between emphasis on legal requirements and emphasis 
on the adequacy of financial statements in providing information. 
To appraise the situation properly, pronouncements on auditing standards 
need not necessarily be considered to be a good source, since at least in some 
countries they are only a reflection of generally accepted standards that are 
already operational. However, many firms apply their own, more detailed 
standards, and in some countries courts take jurisdiction on behalf of the pro­
fession to make certain that auditing practice is appropriate in the circumstances. 
So at least a partial explanation for the absence of stringent auditing standards 
is an individualistic attitude among auditors which emphasizes the choice of the 
appropriate techniques for each company. It might be expected that the above 
mentioned differences in approach towards auditing will make it very difficult 
to develop uniform auditing in the E E C . 
A n additional point is that auditing education is very different in many 
respects. In some countries universities are the main educational institutions, 
while in other countries, apprenticeship systems prevail. Harmonization of 
auditing education is an especially important requirement to develop a harmonized 
auditing practice in the future. In the current situation in each country there is 
a tendency to teach students the auditing approach that is prevalent in that 
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country. In the future, it will be very important to take a broader point of 
view, and that will require that standards are developed at an EEC level that 
define the concept of auditing. 
Even when those standards are developed, the implementation in practice 
will take some time, since resistance to change will hinder auditors in many 
countries from changing their approach. In this area, there is certainly a big 
task for the E E C . 
Finally, we should perhaps mention that many public accounting firms in 
the E E C have recently established relationships with firms in other E E C 
countries. This enables a mutual influence and can be a very important factor 
in harmonizing auditing standards. 
In conclusion, it might be said that my opinion is different from Richard 
Kramer's at the following points: 
(a) In his evaluation, he takes largely the U.S. situation as a starting point 
and compares it with the E E C as a whole. I would prefer an approach 
that analyzes the situation in each country, taking into account the 
legal, economic, and social framework of the country. 
(b) I have a more positive attitude towards the accounting harmonization 
proposals of the E E C . 
(c) I think that auditing standards for the E E C as a whole in the future 
will be necessary, but in the current situation where (and if) the 
financial statements have only national significance, the lack of uni­
form standards is not as bad as Kramer suggests. 
(d) The lack of explicit standards in some countries is partly due to an 
individualistic approach towards auditing, and does not mean that no 
standards exist, but rather that they (especially standards of field-
work) are set for each individual case relative to the needs and 
relationships that have been discerned. 
(e) It will be difficult to harmonize auditing in the future because of 
differences in auditing approaches. In this regard, as differences in 
auditing education among countries are overcome, change will be 




An Examination of the Status of 
Probability Sampling in the Courts 
Boyd Randall 
Brigham Young University 
Paul Frishkoff 
University of Oregon 
Auditing researchers, staggering under an ever-increasing blizzard of pro­
nouncements, articles, and memoranda, might well be disposed to believe that 
complexity feeds on itself. For example, two themes which were of much con­
cern—perhaps even dominant—at the first two University of Kansas Auditing 
Symposia1 were the increase in litigation against auditors and the growing 
sophistication of statistical sampling techniques in auditing. This paper attempts 
to examine the interaction between the two. 
Indeed, his paper arose directly as a result of the 1974 Symposium. At that 
conference, one of the present authors raised the question of whether statistical 
sampling (i.e., probability sampling) would be a better defense in the courts 
than judgment sampling. There appeared to be some division among prac­
titioners present at the conference. 
Practitioner Opinions 
Some felt that the use of probability sampling would ameliorate the position 
of the defense in a lawsuit, since probability sampling is viewed as more "scien­
tific," as encompassing more up-to-date technology, and as more susceptible to 
mathematical "proof" of its validity. 
Others were more skeptical or at least agnostic. They felt that expert wit­
nesses might debate the merits of a particular probability sampling plan to the 
ultimate utter confusion of jurors and jurists. Their contention was that the 
"expert judgment" of a highly trained professional, on the other hand, was less 
suspect and less susceptible to point-by-point rebuttal. 
Our purpose in this paper is twofold. First, we will examine past court 
decisions to discover whether the courts have shown any preference for prob­
ability sampling. Then we will examine cases in which probability sampling was 
used, either by one of the parties or by the courts themselves, to see what implicit 
standards for such sampling may be emerging from the judicial process. 
For readers who are curious about the outcome of these questions, yet less 
than enthusiastic about wading through the details of this paper, we will admit 
at the outset that our conclusions are more equivocal and more tentative than 
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either they or we might have wished. Auditing remains an inappropriate field 
for uncertainty-avoiders! 
Some Definitions 
Probability sampling plans, to quote one source implicitly used by the courts, 
". . . make use of the theory of probability to combine a suitable procedure for 
selecting sample items with an appropriate procedure for summarizing the test 
results so the inferences may be drawn and risks calculated from the test results 
by the theory of probability. For any given set of conditions there will usually be 
several possible plans, all valid, but differing in speed, simplicity, and cost."2 
Simple random sampling is but one of many possible applications of probability 
sampling. 
Judgment (non-random) sampling plans, on the other hand, ". . . have one 
common characteristic: the probability that an individual (item) is included in 
the sample is unknown. . . . When the determination of the individuals (items) 
to be included in a sample involves personal judgment, one cannot have an 
objective measure of the reliability of the sample results, because the various 
individuals (items) may have differing and unknown chances of being drawn."3 
A census involves the examination of all items in a population, rather than a 
sample thereof. The economics and timing of such procedures preclude their use 
for more facets of an audit. 
Extent of Use of Probability Sampling 
The official policy of the AICPA has been to condone both probability and 
judgment sampling.4 An examination that we made of a (non-random) sample 
of six recent auditing textbooks indicated that judgment sampling was not 
explicitly condemned, but the preponderance of material under the heading 
"sampling" dealt with probability sampling. 
Most accredited Schools of Business have required one or more courses in 
statistical theory and techniques for at least the past decade or two. A l l national 
C P A firms and the AICPA have offered training programs or modules on 
probability sampling as well. One might expect, then, that probability sampling 
is used overwhelming. This is apparently not the case, however. 
A questionnaire survey by Jacobs5 of C P A firms in the Los Angeles area re­
vealed a wide disparity in the use of statistical sampling within a given office, 
among firms of a given size, and among firms of differing sizes. As might have 
been expected, the use of statistical sampling by national firms was far greater 
than by locals, but the use was far from universal in any size grouping. 
A more extensive questionnaire survey, undertaken by Strawser and Hubbard 6 
confirmed these findings; their research also indicated that utilization of statistical 
sampling techniques has been increasing fairly rapidly in recent years. These 
results were consistent with an unscientific face-to-face inquiry of various Port­
land, Oregon practitioners undertaken by one of the present authors during the 
past year. 
Judgment sampling, then, is still very much alive, and its acceptability in the 
courts is thus not a trivial problem. 
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Survey of Cases 
We surveyed a wide variety of cases where statistical sampling was an 
explicit issue or in which it was mentioned by the courts. We wish that we 
could report that we found The Definitive Audit Case or a truly helpful case of 
any kind. Instead, we found that references to sampling usually arose where the 
technique was being used to gather evidence for the court, rather than where it 
had been used prior to the litigation, such as in an auditor's test of transactions. 
Therefore, we concentrated on court pronouncements that suggested standards 
that should be used in sampling. Such standards, we argued, should be applicable 
in almost any context, and in particular where an auditor's use of a sampling 
method might be questioned relative to the standards recognized by the courts. 
Implicit Court Standards for Sampling in General 
There is no codified law regarding standards for sampling. Yet standards of 
other bodies, while not of themselves court standards, become so indirectly when 
they are recognized and cited as such by the courts on sufficient occasions. 
"Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases" is 
a Report of the Judicial Conference Study Group on Procedure in Protracted 
Litigation. This report was adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United 
States in March, 1960. It reached the following conclusions on the question of 
sampling: 
Scientifically designed samples and polls have received increasing ac­
ceptance in recent years in government and in industry. The important 
question to be considered in a given case is whether the contemplated or 
proffered sample or poll is admissible under existing rules of evidence. 
Samples [confined to observable facts]. When a sample is offered 
through the testimony of the sampler, the report on the sample examined 
(i.e., on the count of units or the test borings, in the samples noted above) 
usually does not involve hearsay. In order to project this report, however, 
the burden of proof rests upon the offeror to show, by the testimony of 
a statistical expert, that the sample was selected in accordance with ac­
cepted principles of sampling so that it properly represents the universe. 
Note. Once this is established, there remain only questions of relevancy, 
materiality and weight.7 
The note in the above quote refers to two sources of accepted principles of 
sampling. They are: 
1. Munitions Board Standards, Agency of the Department of Defense, and 
2. The American Society for Testing and Materials. 
We were unable to locate the Munitions Board Standards, but we did examine 
the relevant standards of The American Society for Testing and Materials 
(ASTM) in some detail.8 
A perusal of ASTM's standards for statistical sampling reveal—by the sophisti­
cated nature of the language, mathematical notation, and footnote references— 
that these standards were enacted by statisticians for use by those with considerable 
grounding in the field of probability and statistics. 
ASTM's pronouncements also reveal, time and again, a pronounced preference 
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for probability sampling and an aversion to wholesale nonrandom sampling. 
For instance: 
In order to make any estimate for a lot or for a process, on the basis 
of a sample, it is necessary to select the units in the sample at random. 
. . . The only universally acceptable definition of a random selection is 
is one made by the use of random numbers, which in effect is the 
guarantee of thorough stirring of the sampling units in a lot.9 
Selection by use of random numbers need not be more onerous or costly 
than hit-or-miss methods of sample selection, provided the sampling plan 
is thoughtfully formulated. . . . Randomness is obtained by positive action; 
a random selection is not merely a haphazard selection, nor one declared 
to be without bias. . . . However, mechanical selection is still usually 
preferable to a judgment-selection.10 
The foregoing paragraphs do not mean that nonrandom and judgment 
samples, for example, may provide useful information for the efficient 
design of a probability sampling plan. . . . It also should be noted that 
judgment plays an important role in the design of a probability sampling 
plan. For example, it may be used to assess costs, to estimate spreads and 
likely values of variances; also definitions of strata. In the actual prob­
ability sample, however, judgment is not used in the selection of the 
individual items of the sample, nor in making the inferences, nor in cal­
culating the risks of decisions based wholly on the sample or succession 
of samples.11 
Thus, nonrandom sampling is relegated by A S T M to a role of amassing initial 
evidence when little is known about the underlying population. Such might be 
the case in a preliminary stage of an audit of a previously unaudited client, for 
instance, but would not likely be the case in the actual selection of receivables to 
be confirmed for the engagement, and especially would not be supportable for an 
engagement that has been of long standing. 
The courts have cited the Handbook, and thus implicitly the A S T M standards, 
on at least three occasions. None involved auditing, however, and none involved 
a head-on-head confrontation between probability and judgment sampling. 
In Bank of Utah v. Commercial Security Bank,12 the courts rejected plaintiff's 
sampling plan in an action under the Sherman Act for treble damages and 
injunctive relief. The court held that the restraint involved in a "no check" plan 
whereby school employees were required to take some affirmative action to 
transfer funds from defendant bank to a bank of the employee's choice was not 
shown to be unreasonable. 
. . . (T)he tendency is to admit the results of properly conducted 
surveys for whatever they are worth in spite of the hearsay difficulty. . . . 
In this case, however, we do not even reach the hearsay question as it 
relates to the admissibility of surveys, for we think the trial court was well 
within its bounds of discretion in refusing to admit a poll conducted as 
was this one. 
A survey is inadmissible when the sample is clearly not representative 
of the universe it is intended to reflect. See Hawley Products C. v. United 
States Trunk Co., 1 Cir., 259 F. 2d 69, 77; Handbook of Recommended 
Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351,429; . . . Here 
the universe was either all school board and hospital employees under the 
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plan, or at a minimum all school board employees under the plan. The 
sample was chosen from neither of these groups but instead from those 
employees who at one time banked with appellants and later switched 
exclusively to Commercial Security.13 
In another case, Berman v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc.,14 the court 
rejected a poll as evidence, citing the Handbook, and finding the poll to be 
entirely inadequate. One reason was because the sample size was less than 1% of 
a universe of 3,500 to 5,000. It is of interest that the A S T M standards include a 
section replete with mathematical notation entitled "Equations for Calculating 
Sample Size," with the strong implicit assumption that probability sampling is 
used and that characteristics of the underlying probability distribution are known 
or can be estimated.15 
In a third case in which the Handbook was cited by the court, Grotrian, 
Helfferich, Schuz, etc. v. Steinway and Sons,16 the court held that the survey 
offered in evidence met the criteria for admissibility of samples found in the 
Handbook. 
Court's Examination of Underlying Probability Distribution 
The underlying probability distribution on which a sampling plan was based 
arose in two cases involving depreciation, both, however, concerned tax litiga­
tion, not financial auditing. 
In Commissioner v. Indiana Broadcasting Corp.,17 the question was whether a 
television network affiliation for a two-year term, which is automatically renew­
able in the absence of termination by the affirmative act of either of the parties, 
for an unlimited number of successive two-year terms, is a depreciable asset. 
The Seventh Circuit Court held that it was not a depreciable asset. 
The theory of the statistical tables compiled was that an annual rate of 
contract termination for each pertinent period could be obtained by divid­
ing the total number of years commenced by all the affiliation contracts 
during a given period into the total number of contract terminations 
occurring during the same period. Using that termination rate, taxpayer's 
expert witnesses testified that the average life expectancy of any given 
contract could be determined by applying the Poisson-Exponential Theory 
of Failure. The crux of that theory is that the percentage of failure of items 
to which it is applied is a constant. . . . 
Adopting that theory, and applying it with some modification to the 
statistical history, the Tax Court found that an estimated useful life of the 
WISH and W A N E C B A affiliation contracts could be determined with 
reasonable accuracy, and that use of a straight-line method over 20 years 
was a reasonable basis for depreciation of the contracts. 
We think the Tax Court erred. . . . 1 8 
It is likewise clear that the stipulated exhibit graphically refutes the 
existence of a basic premise upon which the Poisson Theory relies, namely, 
that the life expectancy of all contracts is the same regardless of the length 
of duration of the contract.19 
Super Foods Services, Inc. v. United States20 is similar to Indiana Broad-
casting. Super Foods owned franchise contracts with grocers; they attempted to 
depreciate the contracts, but the IRS claimed that the contracts had indefinite 
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lives. The plantiff introduced a study of 486 contracts; the study tended to 
show that any contract which had been in force more than 12 months had an 
average life of 86 months. Expert testimony was that the contracts "display a 
definite and consistent pattern of termination." The government relied on 
Indiana Broadcasting for the proposition that statistics of past performance do 
not reliably predict termination dates. In ruling for the taxpayer, the court 
distinguished Indiana Broadcasting because in the present case the IRS had 
introduced no evidence of their own to controvert plaintiff's statistical evidence. 
Court's Examinaion of Sampling Plan Used by Litigant 
Johnson v. White21 was an action by Connecticut welfare recipients against 
the state commissioner of welfare. The commissioner had converted the F A D C 
program to a "flat grant" system to simplify A F D C payments by averaging 
budgeted needs of each size of assistance unit and making identical payments to 
each family of a given size. The court held that such averaging was permissible, 
and explained: 
The defendant adopted a pre-sample confidence interval of 95%, 
plus or minus 10%; and a post-sample check determined that the selected 
level of confidence had in fact been met. The defendant's sampling tech­
nique was approved by H E W . The plaintiff's claim that in certain 
components of need for certain assistance unit sizes, the sample size was 
too small to guarantee the selected level of confidence. The defendant's 
confidence level, however, was for the average of budgeted needs as a 
whole, rather than for each component in the standard of need. Giving 
due weight to the expert opinion of H E W , the court finds that the 
defendant's sampling technique was adequate.22 
Use of Sampling Techniques by Court Itself 
In Rosado v. Wyman,23 also a welfare case, New York welfare recipients 
claimed that the state impermissibly lowered the standard of need by eliminating 
items arbitrarily in 1970. Social Security Act Sec. 402 (a) (23) provides that a 
state may not lower its standard of need by arbitrarily eliminating items which 
were included before enactment of the amended statue in 1969. 
The court used statistical sampling techniques to determine if amounts paid 
under the 1970 plan accounted for certain special need grants paid in 1968. The 
amount of aid received by a sample of 1968 recipients was compared to the 
proposed 1970 schedule. The court found that 1968 recipients received more than 
was allowed by the 1970 schedule, refuting New York's allegation of paying 
100% of the standard of need in both years. 
Some Other Illustrative Cases 
Many anti-trust cases employ statistics. In bank merger cases, such as United 
States v. Philadelphia National Bank24 and United States v. Manufacturers Han-
over Trust Co.,25 the government used rather simple arithmetical statistics to 
show the effect of mergers. For a detailed analysis of these two cases, and—in 
particular—for suggestions for the use of statistics in similar cases, see Lozowick 
et a l . 2 6 
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An older case involving statistics, a landmark anti-trust action, was United 
States v. United Shoe Machinery?27 The court discussed minor problems with 
the government's choice of universe and of sample selection, but accepted the 
sample pragmatically, because ". . . if anti-trust trials are to be kept manageable, 
samples must be used, and a sample which is in general reasonable should not 
be rejected in the absence of an offer of a better sample."28 
In Hawley Products Co. v. United States Trunk Co.29 (a case, incidentally, 
cited by the court in Bank of Utah v. Commercial Security Bank, which we 
discussed earlier) and in a related case, American Luggage Works, v. United 
States Trunk Co.,30 plaintiff attempted to prove that its design for suitcases had 
acquired a secondary meaning. The survey was "inadmissible to show that in 
the market of ultimate consumers the plaintiff's design had acquired a secondary 
meaning when the universe surveyed consisted of retailers."31 
In International Milling Co. v. Robin Hood Popcorn Co.32 the evidence 
included a consumer action survey designed to determine whether purchasers 
associated the product packaged by International Milling with the product pack­
aged by Robin Hood. The Commission went into detail in describing the survey, 
the questions asked, the selection of a sample and the standard deviation expected. 
Readers may be familiar with the use of sampling in cases where a defendant 
or plaintiff has asserted that a jury is racially imbalanced and thus in violation of 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. In cases such as Carter v. Jury Commission,33 
courts have been willing to accept a statistical analysis of the population and use 
that probability to determine that a certain proportion of jurors should be of a 
particular race. (Such cases, of course, involve arguments from the population, 
rather than from a sample.) A recent article on jury selection goes into detail 
on the statistical problems involved.34 
Sampling Standards Employed by Internal Revenue Service 
The IRS issued some rather lengthy standards of sampling in conjunction with 
the timing of trading stamp redemptions. These standards explicitly condone 
only probability sampling. Thus, "the taxpayer may use any sampling procedures 
that are in accord with generally accepted probability sampling techniques. . . . 
While no specific requirements are established for the sampling expert responsible 
for the design of the study, it is recognized probability sampling is a highly 
specialized field and that otherwise competent statisticians may not be qualified 
in the field of probability sampling. . . . The sampling plan which is used must 
conform to the standards of the 'Report of Committee on Standards of Probability 
Sampling for Legal Evidence—Admissibility of Data from Probability Sam­
ples.' " 3 5 
This report, published by the Society of Business Advisory Professions, Inc., 
in cooperation with New York University, is remarkably similar in tone and 
substance to the previously cited A S T M documents. The report does not allow 
for the possibility of judgment sampling, and indeed makes the solemn assertion 
(in two different places) that: "The interpretation of a statistical calculation such 
as the standard error is not a matter of opinion, nor of judgment, but is a 
mathematical consequence."36 
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Approval of Probability Sampling by U.S. Congress 
In a bill approved in 1964, the House of Representatives specifically permitted 
the use of statistical sampling procedures in the examination of vouchers. A 
detailed report accompanying the bill discusses the appropriate use of statistical 
sampling in the examination of vouchers and the reasons supporting increased 
governmental adoption of statistical analysis.37 
A Most Tentative Conclusion 
No absolutely definitive case has yet arisen to demonstrate that judgment 
sampling will not be allowed by the courts in auditing. Nonetheless, some trends 
seem apparent to us. The courts—and such quasi-judicial agencies as IRS—are 
relying more heavily on sophisticated statistical documents whose standards barely 
condone, and certainly do not encourage, nonrandom sampling when probability 
sampling is feasible. 
We can not conclude with the lame epithet that "further research needs to be 
done." There is no more "data" left to examine, and additional "research" will be 
effected by the courts themselves. Our murky crystal ball suggests that a land­
mark case involving sampling in an auditing context will arise within the next 
few years. We caution those auditors who continue to use judgment sampling in 
the presence of feasible probability sampling procedures to be prepared to defend 
their logic in so doing. For that matter, given some of the decisions cited, we 
urge auditors who use probability sampling to be prepared to defend their 
particular sampling plans in terms of demonstrating that their sample results can 
indeed be argued to be representative of the underlying universe. 
Addendum: Sampling Lost, Sampling Vindicated? 
The following case has been verbally cited to us by several colleagues. So far 
as we know, it has not been officially reported. Moreover, it is somewhat dated 
and was tried on a municipal court level only. Nonetheless, for the sake of com­
pleteness, we include it for the interested reader. 
In Sears Roebuck and Co. vs. the City of Inglewood,38 Sears sued for a sales 
tax refund of $27,000. Sears had found an error in their own local records as to 
the extent of out-of-city sales, such sales not being subject to the municipal tax. 
In support of their contention, Sears conducted a random sample of sales slips, 
which indicated that the refund ought to be $28,250, plus or minus $4,200, at a 
95% confidence interval. 
The judge ruled against any sampling technique! This ruling was not predi­
cated on any statistical oversight in Sears's procedures, but on the judge's conten­
tion that the amount of the refund must be determined exactly, without any 
possible error in estimation, however small. That is, he insisted, as required by 
the applicable statute, that Sears demonstrate a lack of sales tax liability for 
each invoice! 
Since the Court permitted Sears to perform a "complete audit," the plaintiff 
did not appeal the case. The complete audit, of which the sample had constituted 
only 4%, revealed a liability of $26,750.22, well within the confidence interval. 
As we said, we doubt that this case constitutes an important precedent, since 
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special conditions were present which the judge interpreted to preclude any 
form of sampling. If sampling is applicable, judges can be expected to follow 
the precedents that have been cited, and even if a judge does not understand all 
of the ramifications of sampling, sampling is at least likely to be tolerated. 
It is of interest, however, that the author who cites this case goes on to 
comment, hypothetically, ". . . if (the judge) had refused to admit the amount 
of the claim as $27,000 because it was based on a judgment sample as opposed 
to the random sampling insisted on here, that also would have been a valid 
objection."39 
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Discussant's Response to 
An Examination of the Status of 
Probability Sampling in the Courts 
Kenneth P. Johnson 
Coopers & Lybrand 
It may be clear to some that the courts are increasingly dealing with issues of 
probability, or statistical, sampling and how it should be used. It may also be 
clear to some that auditors who continue to use judgment sampling in the per­
formance of their audits should be prepared to defend their logic for doing so. 
However, the discussion by Professors Randall and Frishkoff will not support 
these conclusions. Further, as the authors indicate, it is certainly not clear how 
the courts will appraise the results of statistical sampling as part of the evidence 
used to reach audit conclusions. 
On reviewing this paper, it occurs to me that there may be distinctions and 
observations that the authors have not made, which may assist in anticipating 
what attitude the courts may adopt in ruling on sampling questions that arise 
from audits of financial statements. 
Considerations by the Courts 
Only some of the cases cited turn on a court decision concerning the appro­
priateness of a sampling plan or particular statistical technique used. For 
example, in Johnson vs. White, the court reviewed the sampling plan and 
determined that it was appropriately devised and applied based on a review of 
the techniques employed. Two of the cited cases do not seem to deal directly 
with probability sampling. In Commissioner vs. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., the 
issue seemed to turn on whether a Poisson distribution was either applicable or 
appropriately applied. This entailed consideration of whether proper judgments 
had been made in the planning stage, including whether the defined population 
had the appropriate attributes for the application of this statistical concept. 
Another cited case, Super Foods, appears to have been decided on a legal issue 
rather than on the issue of statistical techniques employed. 
Putting aside these cases, I believe there is another characteristic implicit in 
the remaining cases that should be discussed. The paper notes that "references to 
sampling usually arose where the technique was being used to gather evidence 
rather than where it was used prior to the litigation, such as in an auditor's test 
of transactions." I believe it is significant that the cases cited typically seem to 
deal with specific attributes of a more or less well-defined population. However, 
the court's acceptance of probability sampling plans in these circumstances, in my 
opinion, does not indicate what its attitude would be in the much more com­
plicated auditing environment. The expertise required of an auditor in devising 
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a sampling plan to help support general audit conclusions is sharply distinct from 
that required of an advocate developing evidence to sustain a particular position 
after the fact. 
This leads to my next point. I am not surprised that there are no so-called 
"auditing cases" that deal with the issue of the appropriateness of statistical 
sampling applications or the lack of appropriateness of judgmental sampling. 
By its nature, the auditing process involves a series of judgments. The range of 
those judgments is so broad that there is little possibility that a case will turn 
on the very narrow issue of the specific sampling technique employed. One 
practical reason is that other broader areas, such as materiality of transactions and 
balances and the concept of reliance on internal control, are more promising 
areas for challenge in litigation involving audited financial statements. But those 
factors are outside the scope of this paper and it is sufficient to note that this is 
part of the backdrop for the current discussion. 
Defensive Considerations 
I believe that the genesis of this discussion paper was the suggestion that one 
of the advantages of using statistical, or probability, sampling is that "since the 
interpretation of the results is based on demonstrable statistical principles, the test 
is not only objective, but defensible, even before a court of law . . . or, even 
more important, before one's own conscience. Since the sample is objective and 
unbiased, it is not subject to the questions that might be raised relative to a 
judgment sample." As we have seen, Randall and Frishkoff have not been able 
to support this suggestion through their examination of actual legal cases. 
There is no evidence that statistical sampling would provide a better defense 
than judgment sampling when an audit undergoes the scrutiny of litigation. Let's 
look at the problem a little differently—why hasn't the auditing profession rushed 
to adopt probability sampling? 
Reactions Within the Profession 
At this symposium in 1972, Kenneth Stringer remarked on the increased 
use of statistical sampling, as follows: 
The reasons why progress [in the use of statistical sampling] has been 
more evolutionary than revolutionary are understandable, and have in­
volved both statistical and auditing problems. The statistical problems 
have included the general unfamiliarity of auditors with statistical methods, 
and technical questions concerning the applicability of certain statistical 
methods to auditing situations. The auditing problems have related pri­
marily to defining and expressing audit objectives in terms susceptible to 
statistical measurement, and to the difficulty of combining statistical and 
subjective evaluations of audit evidence in forming overall audit con­
clusions. 
In my view, growth in the use of statistical sampling in independent audits 
continues at only a measured pace. This, in my opinion, is due less to the 
general unfamiliarity of auditors with statistical methods and more to the 
problem of relating statistical measurements to audit objectives and conclusions. 
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In his book on sampling in auditing and accounting, Herbert Arkin elaborates 
on the role of statistical sampling in audits, as follows: 
However, in considering the use of statistical sampling approaches by the 
auditor, it must be remembered that he is in a somewhat different position 
from that of the sampler in most other fields. He normally does not place 
total reliance on the results of a simple sample . . . in arriving at his 
decision, but he usually performs other examinations and a variety of 
other tests and analyses in evaluating the condition of the records and 
their impact on the accuracy of the financial statement.1 
We may summarize the kinds of audit tests and their purposes, as follows: 
• Transaction reviews: To confirm an auditor's understanding of the 
flow of data. 
• Functional tests: To gather evidence that controls are functioning, thus 
permitting reliance on the underlying accounts. 
• Validation procedures: To substantiate an account balance by con­
firmation, physical inspection, reperformance, or vouching. 
• Analytical reviews: To corroborate a logical relationship among items 
or accounts. 
At this point I should note that this framework is designed for purposes of 
discussion and conceptualization. In practice, these distinctions between audit 
procedures and their purposes are never mutually exclusive. For example, every 
transaction review contributes something to functional testing and often to vali­
dation and analysis as well. Moreover, the underlying logic is that, if transaction 
reviews and functional tests reveal no reason to doubt the reliability of the 
underlying evidence, an auditor is justified in minimizing validation procedures 
and analytical reviews. Conversely, if transaction reviews or functional tests 
reveal the possibility of doubt about the reliability of the underlying evidence, 
that doubt can often be removed or reduced sufficiently by validation testing 
and analytical reviews. Accordingly, the auditing process and the resulting 
auditor's opinion are based on a composite of not quite discrete testing com­
ponents. Moreover, to the extent that we can identify such components, their 
contribution to audit conclusions and the auditor's opinion based on such con­
clusions are highly variable and characterized by the subjective and judgmental 
nature of the total audit process. 
An Example 
For example, in functional tests, examination of one item ordinarily demon­
strates the existence of a control or controls, and, in most cases, examination of a 
few items demonstrates that the control or controls are functioning. Of course, 
the purpose of these tests is to determine whether there are disciplinary controls 
which reasonably assure the continued functioning of basic controls. In my 
opinion, the variety and nature of influences that affect the amount of evidence 
needed require the auditor to make a number of judgments in designing and 
applying sampling techniques, statistical or otherwise. Moreover, there is little 
agreement about what constitutes a sufficient test because several factors affect 
the degree of confidence an auditor may have in a specific system of controls, 
and he must take them all into account. Some of these factors are: 
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• The importance to the auditor of the data being controlled 
• The type of control 
• The effectiveness of disciplinary controls 
• The type of conditions that lead to difficulty in maintaining control 
• The auditor's overall assessment of the reliability of the accounting 
system. 
Some Difficulties in Application 
I am not satisfied that our "auditor's" understanding of the concept of 
sufficient control can be uniform enough to permit designation of measurements, 
such as those of confidence and precision, necessary for effective use of statistical 
techniques. Let me illustrate. My firm places stress on evaluating the com­
ponents of controls. In our view, certain aspects of discipline, e.g., supervision, 
are more important to the auditor than other characteristics of control. Since 
there is no consensus yet in the profession on the usefulness of identifying the 
components of controls, I am certain we would fail to agree, for example, on 
what effect the lack of "adequate" supervision would have on the sampling plan. 
Even when the problems of sampling plans and sample size have been resolved, 
there is the issue of the judgment problems involved in evaluating sample results. 
The authors' reference to their murky crystal ball includes a suggestion of a 
landmark case involving sampling in the auditing context. I haven't found a 
basis for the statement. But accepting it for the purpose of discussion, such a 
case will be decided on the court's appraisal of the auditor's judgments made in 
the assessment of the circumstances that support his conclusions as to the appro­
priate sampling plan to be employed. Whether probability sampling or judgment 
sampling is applied, the auditor and the courts must deal with the same critical 
decision. I believe that present probability sampling techniques do not offer 
special "protection or comfort" in this area for the auditor. In fact, I'm con­
cerned that auditors may be misled by an "aura of acceptability" and be bitterly 
disappointed in the legal arena. Bear in mind that either method of sampling 
entails the same essential risk. For these reasons, I believe that the authors' 
cautionary statements are useful reminders and that a practitioner should weigh 
the likelihood that probability sampling will lead in practice to the same prob­
lems as judgment sampling in justifying his procedures. 
Footnotes 
1. Herbert Arkin, Handbook of Sampling for Auditing and Accounting, McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, Inc., 1963, p. 5. 
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7 
Use of Decision Theory in Auditing— 
A Practitioner's View 
James K. Loebbecke 
Touche Ross & Co. 
In 1974, Bill Felix delivered a paper at this symposium entitled " A Decision 
Theory View of Auditing," for which I was the discussant. At that time Howard 
Stettler asked if we would consider reversing roles in 1976. This paper is the 
result of our agreement to do so, with the caveat that I could speak only from 
the point of view of a practitioner since I am neither an academic nor a 
mathematician. 
In planning this paper, I made a limited review of current academic literature 
on the use of decision theory in auditing and, in addition to Bill Felix' 1974 
paper, found several notable works. These will be referred to below. I also 
formally surveyed a group of my peers to determine 1) their familiarity with 
decision theory and 2) their advice on how it might be used in auditing. Their 
response indicates that a very small proportion of practitioners have considered 
the subject formally. Without going into great detail, 70% stated they have no 
truthful idea of what decision theory is, 15% acknowledged having a general 
idea, and 15% stated they could specifically define decision theory as presented 
in the literature. 
These findings should not be interpreted as evidence that auditors are ignorant 
or that they are making poor audit decisions, but rather that decision theory is a 
relatively new concept which has not yet been widely exposed to them. My 
feeling, as was expressed in 1974, is that if decision theory were presented to 
practicing auditors on a broader basis (e.g., in The Journal of Accountancy), the 
introduction would be successful only if the more technical aspects could be 
presented in the auditor's own terms. Since this introduction, to the best of my 
knowledge, has not yet been made, I consider the purpose of this paper to be input 
to that future undertaking. Accordingly, I have tried to identify a decision frame 
that I believe many auditors are using in a way that relates to formal decision 
theory, and to examine some of its implications. 
Review of Decision Theory in Auditing 
A broad definition of decision theory is an essential starting point. Decision 
theory is a systematized approach to problem solving such that the choices made 
will produce the optimum outcome. Formal decision theory utilizes statistical 
techniques extensively. Thus, relative to auditing, the use of statistical sampling, 
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particularly in the form of hypothesis testing, would be classified as part of 
decision theory. 
As Felix and others1 point out, however, the definition of the optimal deci­
sion should consider not only relative probabilities, but also the costs and benefits 
involved. These considerations are combined with the probabilities so as to lead 
the decision maker to take whichever available action will most likely provide the 
greatest payoff (or least cost). Kinney presents the following general model: 
E(W|a*) = min ΣW(s,a)P(s) 
Where E(W) is the cost expected to arise from action a*, the optimum action 
(i.e., the one producing the lowest cost) from all possible actions a with cost W 
associated with states s given the probability P(s) that each state s exists. 
As illustrated by Felix, this can be related in auditing to two states and 
respective actions (Figure 1): 
FIGURE 1 
Basic Audit Decision 
States 
Actions s1—Material S2—No Material 
Error Exists Error Exists 
a1—Render Unqualified Opinion 20 - 7 
a2—Require Adjustment or Qualify Opinion - 3 1 
In this illustration, the matrix contains the net cost W (positive) or benefit 
— W (negative) associated with each possible a/s combination. If P(s 1) = .1 
and P(s 2) = .9, we have the following: 
E (W|a1) = .1(20) + .9(-7) = -4.3 
E (W|a2) = .1(-3) + .9(1) = +.6 
Thus, a1 is optimum in this case as it produces a negative cost (benefit), and 
the auditor would choose to render an unqualified opinion. 
Felix and Kinney have both examined a logical extension of the model at 
this point—the problem of deciding whether to examine additional audit evi­
dence before the decision is considered final. Kinney further processed hypo­
thetical assumptions through the model to determine its sensitivity to the 
various factors involved. 
Dacey2 has studied a problem that I raised in my 1974 discussion—that of 
the model leading to a premature decision. Dacey recommends that auditors 
consider a model based on conclusion theory, which provides for acceptance of all 
hypotheses which meet certain criteria, not just one "optimal" hypothesis. The 
possibilities are held open until adequate conclusive evidence about a single 
hypothesis is obtained. 
Scott3 has also examined these problems and has attempted, as have Demski 
and Sweringa,4 to relate this internal model to outside models. In the case of 
Scott, to the capital market, and in the case of Demski and Sweringa, to a joint 
problem of the auditor and management. 
For my purposes, however, I shall consider two key aspects in the basic 
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model in Figure I: the cost of making the wrong decision and the probability 
that a material error exists. I shall then consider the implications of these 
aspects on the decisions commonly made by practicing auditors. 
Cost of Making the Wrong Decision 
Figure 1 indicates two possible wrong decisions: the issuance of an unqualified 
opinion when a material error exists (a 1, s 1), which I will henceforth call a Type I 
error5; and requiring an adjustment or qualifying when no material error exists 
(a 2, s2), which I will call a Type II error. 
When a Type I error is made, the results can be disastrous. The auditor can 
be held liable for damages suffered by the client on the basis of a tort action for 
negligence, or the auditor can be held liable to third parties on the basis of gross 
negligence, or be held liable for violation of the securities law in certain in­
stances. Of particuar concern, is the further possibility of criminal charges under 
both federal and state laws. This occurred in circumstances in which most 
auditors would hardly believe that a crime had been committed, in both the 
Continental Vending and National Student Marketing cases. 
To illustrate the possible magnitude of direct loss, suppose the auditor were 
required to pay damages to a third party for gross negligence and incurred legal 
fees for a grand total of $5,000,000. (Amounts of this general magnitude have 
been incurred in several instances.) Also suppose the audit fee for the engage­
ment was $500,000 per year. Based on my experiences with the operations of an 
international C P A firm, I estimate it would take over forty years of net income 
from audit fees to recover this loss. 
The indirect costs of a Type I error are not as easy to measure, but they are 
of great concern. A tremendous amount of energy is sapped from the firm by 
a serious lawsuit. Attention of a number of high level partners is required, and 
the attention of others is diverted. Not only is there a loss of these persons' time, 
there is a loss of the leverage they command as well. There is also the possibility 
that a special peer review would be required which would cost several hundred 
thousand dollars and require considerable time. A negative environment can 
be created. Additionally, the firm's reputation can be damaged to the point 
where potential opportunities and even existing clients can be lost. One serious 
Type I error can overshadow good work done on ten thousand other clients. 
It can ruin careers and even lives. 
Type II errors are individually less costly, but at a relatively uncritical level, 
more likely to be incurred. There is a great deal of pressure in auditing to 
control hours worked. This results from client fee concerns and engagement 
scheduling problems caused by turnover and work peaks. Often, where apparent 
errors are uncovered, the auditor will approach the client to request an adjust­
ment. The client may react by refusing, and additional work will be done to 
resolve the situation. Where the matter is resolved in favor of the client, a 
Type II error has been made and corrected. The client may or may not agree 
to pay the auditor for this additional work. If this strategy is followed extensively, 
the auditor may irritate the client to the point where the auditor is replaced. 
If the client accepts the auditor's request for an adjustment or if a qualified 
opinion is issued when a material error does not exist, the Type II error reaches 
109 
the critical stage of impacting the published financial statements. Although low 
chance of discovery is a factor, it is possible the client could suffer damages, and 
a lawsuit against the auditor could result. 
Another aspect of the Type II error problem is the possibility that an auditor 
may seek additional protection by extending the amount of work performed. 
If the engagement is for a fixed fee, there is a cost to the auditor for any 
unnecessary work that is performed. If per diem rates are charged, the client 
bears the cost, but if the auditor's fees become excessive, the loss of clients becomes 
a possibility, with the attendant cost to the auditor. 
In contrasting the relative magnitudes of the two types of errors, as a prac­
titioner I would certainly want to control both of them, but in the final analysis, 
Type I far overshadows Type II. The lawsuits resulting from Type I errors 
have dominated our environment for several years now; they are a study in and 
of themselves. Although we carry large amounts of insurance to cover losses 
that can occur, such insurance is only a long-term financing mechanism. Any 
large loss will be rebilled to us in future years with interest. 
For these reasons, I believe that when auditors make the decision to issue a 
report, the losses associated with Type I errors are foremost in their minds. 
They first decide: "Is there any real chance the opinion should be qualified?" 
If the answer is affirmative, they will go to great lengths to be satisfied. If the 
answer is negative, it is unlikely that much additional work will be performed 
beyond the minimum level associated primarily with tradition or internal policy. 
This approach is at least partially consistent with the formal decision theory 
model. The differences are: 
1. The decision to extend work is biased toward a one-sided expected cost 
consideration—i.e, the cost of a Type I error. 
2. A third decision point can be reached where the auditor cannot sub­
stantiate the basis for a qualification, yet is afraid to give an unqualified 
opinion because of the circumstances. Here the alternatives may be to 
disclaim an opinion or withdraw from the engagement. 
This second aspect is explored in more detail in the next section. 
Probabilities Associated with Type I Error 
Given that the decision framework just described is legitimate in the current 
auditing environment, a logical audit strategy would be to: 
1. Allocate audit resources as efficiently as possible to minimize the risk 
of giving an erroneous unqualified opinion. 
2. Establish a standard for an acceptable level of such risk beyond which 
an unqualified opinion would not be rendered regardless of the in­
ferences that may exist (i.e., unless a qualification is clear, disclaim an 
opinion or do more work). 
Generally accepted auditing standards aim at these objectives, but they are 
far from specific. With regard to the first, there are definitions about general 
types of audit tests and procedures (i.e., compliance, substantive, analytical, con­
firmations, etc.), but little indication as to mix or preference. 
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With regard to the second objective, the minimums set by generally accepted 
auditing standards should provide at least a qualitative floor for acceptable risk. 
Certainly the discussions about competent evidential matter, independence, due 
care, and statistical sampling, for example, give some idea of what is expected. 
However, these become largely abstractions when a single examination is 
involved; and the abstraction is made more severe by the absence of clear-cut 
guidelines for determining materiality. 
Thus, the auditor is in a position where the audit risk cannot really be 
measured, and the notion of the risk being taken must be compared to a presently 
undefinable standard. Is this bad? No, it is simply the way it is, and as time 
goes on clearer standards should evolve. In the meantime, how can the auditor 
minimize risk? 
As indicated in SAS 1,6 the risk of making a Type I error can be viewed as 
comprising two separate risks: Ia—the risk that a material error is committed 
and exists in the financial statements, and Ib—the risk that the auditor fails to 
discover that fact. A complexity to this formulation is that when the Ia risk is 
great, it may also be that Ib is great due to the circumstances that relate to Ia. 
For example, if the Ia risk is great because of an inadequate record keeping 
system, Ib may be great because the system does not provide audit evidence to 
inspect. It is important to recognize this interaction because it implies that in 
certain circumstances where Ia is great and the interaction exists, it is not possible 
to perform an audit in accordance with professional standards. In such situa­
tions, the auditor should recognize this at the outset and withdraw from the 
engagement, rather than attempt an audit for which the fee may not be collected, 
incur extreme client/user dissatisfaction, and/or be faced with a high risk of 
Type I or Type II errors. 
The specific magnitude of Ia risk cannot, of course, be measured objectively. 
However, conditions which will indicate its general magnitude can be appraised. 
Thus, where Ia is low or moderate, certain strategy alternatives relative to 
controlling Ib can be available; whereas, if Ia is high, disengagement or a special 
set of procedures should be considered. 
Figure 2 presents the factors which affect the propensity for a material error 
to exist, the possibility of interaction with Ib risk, and the steps available to the 
auditor to make an appraisal of the risk and/or to achieve some control over it. 
Thus, we see that there are very strong interactions between the integrity of 
management and the design of internal control, and the auditor's ability to 
gather sufficient competent evidence. If management is dishonest, it may conceal 
evidence or make false representations to the auditor, which cannot be overcome 
with evidence-gathering procedures. The common thread in many of the 
notorious lawsuits against CPAs is the presence of dishonest managements. 
Finally, if the design of the system of internal control is such that economic 
events can occur and yet escape capture by the system, adequate evidence may 
not be available for the auditor to examine. 
A possible interaction exists where the industry is unique and an industry 
expert is not available; perhaps the audit should not be undertaken. In cases 
where the company is having problems with excessive growth or possible in­
solvency, or if client personnel lack competence, errors may be more likely, but 
the auditor's ability to find them may not be affected. On the other hand, where 
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FIGURE 2 
Factors Related to Existence and Detection of Material Error 
Factors Which Interaction Steps Available to Auditor 
Increase Propensity with Risk of (or Audit Firm) to Appraise or 
for Material Error Nondiscovery Control Risk of Material Error 
• Nature of industry Possible • Use of industry experts 
• Control of industry mix 
• Nature (condition) Possible • Financial analysis 
of business • Client profiling techniques 
• Integrity of manage­
ment 
Strong • Client investigation procedures 
(new and repeat) 
• Score card (retrospect) of client 
representations 
• System of internal Strong • Table of transactions and sources 
control—i.e., design of evidence 
• Preliminary evaluation 
• Competence of client Possible • Observation 
personnel • Tests of data 
the condition of the business causes management to compromise its integrity, or 
where incompetent personnel make auditing such a painful and time-consuming 
process that the auditor takes unwarranted expediences, interaction occurs. 
Some of the steps listed opposite each factor are familiar ones. Others may 
be new. Following are comments on the relatively unusual steps: 
Financial Analysis. This is not new in itself, but more advanced models are 
beginning to be used by auditors. Specifically, bankruptcy prediction techniques 
are being used for the purpose cited here. Two techniques used by Touche Ross 
are a discriminant analysis by Altman 7 and a gambler's ruin model developed 
by Wilcox. 8 
Client Profiling Techniques. Some audit firms recognize that certain client 
characteristics are related to greater risks, and a profile is maintained citing these 
characteristics for audit clients. This is kept current and reviewed at least 
annually to consider whether the audit program adequately considers the risks 
involved. 
Score Card of Representations. Throughout an audit, certain representations 
are requested and made by responsible client personnel. For example, the col­
lectibility of specific accounts receivable and the ultimate outcome of construction 
projects in process. A record of these by person is maintained in the permanent 
file, and in subsequent periods the actual results are entered to judge the 
accuracy of the representations. 
Table of Transactions and Sources of Evidence. This technique requires the 
auditor to identify all possible economic events which are likely to occur with 
regard to the entity. These are generally described as types of transactions and 
are constructed into one axis of a two-dimensional matrix. The other axis lists 
all sources of evidence available to the auditor about those events. These are 
generally divided into specific internal control subsystems of the entity and other 
sources, such as outside confirmation, board of directors' minutes and direct 
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physical observation. The body of the matrix indicates the relationships be­
tween the axes and allows the auditor to make preliminary appraisals and plans. 
Specifically, it is possible to see whether there are any transactions which lack 
substantive evidence sources, to determine which systems must be evaluated and 
the extent of potential reliance on internal control, and to plan the proper se­
quence of audit steps. 
Figure 3 presents in a fashion similar to Figure 2 the factors which affect 
the auditor's risk of failing to discover material errors should they exist. 
FIGURE 3 
Factors in Failure to Discover Material Errors 
Factors which Affect the Auditor's 
Risk of Non-Discovery of Errors 
• Scope and terms of engagement 
• Reliability of audit evidence 
a. Nature (effectiveness) 
b. Timing 
c. Extent 
• Performance by auditor 
a. Capabilities 
b. Conditions 
Steps Available to the Auditor 
(or Audit Firm) to Control Risk 
• Engagement letter 
• Audit plan 
• Selection of evidence— 






The factors shown relate to the auditor's achieving the position where there 
is clear agreement about the examination to be performed and the feasibility of 
such performance, and where there is certainty that the audit conclusions are 
sound. This latter aspect relates to the evidence itself and the proper interpretation 
of the evidence. Interpretation is used in the broad sense of not only evaluating 
what is observed, but observing what is available. Interpretation is behavioral. 
Proper interpretation requires knowledge, experience, alertness, and similar per­
sonal strengths in the individual auditors involved. However, the conditions 
under which interpretation is accomplished are also a factor. The physical form 
of the documentation of the evidence gathered influences interpretation; also, any 
time constraint under which the interpretation must be made has an effect. 
It is interesting to speculate how the need to meet tight deadlines for a registration 
statement or an early annual report issuance during the "busy season" affects the 
auditor's judgment in this area. 
Selection and Evaluation of Evidence 
With regard to the steps available to deal with the factors, the most pertinent 
set deal with the selection of evidence. The theory of evidence can be presented 
in various ways; I have chosen here to distinguish between direct and indirect 
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forms of evidence. (I do not intend, however, to present a comprehensive theory 
of evidence.) 
Direct evidence is defined as evidence of the monetary amounts recorded in 
the financial statements, as of the financial statement date. Indirect evidence 
is defined as all other evidence. One might argue that an ideal audit would 
contain all direct evidence, i.e., risk would be minimized. On closer inspection, 
however, this may not be true, because the relative quality of the available indirect 
evidence may be better than that of the available direct evidence, and obtaining 
indirect evidence might enhance improved performance by the auditor. 
First, let's consider the quality of the evidence. The quality of a single type 
of evidence relates to the source of the evidence and effectiveness of the audit 
procedure used to obtain it. For example, with an account receivable confirmation, 
the source of the evidence is an outside party—a high quality source. The 
effectiveness of the audit procedure, however, will vary depending on the reliability 
of address information, the design of the request, the nature of the industry, and 
the characteristics of the customer. On the other hand, a management repre­
sentation may not constitute adequate evidence because of its source, even though 
the auditor's interviewing techniques are effective. 
Where the quality of a single type of evidence is lacking, the auditor must 
generally obtain evidence of other types. If all indicate the same conclusions, their 
aggregate quality will be significantly enhanced. This is a point that should be 
noted because traditionally some auditors have confused evidence quality with 
evidence quantity. As a result of this confusion, they have attempted to com­
pensate for a relatively ineffective audit procedure by taking large samples. It 
should be quite clear that the bias introduced by improper measurement of sample 
values has a severe effect on the sampling distribution regardless of the sample 
size.9 Thus, the auditor may be better off taking relatively small samples of more 
types of evidence whenever the quality of a single type is not clearly superior. 
Many of the types of indirect evidence relate to testing the internal controls 
of the client organizations and balances at interim dates. Both of these ap­
proaches allow a large amount of audit work to be spread throughout the fiscal 
year preceding the financial statement date. This enhances planning and control 
and effective staffing—conditions which can reduce audit risk. Internal control 
testing also has the advantage of providing evidence of a second type relative to 
other direct evidence. 
The danger of these approaches is concerned with the difficulty of relating 
the conclusions to the financial statement balances. Where reliance is placed on 
internal controls, an appraisal must be made relating the effectiveness of the 
various subsystems to potential monetary errors in the accounts. This is a 
complex task and it is questionable whether it can really be done subjectively 
except in vague terms.10 The problem with interim-date tests relates to the risk 
that conditions may change between the interim date and year end. The ap­
praisal of this risk is closely related to the evaluation of internal control. 
Non-Sampling Error 
Non-sampling error—the result of incorrect performance by the auditor— 
causes bias in the same manner as an ineffective audit procedure. Non-sampling 
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error can result from assigning the wrong person to a specific audit task, or from 
subjecting the auditor to conditions where fatigue, boredom, or other personal 
weaknesses might occur. These can be controlled by a variety of approaches as 
shown in Figure 3. 
It would appear that the aspect which most closely relates to the formal deci­
sion theory model is the determination of the extent of procedures—i.e., sample 
size. Both the costs of sampling and probabilities can be specified for a decision 
model in much the same way as with classical sampling. The difficulty would 
occur in attempting to specify the cost of a Type I error (as I have defined it) 
because this relates to the aggregation of all evidence, not just the results of a 
single test. The jump from individual tests to the overall aggregation appears 
to be the greatest challenge to formal model usage. 
Summary 
The concepts of formal decision theory are extremely useful to auditors as a 
means of recognizing which elements of audit effort should receive available 
audit resources. Traditionally, there have been observations that too much time 
is spent on trivial areas or areas which are "the easiest to audit." I have at­
tempted to present the audit framework in such a way that various elements 
can be discussed relative to their effect on the risk of issuing an unqualified 
opinion when material error exists in the financial statements, as I believe this 
risk is of pervasive concern among practicing auditors. 
In controlling this risk, it was indicated that the auditor should appraise the 
client's propensity to commit a material error. Most significantly, two factors— 
integrity of management and design of internal control—have strong interactions 
with the auditor's ability to discover errors. If these factors are negative, dis­
engagement or disclaimer is advised. It is also possible that other factors—nature 
of the industry, condition of the business, and competence of client personnel— 
could have similar interactions in some circumstances. 
Based on the importance of this aspect of risk, one would expect auditing 
firms to establish standards and procedures for the initial and continued ac­
ceptance of clientele, the use of financial analysis on all audits, and the develop­
ment and use of industry experts. One interesting social consequence of all 
auditing firms adopting such policies would be to set minimum standards for 
managements to qualify for audits. 
In examining the various aspects relating to the auditor's discovery of errors, 
it was indicated that the effectiveness of procedures and control of non-sampling 
error were essential prerequisites to further assumptions relating to sample size. 
Although these factors are most often discussed in the context of statistical 
sampling, they apply to judgmental samples as well. 
The key point to be made regarding the risk of non-discovery, however, is 
that the proper combination of all elements is not clear, and would not be 
universal for all audits. The phrase "appropriate in the circumstances" has real 
meaning here. The auditor's skill provides as meaningful and effective a basic 
recipe as can be contrived, and further assistance should be available through 
firm and professional standards, guidelines, and tools. In this regard, auditing 
firms can be expected to deal with such issues as: 
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• What training costs will be incurred. 
• What minimum duties and responsibilities should be defined for partners, 
managers, and staff. 
• When specialists must be consulted. 
• When certain tools, such as questionnaires or statistical sampling, must 
be used. 
• What audit procedures must always be done at year-end. 
• What constitutes minimum reliance on internal controls. 
• What types of workpaper review are necessary. 
• How technical issues are resolved. 
Some of these issues have passed to the professional level. A review of 
pronouncements indicates a predominant concern with control of Type I errors. 
SAS 4, Quality Control Considerations for a Firm of Independent CPAs, for 
example, cites areas where firms should have policies established and gives 
examples. And the current Auditing Standards Executive Committee agenda 
includes additional such items, such as management's illegal acts and the 
auditor's responsibility for detection of fraud. Little that has happened in the 
profession of late has resulted in less auditing. 
A l l of this leads up to the point of the next logical question—"what is the 
relationship of the costs and benefits of auditing?" Are the benefits sufficient to 
justify those costs?11 Can the cost factors be changed, e.g., through legislation of 
legal liability statutes? Until such issues are made more clear, it will be 
difficult to gain agreement on what constitutes reasonable assurance in auditing. 
And until reasonable assurance and materiality are more clearly defined, auditors 
will continue to take their present defensive position of acting to minimize 
the Type I risk. 
One of the issues of the Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities12 is the 
cost-benefit issue. Successful efforts by the commission will facilitate more 
formal use of decision theory in auditing. 
Footnotes 
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—Kinney, W. R., Jr., "A Decision-Theory Approach to the Sampling Problem in 
Auditing," Journal of Accounting Research, Spring 1975. 
2. Dacey, R., "A Conclusion-Theoretic Resolution of the Auditor's Detection Problem," 
Working Paper No. 75:13, University of Oklahoma Center for Economic & Management 
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3. Scott, W., "A Bayesian Approach to Asset Valuation and Audit Size," Journal of Ac-
counting Research, Autumn 1973. 
4. Demski, J. and Sweringa, R., "A Cooperative Formulation of the Audit Choice Problem," 
The Accounting Review, July 1974. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Use of Decision Theory in Auditing— 
A Practitioner's View 
William L. Felix, Jr. 
University of Washington 
Jim Loebbecke is to be complimented on his willingness to provide a prac­
titioner's view of a topic area that is, I am sure, very difficult to deal with. 
Researchers interested in using decision theory as a descriptive model of 
auditing practice need feedback and criticism from practitioners. Otherwise, it is 
very likely that inaccurate models and inferences from these models will result. 
I would particularly like to observe the importance of contributions such as the 
auditor's logic process that Jim provided in his 1974 comment on my paper. 
These views of the basic audit process, including (1) steps for the collection of 
particular kinds of evidence and (2) steps that represent major decision points 
in the audit process, are the kind of basic information and feedback that is 
necessary to construct useful models. 
Significance of Research on Decision Theory 
The significance of the research efforts in decision theory may not be entirely 
clear. The line of argument that is most appealing to me is that a decision theory 
model requires rather precise specification of relationships and decisions that may 
have previously been left rather vague and imprecise. The result of greater 
precision ought to be better understanding of the consistencies and differences 
in the various opinion formulation processes being used in the profession. In 
addition, the resulting well structured and understood models would improve 
the ability of researchers to investigate problems and by implication, for the 
profession to adapt to changes. 
Possible Misconceptions 
On the first page of his paper, Jim indicates that approximately 30% of the 
practitioners he surveyed have some idea as to what decision theory implies with 
regard to auditing. Being realistic, I suspect that this is a fairly optimistic figure. 
There are probably only a handful of practitioners in this country that can 
approach Jim's knowledge of this particular application of statistical inference. 
Yet I think that his paper indicates that he has some misconceptions about the 
nature of decision theory, either as a normative model of the auditor's decision 
processes or as a descriptive model of how auditors behave. Let me illustrate my 
point with a couple of observations from Jim's paper. In the last paragraph on 
page 110 of his paper under "point 1" he states that the decision to extend work is 
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biased towards a one-sided expected cost. That is, that the auditor is so over­
whelmed by the potential impact of Jim's Type I error that other potential deci­
sion factors don't matter. I would agree that this outcome is possible, but it seems 
to me that regardless of whether or not this situation will exist, a decision theory 
model will handle it properly. The auditor's degree of belief or probability for 
this type of error is used to weight the cost of the error so that the result or 
expected value is used in making choices. Regardless of how overwhelming the 
consequences of such an error, if it is of very low probability or very unlikely to 
occur, it may not be significant in the final outcome. Some of Jim's discussion 
indicates that he understands this point yet he is describing it here as a difference 
in the model. 
Risk Assessment 
On page 111, Jim's discussion indicates some concern about the objectiveness 
of the assessment of the risks the auditor uses in decision making. It is my 
belief that the critical assessments of risk made by the auditor are now, and 
always will be subjective. Decision theory, or its use in auditing, does not imply 
an objective measurement of risk. A l l that is required is that in some way the 
auditor elicit subjective assessments of risk and combine them with whatever 
objective sampling evidence is available to reach a composite risk assessment 
that is then used for decision making. This point is raised again on page 115, 
where Jim states that it would appear that ". . . the aspect (of auditing) which 
most closely relates to the formal decision theory model is the determination of 
the extent of procedures—that is, sample size." It may be that most near-term 
applications of a decision theory model would be in audit decisions that relate 
to samples and sample sizes, but the use of the model itself is primarily oriented 
toward the combination of the results of judgment and sampling in order to 
reach audit decisions both in terms of individual tests and as the auditor aggre­
gates evidence from a variety of sources to reach overall decisions on balances 
and the financial statements taken as a whole. 
Audit Process Model 
To illustrate, let me refer to the flow chart in Appendix I. As complex as 
this chart appears, it is only a partial model of the audit process. It presents 
the elicitation, assessment, and evidence composition problem for accounting 
systems, the conversion or transition from accounting system error rates to 
account balance error rates, the assessment of balance error amounts and their 
composition for total error amounts, and the individual account error amount 
aggregation problem, all in one chart. Clearly missing are the beginnings of 
the process where the auditor engages in a general learning process before 
trying to disaggregate this general evidence to priors on the error rate for 
specific procedures, the contribution of this general learning to assessments for 
decision problems throughout the audit process, and most critically, the 
specification of the terminal loss function which will be used for decisions 
throughout the process. The major point that I would like to make from the 
chart is that it indicates that a decision theory model is certainly not oriented pri­
marily toward determination of the extent of audit procedures. It is far broader. 
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On page 110, Jim observes that the two-state decision model in my prior 
paper does not represent all the alternatives. I would certainly agree that the 
model was designed primarily to illustrate the potential rather than to be a 
definitive description. In another paper, a student and I have addressed the 
problem of expressing the auditor's payoff function more realistically. Appendix 
II illustrates a possible specification of the auditor's action space. Note that 
the action space includes a clean opinion, various kinds of non-standard opinions, 
and withdrawal from the engagement. 
Appendix III illustrates the nature of the loss functions that we are exploring. 
These models allow inclusion of both fixed and variable losses. Each functional 
form is made up of, at most, three plateaus, corresponding to immaterial near 
zero error amounts, small error amounts, and extremely large error amounts. 
The change from one plateau to the next starts out slowly, builds up rapidly, 
and then slowly approaches the target plateau. Also, rather than argue for a 
single payoff function, we suggest a decomposition of the assessment problem 
into three components: professional reputation, legal costs, and settlement costs. 
In conclusion, I would like to return to the title of Jim's paper. We are not 
ready for the use of decision theory in auditing, and many of Jim's comments 
are indicative of the reasons why such use is not now being proposed. Continued 
research and teaching of decision theory in auditing are both desirable, how­
ever, because of the potential of this methodology to make us better heuristic 
decision makers, and the promise of the research to achieve those benefits in 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX I I 
Specification of Auditor's Action Space 
Clean opinion 
Non-Standard (Extended below) 
Withdrawal 







dispute on GAAP 
An inconsistency in 
principle or entity 
Level of Materiality 
Moderate 
"Except for" opinion 
qualification 
"Subject to" opinion 
qualification 
"Except for" opinion 
qualification 







APPENDIX II I 
Three Plateau Loss Functions 
L ( x ) = The present value of a f t e r tax losses corresponding to e r r o r 
amount x. 
X = The aggregate error amount. 
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Capital Investment and U.S. 
Accounting and Tax Policies 
Richard D. Fitzgerald 
Price Waterhouse & Co. 
Capital formation is the lifeblood of our industrial and economic complex. Yet 
we hear increasing warnings of the problems ahead from undercapitalization of 
American business and the resulting constraints on production and employment. 
Historical Background 
For years, American business has been largely self-financing. Fifteen years 
ago, close to 90 per cent of corporate capital expenditure was supplied from 
internal cash flow—retained earnings and depreciation. This proportion has 
dropped significantly, although recently improved corporate earnings should 
help for the short term. We are all aware of the collapse in equity market 
financings in recent years. From a high point in 1972 of nearly $15 billion in 
equity offerings, there has been a dramatic decline in the last two years. The 
difficulty of raising equity capital on a reasonable basis has been accompanied 
by record levels of corporate indebtedness—an amount outstanding nearly as 
large as one year's G N P . Debt to equity ratios have risen sharply in the last 
decade. Of particular concern has been the marked increase in short-term 
indebtedness which requires continual refinancing. 
One U.S. businessman has summarized his view of the basic capital problem: 
The shortage of equity capital has been especially worrisome. This 
has forced us to rely on short-term and long-term debt to finance innova­
tion, modernization and expansion. Consequently, interest cost has be­
come a significant added expense, depressing profits. Lower profits make 
it more difficult to generate retained earnings. Lower earnings and a 
high debt to equity ratio further depress the value of the company's shares, 
making equity financing even more difficult. 
While a number of studies have been made of the potential capital shortage, 
there are, as you might expect, as many different answers as there are studies. 
The New York Stock Exchange, in its often-quoted study of capital needs, has 
estimated a frightening shortage of savings compared to capital needs—$650 
billion over the next ten years. Their study was based on projections of desired 
levels of investment and available savings under basic assumptions of 3.5 percent 
real growth and 5 percent inflation annually. Several other studies, such as 
Chase and Business Roundtable, also reflect shortages. The Brookings study, 
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based on lower levels of inflation and unemployment and larger government 
surpluses, shows about a breakeven over the period to 1980. It may be that these 
studies and the many comments provided in hearings have not yet fully con­
vinced Congress, but the outpouring has certainly made a sizable impact on its 
members judging by the variety of proposals being seriously considered by 
Congressional task forces. 
Quantifying the Problem 
Whether or not it is possible to conclude on some quantification of capital 
needs for the next decade, there seems to be growing recognition that the social 
objectives pursued by government have created bias in the direction of consump­
tion rather than savings and that it is time to assess and moderate the discentives 
affecting capital investment. We know that one and one-half million new 
workers will be moving into the job market over the next ten years at a minimum 
investment cost of $35,000 each. This will account for at least $50 billion a year 
of new investment. There also will be the replacement, modernization and 
environmental demands of the future—all to be considered in light of continuing 
inflation. If there is no staggering shortage of the magnitude shown by the 
N Y S E study, it does seem reasonable to conclude there will be no surplus either. 
Senators Javits and Humphrey, not particularly noted for their conservative 
banners, in jointly sponsoring certain legislation for employee stock ownership 
plans, have commented within the last month on their concerns with capital 
formation: 
(I)t is no secret that the United States is experiencing a substantial 
problem with respect to a shortage of capital investment. The U.S. 
Treasury estimates that from 1960 to 1973, investment as a percentage of 
real national output was 13.6 percent in the U.S. as compared to 29 
percent in Japan, 20 percent for West Germany and 18.2 percent for 
France. What is needed to alleviate the capital shortage of the 1970's and 
1980's are new approaches to equity investment. (Javits) 
In recent years new stock issues have only contributed 2 to 5 percent 
to corporate financing needs. Last year, for example, just 568 companies 
used new stock issues to help raise capital. I believe that is an unhealthy 
situation for the U.S. economy and one that must begin to have some 
remedies applied if we are to meet the large capital needs of the coming 
decade. (Humphrey) 
Cause and Effect 
The effects from inability to raise the desired capital are not difficult to 
foresee. In a capital intensive country, the initial consequence will be evidenced 
by continuing unacceptable levels of unemployment. The reduction of invest­
ment must necessarily mean curtailment of plant expansion, modernization and 
research and development. There is no way that technological improvement can 
be sustained and new job opportunities created without the required investment 
input. There is no way productivity can be enhanced if industry cannot buy the 
equipment necessary to do the job. Moreover, the scramble by industry in capital 
scarce times produces the high interest rates that help close the cycle for stifling 
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earnings and impeding economic growth—as we have been so painfully aware 
in the last two years. 
World Interdependence 
In assessing U.S. needs and objectives, clearly economic interdependence 
around the world is a reality. While the severity of cyclical swings may vary 
from country to country, there is direct linking of investment resources and 
demand. Inflation, currency exchange rates, and interest rates all involve world­
wide consideration. Not too long ago in the U.S., we were pre-eminent with our 
abundant raw materials, cheap energy, super technology, high volume, and 
profitability. It doesn't take much reflection to recognize that those days may be 
gone forever. We are now faced with either scarcity in some resources or control 
over their supply held by other nations. The technology achievements and 
productive capability of some countries provide the keenest, if not superior, 
competition to our own industry. In fact, the emerging economic and political 
order in the world demands a larger sharing in production and revenues by 
less industrialized nations. 
In preserving and building its capital base, business must continue to sharpen 
its own management technique to optimize return from new expenditure, to 
conserve its liquid resources and to take full advantage of tax and other oppor­
tunities to retain capital. For many companies, the LIFO inventory method has 
helped alleviate capital erosion. Despite the pain of reducing reported earnings, 
hundreds of companies made this move in the last few years to preserve capital 
that would otherwise have been paid out in income taxes. Although it seems 
business managers are carrying the struggle as well as possible, the resolution of 
capital shortage problems ultimately has to rest with motivation and government 
policy. 
Taxation Policies 
Of prime importance in stimulating capital investment is the taxation system. 
Our federal tax system is built substantially on the income tax—a tax inherently 
unfavorable to investment. In fiscal 1975 about 60 percent of federal revenue 
came from personal and corporate income taxes. As government has grown and 
tax rates increased, what the reformers choose to call "loopholes" are whittled 
here and there into the structure to permit some money to flow into investment. 
This kind of tax system means permanent conflict between government's revenue 
appetite and the nation's capital needs. 
In effect, the U.S. has maintained a tilt in tax policies toward consumption 
and away from savings and capital formation. Our tax experts point out a 
number of shortcomings when the U.S. tax system is compared with other 
industrialized countries. 
Capital cost recovery on fixed investment. The adoption of the A D R class 
life system in 1971, together with the restored investment credit, did improve 
capital cost recovery in the U.S. It is estimated that with regard to fixed invest­
ment since then, using double-declining balance, about 60 percent of the original 
cost can be allowed for tax depreciation in the first three years. Nevertheless, 
compared to other countries, the U.S. is still nearly at the foot of the class. For 
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example, the U . K . allows 100 percent recovery in one year; Canada in two years; 
Sweden in three years. 
Inflation adjustments. The U.S. has no provision in tax law for inflation 
recognition unless you count LIFO as basically a tax measure. Some countries 
allow special valuations, reserves and adjustments for inventories and other 
assets. The Task Force on Business Taxation estimated underdepreciation of 
$10 billion in industry overall for 1970 alone in considering inflationary effects 
up to that time. This condition has undoubtedly worsened with the high 
inflation level in subsequent years. Replacement cost depreciation for fixed 
assets is certainly a lively subject these days for financial reporting, but there is 
little reaction from the government for its acceptability for taxation purposes. 
The New York Stock Exchange study indicates that, after adjusting for in­
ventory profits and underdepreciation based on historical costs, effective corporate 
tax rates on pre-tax profits for 1973 and 1974 were about 66 percent as contrasted 
with the statutory rate of 48 percent. In fact, the Exchange estimates on this 
inflation adjusted basis that in 1974 business actually paid a portion of its 
dividends out of capital. 
Capital gains. No other major industrial country imposes a maximum long-
term capital gain tax as high as the U.S. Only Canada and the U . K . have 
capital gains tax levels comparable to ours. Yet the reformers press for taxing 
capital gains as ordinary income despite the fact that the system is still another 
form of double tax on earnings, that the gain is often due to inflation and that 
unequal treatment would apply to losses. It is probable Congress will extend the 
required holding period to one year from the present six months' term. On the 
other hand, the Administration has proposed a sliding scale of exclusion after 
the one-year holding period—50 percent of the gain up to five years, increasing 
to 70 percent after twenty-five years. 
Foreign subsidiary earnings. U.S. tax law has been constantly whittling 
away at the economic neutrality concept. Other countries for the most part 
exempt foreign based income or allow tax credits. No other country penalizes 
foreign earnings, as has been proposed in recent months, through the taxing 
of unremitted foreign earnings. Sound taxation concepts should preclude double 
taxation, allow foreign tax credits at the higher of U.S. or foreign tax rates, and 
provide for deferral of tax payments until such time as income is received 
through distribution. To impose taxes earlier would impose a penalty and a 
bias against foreign investment. 
Incentives for investment and savings. The U.S. has no real incentives for 
direct investment, while other countries exempt certain types of income and 
grant special write-offs and allowances. A few years ago, the Administration 
called for new tax proposals to stimulate research and development of new 
industries and technologies. Such development can be best encouraged by 
additional tax credits for at least part of the cost. The rapid amortization pro­
gram enacted for anti-pollution equipment has been made unnecessarily complex 
and limiting and in part contradicts the flexibility of the A D R capital cost 
recovery procedure. If our national policy is to ensure the highest quality and 
safety for our environment, why not make the expenditures required of business 
simply tax deductible as incurred? 
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Double Taxation of Corporate Income 
As you know, we have a double taxation approach to corporate earnings 
while all other major countries have some form of relief from such impact. In 
the jargon of our tax experts, the U.S. system is known as the classical or 
separate method; i.e., tax is imposed at the corporate level without regard to 
dividend distributions. These distributions are then separately taxed to the 
recipient. The classical system, however, conflicts with stimulating equity 
investment and tends to give foreign competitors an advantage especially where 
consumption-type taxes ( V A T ) are a major source of tax revenue. Moreover, 
our system tends to discourage dividend distributions. For this reason, penalty 
taxes have had to be devised to deal with "unreasonable accumulation" of corpo­
rate earnings. 
None of our major industrial competitors—Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom or France—use the classical system. These nations, along with Canada 
and a number of other industrial countries, utilize either a split-rate or an 
imputation system. Both methods tax business profits at lower overall rates 
than the classical system and thus make corporate stocks a more attractive 
investment. 
Split-rate system. This system taxes retained profits at a higher rate than 
those which are distributed. In theory, the tax rate on distributed profits could 
be as low as zero. In practice, however, it is somewhat larger. The maximum 
rate in Japan, for example, is 40 percent for undistributed profits and 28 percent 
for distributed profits or an effective 34 percent rate assuming dividend distribu­
tion of one half of earnings. Advantages of split rate are the reduced taxation 
at the corporate level, its flexibility for modifying tax policy, and incentives for 
distribution of earnings. 
Imputation system. Under this system, the shareholder receives a direct 
credit against personal tax liability for the taxes paid at the corporate level. 
Generally, the credit is the portion of the corporate taxes applicable to the 
distributed earnings, typically less than 100 percent of the corporate tax. The 
U.K. , for instance, has enacted a basic corporate tax rate with a credit to 
the shareholder equal to about one half of dividend distributions. This means 
the shareholders, as a group, would get a credit of about 50 percent of the tax 
paid by the corporation if all after-tax profits were distributed. As in most 
imputation systems, the "dividend income" of the shareholder includes the tax 
credit allowed, in addition to the cash received. For example, if a cash dividend 
of $100 is received and a tax credit of $50 is allowed, the shareholder will 
gross-up the two amounts and report dividend income of $150. 
Dividend deduction method. Another and differing system, the dividend 
deduction method, is considered by many as the best suited to the U.S. Under 
this method, dividends paid, or a percentage thereof, are deductible in computing 
the paying corporation's taxable income. Although closely related to the end 
result of the split-rate method (the overall effective tax rate is reduced by 
dividend distributions), the concept and technical aspects differ considerably. 
Even though it is not used by any of the major countries, it is the avenue 
through which many believe relief from double taxation may most likely be 
achieved in the U.S. 
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Assuming the same basic tax rate—50 percent, for example—all four of the 
systems impose the same tax burden on the funds retained. The split-rate, 
imputation, and dividend-deduction systems, however, pass to the shareholder a 
bigger after-tax share of dividends than the U.S. classical system. 
Dividend Taxation Proposed for U.S. 
The Administration has recommended to the House Ways and Means 
Committee a combination system of dividend deduction and stockholder credits. 
As proposed, the plan would be phased in over several years to lessen the 
impact of tax revenue reduction. In the ultimate application of the plan, a 
corporation would pay the normal tax on earnings less a deduction equal to 
50 percent of dividends paid to stockholders. The stockholders would gross up 
their cash dividend received, by the amount of such 50 percent corporate deduc­
tion, and take a direct tax credit equal to such amount. The net effect would 
be an elimination of double tax. 
The Administration's proposal arrives at the right solution. However, some 
experts believe the procedures involved in the combination of dividend deduc­
tion and tax credit would be extremely complex for the millions of shareholders 
involved. Their recommendation is for initiating only the dividend deduction 
system at the corporate level. 
Regardless of the form of business organization, individuals' taxes would be 
levied on income received. The choice of corporate financing, whether debt or 
equity, would also be neutralized, thus removing the present bias from a tax 
viewpoint toward debt financing. Most important politically is the neutrality 
achieved among individual taxpayers. Dividends received would be fully taxable 
to recipients at their respective rates. This is not to say that the deduction system 
has no disadvantages. It does tend to penalize the developing corporation which 
needs to retain funds for expansion and would likely encourage a higher level of 
dividend payment for other corporations. However, it can be argued that such 
a system would increase the total supply of savings or capital for reinvestment 
by the individual. For those interested in reviewing the differing systems of 
eliminating double taxation on dividends, the AICPA's Statement No. 3 of 
Tax Policy contains a comprehensive discussion of the subject. 
Tax Policy and Flow of Capital Funds 
There are hopeful signs that both Congress and the Administration recog­
nize the need for rethinking tax policies on a long-term basis if we are to 
increase sharply the flow of capital funds. The major areas to be considered, in 
addition to the basic tax rate and deductibility structure, should be capital 
recovery allowances, bearing in mind the escalating costs of replacement; elim­
ination of double taxation on dividends; direct investment and savings incentives 
(such as initiated in a limited way with Employee Stock Ownership Plans) 
and modification of capital gains tax. Whatever the political realities at the 
moment, this country's taxation policies need to be redirected if we want to 
improve the availability and flow of capital investment. 
Accounting and Disclosure Policies 
Now to turn to comments on the impact of accounting policies on invest-
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ment. Accounting wields an important influence in our country because of its 
significance, among other things, in determining corporate profits and taxation 
revenues—key factors in the economic climate. It seems clear that a funda­
mental goal both of the private sector and government is to achieve reasonable 
economic and social stability and smooth out, or at least minimize, those 
disruptive cyclical swings characteristic of our economy. This goal should be 
considered in the formulation of accounting objectives and policies and effort 
made to avoid unnecessary or unrealistic distortions in periodic income measure­
ment. The credibility and utility of accounting policy will be largely tested not 
by reference to its theoretical niceties but by how well it reflects the substance of 
business planning and operation. 
Anyone who doubts the influential role of accounting in our country need 
only be reminded of the imminent Congressional hearings by Senator Metcalf's 
subcommittee. These hearings are intended to probe into the activities and 
structure of the accounting profession as a whole, the Big Eight firms, the 
AICPA, the FASB, and several relevant government agencies. At stake may be 
whether accounting principles will continue to be set in the private sector. 
The financial reporting system in the U.S. is generally regarded today as 
without equal in the world. The wealth and depth of financial information 
available for a publicly held company in the U.S. is simply tremendous. Much 
of this vast disclosure lode (some spell it one way, others differently) followed 
the Securities Acts legislation of the early thirties. Before that the profession 
and notably the New York Stock Exchange struggled hard to improve re­
porting, and there were improvements in those days—initiation of published 
quarterly earnings, increased incidence of annual audits, expanded disclosure of 
accounting policies and valuation bases. The Bulletin "Uniform Accounting" 
prepared by members of the accounting profession and banking industry and 
published by the Federal Reserve in 1917 was one milestone in those earlier days. 
The report, "Audits of Corporate Accounts," by the Committee on Cooperation 
with Stock Exchanges was another early effort by the private sector which 
contributed to strengthening the reporting and the auditing processes. 
Nevertheless, the tidal waves resulting from the stock market crash and the 
great depression so completely overran confidence and credibility in financial 
reporting that there was little effective resistance to the new securities legislation 
and the new reach of government regulation. In fact, in many ways, this period 
was the foundation of the super-regulatory era we have today. 
It would be easy and popular to put down the regulatory process in financial 
reporting. Some knowledgeable people have devoted a great deal of study and 
writing to advancing the hypothesis that the flood of disclosure dictated by the 
Securities Acts and by the SEC, for example, may not really have enhanced 
reliability or aided performance by investors. These views challenge the 
effectiveness of the regulator and assert the need for more careful analysis to 
underpin new proposals and to check on the efficacy of existing regulations. 
I must say I cannot accept conclusions that indicate little or no benefit from 
the regulatory process. I include in this process both government and the 
private sector. I believe that while there have been setbacks and abuses, for the 
most part developments in financial reporting have been supportive of investor 
confidence and new capital formation. Beyond the continual refinement and 
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expansion of legal and accounting disclosure following adoption of the Securities 
Acts, the regulatory aspects have generally created a heightened awareness and 
incentive on the part of the security issuer and the seller for a diligent and careful 
presentation of financial information. 
We only need turn to the municipal securities market at the present time to 
note the clamor for prospectuses and disclosure along the lines we have become 
routinely accustomed to in corporate offerings. Recognizing that someone may 
be able to demonstrate twenty years from now that the investor was no better 
off with additional disclosure of a municipality's finances probably does not 
sound very convincing at the moment to those holding New York City bonds 
or notes. 
Whether or not we believe this burgeoning disclosure process has helped the 
investor and capital formation, there are limits, nevertheless, beyond which 
additional disclosure requirements can be viewed as unreasonable and unneces­
sary. Those critics of the disclosure process are on target with this point. Exten­
sion of disclosure requires sound and tested justification rather than novel theories 
of the regulator. Much of today's problem with expanding disclosure stems 
from the duplicative effort and expense to present information calculated under 
alternative accounting bases—the "as if" type of accounting. Apart from the 
confusion of differing sets of data, it is frequently not feasible to place such 
alternative information on a fair and complete basis because earlier underlying 
business decisions might well have been different if the new assumptions or 
accounting requirements had been applied contemporaneously. It is a cardinal 
rule of pro forma presentations, caveats notwithstanding, that pro formas can 
be misleading if all conditions and assumptions are not taken into account. 
Problems of European Companies 
Based on recent discussions with officials of several large European com­
panies, it seems some of them have lost interest in stock listing or public security 
issues in the U.S. Most commonly cited as impediments are the generally uni­
lateral and inflexible positions of the relevant agency and the effort and expense 
to contend with elements of U.S. generally accepted accounting principles in 
addition to local principles for reporting. The new requirements, for example, 
relating to foreign currency translation, replacement cost accounting data and 
auditor review of interim statements are viewed as imposing unnecessarily costly 
conditions. It is somewhat ironic that at the time these companies were pointing 
out their disenchantment, the New York Stock Exchange had just released its 
more liberal requirements to encourage foreign issuers to list on the Exchange. 
Multinational Company Problems 
Certainly the multinationals, wherever located, are not ranking very high at 
the moment in the "favorite person" poll. Many government organizations, 
domestic and international, are crawling over each other to devise and mandate 
sanctions, codes, and disclosure requirements to suit the purposes of each special 
interest. The O E C D (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop­
ment) comprising the U.S. and 23 other industrialized nations, is probably in 
the vanguard. Its proposed guidelines are expected to be voted upon by the 
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member countries next month. The kind of published financial data they want 
may not seem earthshaking to us in view of existing U.S. practice, but I can 
tell you their relatively modest disclosure proposals have created considerable 
controversy and debate over the past year among the O E C D members and their 
advisory groups. 
It is also obvious that demands in other quarters are increasing for informa­
tion on multinational companies. Some demands are for much more detailed 
data than proposed by the O E C D . Within the past: few weeks, for example, 
legislation has been introduced in Congress that calls for the reporting by U.S. 
companies to the federal government of operating results and other data. A l ­
though the requirements are similar to the type of information contemplated by 
the O E C D , unfortunately the legislation would require such data to be pro­
vided separately "by each foreign affiliate, by country and by activity." In 
addition to the substantial cost burden, the questionable utility of such details, 
and the concern over risks of exposing sensitive information to competitors, 
there are other difficulties inherent in the mass of information proposed for 
disclosure under this kind of legislation. To start with, it may not be possible 
for the multinational to obtain the necessary detailed data on some foreign 
"affiliates" since they are defined on the basis of 10 percent or more ownership. 
(U.S. accounting requirements for recognition of affiliated company earnings 
in the financial statements of the enterprise start generally at the 20 percent 
ownership level.) 
A pervasive problem also relates to the many differences in accounting and 
taxation principles from country to country. In many foreign countries, financial 
reporting closely follows taxation rules. It frequently is not useful to compare 
statutory financial filings of a company in one country with filings of another 
company in a different country. No valid comparison can be made due to 
variations, for example, in allowable depreciation methods, inventory valuation 
and other valuation reserves, and write-offs. Additional confusion, suspicion and 
criticism may result from attempting to compare results of local operations as 
measured by the enterprise's accounting policies with the results measured on a 
statutory basis. Nor would separate financial statements of the many subsidiaries 
and affiliates prepared on the enterprise's accounting basis necessarily provide 
clearcut resolution of the problem. There are usually significant consolidation 
adjustments that would require arbitrary allocation as well as the most funda­
mental question of all—do financial statements in local currency amounts, or 
after translation for the parent company's consolidation, provide the more useful 
presentation? 
In any event, I believe that those parties clamoring for special multinational 
reporting should be adequately served by the substantial amount of information 
presented in annual reports to shareholders and to the SEC. These reports 
would include some reasonable geographical grouping of operating results and 
other key data such as proposed in the FASB draft on segment reporting and 
in the O E C D guidelines. There should also be more widespread publication in 
local language of a company's annual report within those countries where sig­
nificant operations or interests are involved. I believe the extensive financial 
information on a U.S. company presently available is not generally appreciated 
in the U.S., let alone in other countries. 
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The European Economic Community has recognized the problem of diverse 
accounting among its member states. Its current proposals are intended to aid 
the standardizing of financial statement content and disclosure for reports by 
companies operating in the E E C . The U . N . is also active. It has established a 
Research and Information Center to collect, analyze and present information 
concerning businesses operating internationally. The developments in this pro­
gram should be followed closely. 
Inequities in the Regulatory Process 
The O E C D and E E C proposals have been based on an elaborate process of 
exposure and study, including acceptance of the views of outsider advisors. I 
think the FASB also can take credit for its study and deliberation process 
followed—even if we don't always like the answers produced. Most times in 
this country, however, the federal regulatory process is quite narrowly based 
and dictatorial. In fact, some wide-reaching requirements may often result from 
advocacy by a single member of a regulatory body, or even by a single person 
on the staff. It is true that administrative proceedings require a public exposure 
and comment period, but if one were to view the SEC in recent times, for 
example, it is questionable how effective this exposure period has been for 
private sector interests. Within the last few weeks, for instance, the Commission 
has announced its new requirements for disclosure of replacement cost data as 
supplemental information to financial statements. Companies will soon need to 
incur substantial costs to develop the information on a new and completely 
different accounting basis in addition to that regularly applied. 
Much can be said in highly inflationary periods to support an accounting 
model that reveals the impact on operations and investment from inflation as 
contrasted with displaying solely the effects of historical amounts. There is no 
question the accounting profession here and elsewhere in the world is in tune 
with this general objective. Its methodology and implementation requires resolu­
tion. In my view, however, the SEC's recent action is precipitous and unjustified. 
Many comments received in the exposure process urged the need for a coordi­
nated program of study and experimentation for such radically new concepts 
in order to preserve some degree of comparability among companies. Sub­
stantive comments were furnished to the SEC by many demonstrating the in­
completeness of its requirements to reflect properly inflation effects on the 
enterprise. (By way of contrast, the FASB in its inflation accounting study has 
been able to enlist a large number of major companies for testing out the 
proposed concepts.) 
Concerns and criticisms have also been voiced in the United Kingdom over 
the Sandilands committee recommendation for adoption of current cost ac­
counting. At least two years will be available there for study and experimentation 
before any requirement might be imposed. Because of the SEC's crash pro­
gram, I think we may have missed a great opportunity to join all the issues on 
an international accounting basis. It would seem the U . K . situation and the 
emerging Netherlands disclosure could have offered real possibilities for broad-
scale resolution. Instead we are faced with the probability of new conflicts and 
differences among national groups and accounting requirements, not to mention 
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the additional burden placed on those companies which must comply with the 
differing requirements of more than one jurisdiction. 
A great deal more could be said of the regulatory impositions on reporting 
companies. The principal point, however, is that the agency or the government 
must find a better way of assessing need for and the benefits to the public of 
their proposed programs. Applying intuition and motivation of a few regula­
tory officials has resulted in piling disclosure upon disclosure. As Professor 
Stegler says in his "The Citizen and The State": "Each year the appropriations 
of each regulatory body grow about 8% on average: 1% for population, 5% for 
prices and 2% for growing evil. The momentum of events is awesome." You 
also may have noted the finding of two Stanford University professors in a 
recent study. They say we have now reached the milestone of having over 
one-half of the U.S. work force engaged in some form of information gathering 
and processing. 
It may be that those agencies primarily concerned with the financial re­
porting process should maintain advisory committees, with representatives drawn 
from the private sector, in order to help achieve a balanced and objective view­
point in the development of new proposals as well as subsequent periodic review 
of existing regulations. There needs to be greater involvement of those parties 
being affected by the regulatory requirements. Agencies tend to follow the 
concept of "let the private sector prove our proposal is wrong" rather than 
the agency's shouldering the burden of proof that a proposal is really needed 
and can be cost/benefit justified. Then, of course, under the agency's approach 
of "prove us wrong," it is less than fair that the agency acts alone as judge and 
jury in reviewing the evidence submitted by the private sector. 
Moreover, after a regulation is issued, new interpretations by the agency 
creep in resulting in further unjustified requirements. The comprehensive study 
of the entire corporate disclosure system recently announced by the SEC may 
be an encouraging sign. While its objectives may be more broadly based, I 
hope the study might also stimulate a challenging look at Regulation S-X 
and other rules which have not had a good sifting out of trivia in years—for 
example, the endless details of stock option information and the SEC's anti­
quated policy for separate parent statements in addition to the consolidated 
statements. Let there be a truly objective assessment of how much disclosure 
is needed by the "average prudent investor," short of drowning in confusion 
from overly technical material and alternative presentations of financial details. 
Role of the Private Sector 
It is equally essential that the private sector continue to take an ever-diligent 
role in constructively evaluating and articulating its views as to the usefulness 
and practicality of new proposals. This contribution cannot be effectively made 
by mere protest. The role of business and other groups in the development of 
financial reporting must recognize the differing views and needs of the various 
parties at interest. Response to proposals needs to be supported by hard evi­
dence which in many cases can only be achieved by actual experimentation and 
display of the reasonableness or the impracticability of the proposal. 
It often will be advisable to communicate these views to members of gov­
ernment apart from a particular agency that may be involved, and also to the 
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financial and business community at large. It will take a highly organized and 
skilled approach to maintain the financial reporting process on a basis pro­
viding reasonable benefits to all segments of the community. 
Conclusion 
Evidence and commentary point to serious concerns with the availability of 
capital for desired investment goals in the next decade. A leading investment 
banker, for example, has estimated that to arrest deterioration in the quality of 
corporate credit, for some years there will have to be a net increase in equity 
financing of more than $20 billion annually. This compares with half or less 
than that amount achieved in the past two years. 
The significance of accounting policy and disclosure should not be under­
estimated. The current interest in multinational operations underscores the lack 
of understanding concerning the differences and limitations in accounting prin­
ciples and financial reporting. Indeed, more apparent than ever is the need for 
international standards of accounting and a better balanced program for gov­
ernment's regulatory process. 
Finally, the reassessment of U.S. tax policies is critical to an effective pro­
gram for stimulating capital formation and equity financing. As Secretary 
Simon stated in his presentation to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress: 
First and foremost we must have a much greater understanding on the 
part of the public on the basic concepts of capital. Capital is the corner­
stone of increased productivity, of higher real wages, of greater job 
opportunities, of a strong competitive position internationally, and of 
holding down the rate of inflation. 
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